The Domestic Sources of European Foreign Policy: Defence and Enlargement looks at the challenge of developing a foreign policy for a Union of 27 states. It analyses the relevance of domestic political processes for the EU's common policies and examines the democratic deficit in EU foreign policy. It thereby highlights what is unique about this policy and reflects about its possible future evolution. The study is novel in that it examines the influence of domestic politics across the whole of the EU. As the EU continues to face difficulties in formulating common policies (this goes beyond foreign policy; the crisis surrounding the single currency is a recent and notable example), this book offers a unique insight into the complexities of enhancing the EU's common policies by assessing domestic political debates and the role of actors who legitimize or constrain support for common policies.

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DEFENCE AND ENLARGEMENT

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To my family, on both sides of the Atlantic

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Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald
Lucerne, Switzerland, July 2012

Abstract

For any head of state, foreign policy poses a major challenge as it involves a complex, two-level game famously depicted by Robert Putnam (1988). The more so for a Union of twenty-seven states aiming at coherent policies while having to consider the weight of internal political processes in each member. And yet, what might seem at first an insurmountable challenge has produced several successful, if complex, foreign policies. How can we explain this? This book looks at two of the most important and fruitful foreign policy areas advanced by the European Union: enlargement and security and defence policies (ESDP/CSDP). It aims to explain how domestic political processes allow or limit cooperation between twenty-seven Member States in two policy areas and perhaps in others as well. This is particularly important as the EU enters a new, deeper phase of foreign policy cooperation under the Lisbon Treaty, and as global economic woes have laid bare the difficulties of developing common policies amongst Member States. Understanding the sources that facilitate cooperation and burden-sharing amongst Member States and improved collaboration with partners such as NATO seems particularly pertinent in a rapidly changing and interdependent environment, as sudden events such as the 'Arab Spring' and the rise of new powers demonstrate. It is also essential for the continuation of successful policies such as enlargement. For these reasons, this book opens the black box of domestic preference formation. In doing so, it follows and expands Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism while relying on both quantitative and qualitative methods to uncover state-society relations.

Preface

On 23 September 2008, the former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer gave a speech at the Graduate Institute in Geneva on the role of the EU in global affairs. After arguing that it was necessary for Europe to play a more assertive role, given the rise of new powers – and assuring his audience that the political will to do so had been growing slowly but surely – Fisher argued that Europe faced three main challenges if it was to remain a major actor in the world. The first was the further development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP – called these days the Common Security and Defence Policy [CSDP]); the second was enlargement towards Turkey; and the third was energy policy. This conception supports the view followed in this book, namely, that both enlargement and defence are essential foreign policies for the future of the EU's role in the world. However, both of these policies depend on Member States (MS) being able to cooperate. It seems relevant then to ask, what allows or limits the ability of Member States' governments to contribute to these strategic objectives?

Considering that the scope of European foreign and security policy (EFP) has widened and deepened in an unprecedented manner during the past two decades, this question might seem redundant. Indeed, this evolution has been so remarkable that foreign policy has become one of the most dynamic areas of European integration. Furthermore, some might argue that the public has little interest in these affairs and as such little influence in the evolution of EFP. On the other hand, in light of the significant debate that has emerged over enlargement – and particularly on the question of Turkish enlargement – it seems hard to maintain the assertion of the indifference of domestic actors towards EFP. Moreover, as this book will show, policymakers are not immune to these demands and have reacted to shifts in public preferences. Beyond public preferences, there are other relevant domestic factors, such as budgetary concerns or electoral cycles that have constrained policymakers' room for manoeuvre in the areas of security and defence or enlargement. These constraints have translated into policy, either in the form of red lines that are not to be crossed, or in the form of cooperation – or lack of it – in collective undertakings, such as training, funding, and deployment of personnel that are involved in some of the most important foreign policy activities of the European Union.

This book looks into the motivations of policymakers to further or to block cooperation in developing European foreign policy. Politicians after all want to be re-elected and as a result foreign policy cannot be dissociated from domestic political processes, be it the influence of economic groups or that of public opin-

ion or mass media. At the same time, as Fisher claimed, European foreign policy is applied in an environment which is rapidly changing and which calls for coherent and concerted policies. Compared with the giants that are poised to dominate the twenty-first century, such as China, Brazil, and India, or the one that already does, the United States, the Member States of the European Union are small players. Nonetheless, the EU is, amongst other things, the biggest market in the world and the biggest foreign aid contributor. We observe then two sometimes contradictory trends: a global trend which pushes Member States towards cooperation; and on the other hand, a domestic trend which often resists bearing the costs of a common foreign policy. Most foreign policy studies, and especially those on European foreign policy, have devoted overwhelming attention to the first dynamic. This book concentrates on the second, which is at least as important. In the end, the role the European Union will play in this century will depend on the interaction of both foreign and domestic dynamics. This interaction will determine whether the EU continues to be a major actor in world politics or whether it will be a bystander beset by its internal divisions. Hence the importance of understanding the domestic dimension of European foreign policy that this book addresses.

1 • Introduction

A common (mis)perception about European foreign and security policy (EFP) is that it largely does not exist, and when it does exist that it usually underperforms. This perception stems to a large extent from a misunderstanding of the aims and tools of EFP (and perhaps a general lack of information about what EFP entails). However, it also reflects a puzzle, namely, how twenty-seven states with different and widely divergent interests, originating from twenty-seven different electorates and political processes, are to develop a coherent common foreign policy. Some scepticism seems justified. And yet, over the past two decades, the European Union has stabilized the region that was once adjacent to it through a highly successful policy of enlargement. It has also engaged in over twenty civilian and military operations not only in Europe but also in faraway theatres, such as Africa and South-East Asia.[1] Hence the question arises: Under what conditions do the governments of the twenty-seven MS cooperate in common foreign policies?

This book seeks to answer this question and more generally the above-mentioned puzzle of cooperation in foreign policy-making by looking at economic interests and domestic political processes in the twenty-seven MS. It does so by evaluating the formation of Member States' preferences in two of the most relevant and successful EU foreign policies to date: enlargement, and security and defence policies (ESDP/CSDP).[2] When looking at enlargement, the focus is on Turkish accession, as it is the most contentious and the most likely case where domestic preferences will affect policy. If domestic politics do not play a role in this case, they are unlikely to do so in less salient ones. In security and defence policies (ESDP/CSDP) the focus is on civilian and mixed civilian-military missions as these form the vast majority of operations (only five have been purely military).

The argument: economic interest and domestic politics

The main argument advanced in this book is that policymakers respond to economic interest and to domestic pressures (from political parties, public opinion, and the mass media, inter alia) and that these in turn will affect cooperation between the twenty-seven MS in the two areas under study. This does not make a common foreign policy impossible, but it means that it is a complex process in which *both* negotiations between MS *and* domestic factors play a role. Studies of European foreign policy have mainly focused on the first aspect and neglected the second.[3]

Economic interest

The role of economic interest in European integration has been highlighted by Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism (LI). Indeed, LI makes economic interest the most fundamental factor in explaining European integration. LI assumes that some of the main constraints faced by national leaders emanate from positive or negative economic effects on particular constituents. In this sense, EU integration can be understood as 'a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents' (Moravcsik 1998: 18). This analysis also considers that state preferences vary between states and across time according to issue-specific interests and domestic institutions (Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig 2009). This means that both different issues (beyond the merely economic) and institutional factors are likely to contribute to opposition or support by different societal actors. As a consequence, an appraisal of preference formation needs to consider a wide range of actors and institutional structures. A criticism made of liberal intergovernmentalism is that it does not probe deeply enough into these issues. Moravcsik has responded to this criticism by stating that

> articles outlining the liberal paradigm are not designed to 'test' the paradigm but to present a selection of this research and to show that the paradigm … provides a coherent account of that work. They constitute, in a Lakatosian sense, an ex post reconstruction of a theoretical trend in the field. The precise scope of the liberal paradigm's explanatory power … remains an empirical issue for future researchers to resolve. (Moravcsik 2010: 114)

This book tests this paradigm in the field of European foreign policy. In order to do so, I contrast the role of economic interest with that of other societal actors. I have enlarged LI with the aid of comparative politics, which considers both the input and output sides of the political system by looking at actors such as the mass media, political parties or public opinion, and institutional settings (Easton/Dennis 1969; Geddes 1991).

Domestic politics

In developing a domestic analysis and taking LI as point of departure, I have firstly included several measures to account for the interests of economic groups, by looking at costs of and opportunities for economic gains arising from security and defence policies and Turkish accession. Secondly, to account for domestic factors, I look at both input and output factors. These two elements, input and output, form the basis of a pluralist analysis.

The input side is formed by political parties, pressure groups, electoral behaviour, and mass attitudinal configurations (Peters et al. 1977). Accordingly, I have included in this analysis the effects of public opinion, the representation of political parties in national parliaments, and mass media reporting. The output side

consists of institutional factors encompassing governmental and institutional configurations (Peters et al. 1977). Tsebelis (1995; 2002) has suggested a method of accounting for their variation by looking at the role of veto players. In this view, in order to change policies, a number of actors (individual or collective) need to agree on change. These actors, or veto players, 'are specified in a country by the constitution (the President, the House, the Senate in the United States) or by the political system (the different parties that are members of a government coalition in Western Europe)' where the former are defined as institutional and the latter as partisan veto players (Tsebelis 2002: 2). Outcomes that may alter the status quo (or win-set) in this view depend on three main things:

1 the number of veto players,
2 the ideological distances between them, and
3 their internal cohesion.

Given that most EU MS are ruled by government coalitions, I have included a measure of partisan veto players as an explanatory factor. Since the popularity of a government might also influence whether it is likely to pursue certain policies or not (particularly if these are unpopular), a measure of government approval is also included.

In short, my argument is that policymakers will give weight to both economic and political considerations when supporting accession or when participating in security and defence operations. I would expect MS to support ESDP/CSDP operations in areas where they have strong economic interests, and to support the accession of states with which they maintain strong economic links. Furthermore, I would expect MS to support operations and accessions that are uncontroversial, or which are supported by public opinion and/or political parties and/or the mass media. Finally, I expect popularity to decrease a government's responsiveness to national media, political parties, and public opinion, and the presence of partisan veto players to increase it.

Existing explanations

Broadly speaking, European foreign policy has been examined through both rationalist and cognitive lenses. Cognitive approaches have observed socialization processes amongst Member States and the creation not of a 'foreign policy system but of a foreign policy society' in which interests, values, ideas, and beliefs are shaped (Tonra/Christiansen 2004: 8). Rationalist approaches such as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), more closely associated with the realist tradition of International Relations, focus on the individual behaviour of MS and of statesmen (e.g. Hill 1996). However, as cognitive approaches, they tend to neglect the role played by domestic politics. Some liberal accounts (such as liberal institutionalism) also focus on structural conditions and hence do not usually address the effects of domestic

politics in the formation of MS preferences. A notable exception, mentioned above, even if more broadly applied to European integration and not to European foreign policy per se, is the work of Andrew Moravcsik (1993; 1998), on which my own approach is based. Liberal intergovernmentalism explains European integration through the interplay of preferences, bargaining, and institutions. In this it follows

> the central claim of liberal international relations (IR) theory, which clearly distinguishes it from other IR paradigms … variation in 'preferences' is the fundamental cause of state behaviour in world politics. Paradigms like realism or institutionalism stress the variation in capabilities and information, while treating preferences as constant or exogenous. Liberalism reverses this perspective: variation in ends, not means, matters. (Moravcsik 2010: 113)

The analysis I develop in this book focuses on the first aspect of LI, the formation of state preferences.

Brian White divides the main points of contention in the literature along five dimensions (Carlsnaes/Sjursen/White 2004). A first dimension refers to 'actorness', or more precisely, the kind of actor that the EU is and its role in the international arena: a civilian power, an international entity, or a superpower in the making. A second is constituted by structuralist approaches, mainly those within liberal institutionalism whose emphasis is on structure rather than on actors. A third is that of 'Europeanization' studies, which aims at connecting different levels of analysis and focuses on the impact of European integration on member states. A fourth is social constructivism, which aims to connect agents and structures through structures which are social rather than material and are thus constructed by actors, which in turn affects actors themselves. Finally, a fifth dimension connects Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) with European foreign policy. Since FPA has been seen mainly as a state-centric realist approach, it has required some adaptation, namely replacing state by actor and government by governance. Each of these perspectives looks at different objects. In this sense, rather than being exclusionary they complement each other. As emphasized by Bache and George (2006), rationalists and reflectivists both find evidence to support their arguments. This should not be too surprising since they look at different issues. Thus, while reflectivist approaches focus on the day-to-day workings of EFP, rationalists tend to look at key moments or crises.

However, as the previous overview shows, studies that consider the role of public opinion and other domestic factors in EU foreign policy are hard to find. Addressing this gap is the main contribution of this work. This lack of attention might stem from the complexities of the EU system and from a long-held view that public opinion and domestic politics have little influence in foreign policy decisions. This view, which resulted from the influential works of Lippmann (1922) and Almond (1950), came to dominate scholarly works on foreign policy for most of the period following the Second World War (see, for example, Cohen 1973). It has,

nevertheless, faced increased criticism as empirical evidence against it has been amassed (Page/Shapiro 1983; Jentleson 1992; Stimpson/MacKuen/Erikson 1995). The three main assumptions of the 'Almond-Lippmann consensus' are: the volatility of public opinion; a lack of structure in public attitudes; and limited impact of the latter on foreign policy. Empirical studies (mainly focused on the United States) have shown that parliaments, pressure groups, the mass media, opinion leaders, and, more widely, public opinion have all proved to be relevant actors to be considered when evaluating foreign policy decisions.

Holsti (1992) has made perhaps the most overarching revision and critique of the Almond-Lippmann consensus on the basis of recent academic publications. In these, he finds strong evidence against the idea that public opinion exerts little influence in foreign policy and that it is unstructured and volatile. Mueller (1973), for example, examines both the Korean War and the Vietnam War and finds that changes in public opinion occurred in ways that seemed explicable and rational, rather than random and mindless. For their part, Page and Shapiro (1988) evaluate a massive data set on questions posed by major polling organizations since the 1930s and find that mass opinion in the aggregate was characterized by a great deal of stability. They also find that changes in public opinion were neither random nor abrupt, and that they move in directions which make sense in terms of events. As to belief structures, Holsti finds convergence on two main points: that even if the general public is rather poorly informed about foreign affairs, its attitudes are structured in at least moderately coherent ways; and that a single isolationist-internationalist dimension inadequately describes the main dimensions of public opinion on international affairs. These findings suggest that 'even in the absence of much factual knowledge, members of the public use simple – perhaps even simplistic – heuristics in order to make sense of an increasingly complex world' (Holsti 1992: 450).

Evidence of the influence of domestic politics in foreign policy-making has been found in other cases than the United States. In their edited book on US and European foreign policies, Nacos, Shapiro and Isernia (2000) show that a main factor enhancing the impact of public opinion and the media over foreign policy has been the end of the Cold War, which deprived governments of an 'evil enemy' narrative and the proliferation of new media and the internet. In the same volume, Sinnott argues persuasively that since the 1990s public opinion impacted European integration and that an emerging politicization is observable. The conclusions of this book support this view as, at least in enlargement, politicization is taking place.

Filling this gap seems relevant for other reasons. Domestic foreign policy studies abound for other major actors in world politics (e.g. the United States, China, and even for particular MS of the European Union), but have not been extended to the whole EU. In part, of course, this reflects the fact that the EU is not a state and that EU foreign policy-making is a complex affair involving a multiplicity of actors. Nonetheless, the EU does develop significant foreign policies with major

consequences in the international arena (such as ESDP/CSDP and enlargement, the focus of this book). The main problem of EFP, as observers constantly remind us, is a lack of coordination and burden-sharing between MS. The essence of this collective action problem, namely, the sources of MS preferences, has scarcely been studied. Given that domestic factors affect foreign policy in other cases, it seems relevant to understand the manner in which domestic actors have an impact on EU foreign policy-making.

At this point, it must be said that by looking at preference formation within MS, I do not imply that MS are shielded from pressures from other states; or that Europeanization or external forces are not significant in formulating FP decisions. However, recognizing that such forces exist should not restrain scholars from paying attention to debates on legitimacy or on the obvious reversals the EU has faced whenever it has attempted to obtain the support of its voters for further integration (e.g. Maastricht, Constitutional, and Lisbon Treaties). Domestic constituencies and domestic political processes are significant players in defining European integration and EFP and should be recognized as such.

Perhaps one main reason for the lack of attention to domestic factors in the EU might have to do with the fact that the literature on European foreign policy has closely followed studies of European integration. Scholars of European foreign policy have thus inherited the debates of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, none of which pays much attention to domestic actors (Faber 2005). Neo-functionalism's main focus is on an automatic process of spillover resulting from economic integration. Even if later versions of neo-functionalism have sought to avoid the deterministic nature of the original thesis (differentiating integration phases and cycles). Intergovernmentalism makes the sovereign state the main actor. In this domain of 'high politics', member states react in different manners to similar crises according to their particular historical experiences. Even when later versions of intergovernmentalism have also favoured a more flexible definition of power and national interest, the argument tends to be structural and to focus on policymakers rather than on domestic actors.

Another reason for the lack of attention to domestic politics might be that the study of European Foreign Policy (EFP) has suffered from the lack of consensus on a definition of what EFP entails. Perhaps this is not surprising considering the complexity and diversity of actors involved in EFP-making. As the focus (and results) of any analysis ultimately depend on the conceptual framework on which it rests, it is necessary to examine some of the distinctions that have been made before clarifying the idea pursued in this book.

Walter Carlsnaes (2004) has created a compelling overview of the field which also shows the diversity of views that exist. So, for Hazel Smith (2002: 7-8), since the EU has the 'capacity to make and implement policies abroad which promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the actor in question', it can be studied in the same way as any nation-state. Karen Smith (2003) follows this principle and looks at the main objectives of EFP-making in order to define what EFP

consists of: regional cooperation, human rights, democracy and good governance, conflict prevention, and the fight against international crime. On the other hand, White (2001) contends that, in order to be useful for analytical purposes, the concept must encompass the fragmented nature of agency and the variety of forms of action it takes. Ginsberg (2001) considers EFP as the concrete civilian actions, policies, positions, relations, commitments, and choices of the EC (and EU) in international politics. Krahamann (2003) looks at core European states and their actions in multilateral organizations as the main actors, and regional policies as their main arena. Furthermore, Michael Smith defines EFP as cooperative actions that are:

1 undertaken on behalf of all EU states towards non-members, international bodies, or global events or issues;
2 oriented towards a specific goal;
3 made operational with physical activity, such as financing or diplomacy; and
4 undertaken in the context of EPC/CFSP discussions (although the EC can also be involved). (Smith 2004: 18)

These distinctions point to different analytical objects, as some definitions consider MS to be the core actors (some even go so far as to consider only a few MS) and others give supranational actors an important role in EFP-making.

A common definition of European foreign and security policies is that of Christopher Hill (1996), who defines EFP as a system of external relations. Dannreuther (2004), on the other hand, like White (1999), considers three distinct but interdependent decision-making systems: the coordination of national foreign policies, economic and trade policies, and EU policies centred on foreign and security policies, previously included in the second pillar. Dannreuther applies this framework to enlargement, political union, and security challenges.

The definition I follow in this book is most closely related to the views of White and Dannreuther (according to which distinct but interdependent decision-making systems exist depending on the issues being considered). This does not mean that supranationalism or socialization processes are not relevant. Indeed, EFP results from a fragmented agency, where both MS and supranational actors are relevant, but play different roles, and may even compete with each other depending on the issues under consideration.[4] However, since the main focus of this analysis is on domestic factors, issues where MS are the main actors have been preferred (areas such as trade or aid, where the Commission has almost exclusive competences, would not suit such an analysis). That being said, in enlargement, both MS and the Commission play relevant roles.

Before moving into the next section it is important to mention another strand of literature which even if not directly related to European foreign policy is close to the aims of this study. This literature looks at the impact of public opinion on the positions of national politicians on issues of European integration. This perspective is particularly important since, as will be shown in the results of this study, on

the issue of enlargement political parties are the most significant factor in explaining support for accession. Hence it is worth reflecting on their role, and on the link between political parties and public opinion. Whether public opinion shapes the positions of political parties or vice versa is a contested issue. Carrubba (2001) has found evidence that political elites follow the positions of the electorate, while the view that political parties are the ones giving cues or that the 'causality is elite driven' is also supported (Hooge/Marks 2005; Steenbergen/Jones 2002; Anderson 1998; Hobolt 2006). Furthermore, a third possibility, that of a dual process in which elites both respond to and shape the views of the electorate, has also been suggested (Steenbergen et al. 2007). In the case of accession, the evidence from this book shows that often there is a mismatch between public opinion and political parties. This might result in parties that are against enlargement gaining power, or in a larger number of political parties opposing accession in national parliaments (which in turn explains shifts in MS positions towards enlargement). In a second, related, process, the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties that use considerations of national identity to mobilize opposition to the EU might further increase opposition to accession (De Vries/Edwards 2009). This might suggest that in accession a dual process is at play in which public opposition to accession fuels the rise of opposition or radical right parties, which in turn further politicize the issue of enlargement.

In sum, given that so far the literature has failed to incorporate a comparative domestic dimension in the study of EU foreign policy, it seems relevant to address this gap. With this idea in mind, I have selected two cases that seem particularly relevant, not only because they are two of the most important foreign policies implemented by the EU, but also as they both are particularly salient and are controversial. Both policies depend for their success on cooperation between MS: in ESDP/CSDP by seconding personnel, without which this policy cannot work; and in enlargement by supporting (or at least not blocking) the efforts of the Commission to implement the accession process on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria and conditionality. In the case of the enlargement of the EU, particularly towards Turkey, public opinion and other domestic actors such as the mass media and political parties have been vocal in their opposition in a number of MS. In security and defence policies, even though overall support for ESDP/CSDP has been high, things happening on the ground can rapidly diminish support. These two cases relate to the same conundrum: how can one explain cooperation in areas in which, given the costs, one would not expect it to happen? It seems particularly perplexing that policymakers would be able to implement policies that are in many cases opposed to the preferences of their domestic constituencies, as existing studies seem to assume. Taking these elements into consideration the following research question is posed:

Do domestic and economic factors affect cooperation between the twenty-seven MS, leading to common European foreign and security policies in the fields of defence and enlargement, and if so, what are these factors?

Theoretical and methodological considerations

This study derives a set of competing hypotheses from the general literature. Insight is drawn mainly from liberal intergovernmentalism, European integration studies, and comparative politics. The hypotheses are tested on the basis of primary sources (e.g. personnel deployments, public statements) supported by secondary sources (e.g. academic studies, media reporting). These results are complemented by a more detailed examination of cases that appear particularly relevant.

The methodology followed is thus both quantitative and qualitative. This follows Robert Putman's et al. (1993) notion that social scientists and wise investors are much alike, and they should rely on diversification to magnify strengths and offset the weaknesses of any single instrument. Quantitative analysis is as a result complemented by qualitative methods, namely, expert interviews and in-depth case studies. This is usually referred to as 'nested analysis' or 'mixed methods' in the literature. It means combining statistical and case study analysis, with the aim of achieving synergies from both quantitative and qualitative modes of analysis (Lieberman 2005). In this case, both statistical and fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analyses (fsQCAs) help in the selection of cases for more in-depth study.

In the case of ESDP/CSDP, given that there is significant variance in the number of personnel deployed at any given time by MS (see chapter 3), statistical analysis is applied. In the case of enlargement (see chapter 4), there is little variance in the dependent variable as the positions of the MS with respect to enlargement tend to be stable over time. This makes statistical analysis somewhat harder to apply. Statistical analysis is thus complemented by an fsQCA; a useful approach, as it allows to identify combinations of domestic conditions that explain the support – or lack of support – of MS for enlargement.

Organization of the book

The book is organized into four main parts. After developing the theoretical argument in the next chapter, the empirical account is developed in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 deals with the security and defence policies ESDP/CSDP, and chapter 4 with enlargement. Each of these chapters includes a brief explanation of the methods and data used. Chapter 5 concludes the study through a comparative evaluation of the results obtained in the two issue areas. It discusses the influence of domestic politics in EFP and the applicability of this kind of framework to other issue areas.

2 • Theorizing European Foreign Policy

The European Union, owing to its unique institutional structure, faces a major challenge when formulating foreign policies. On the one hand, the support of its Member States (MS) is essential in order to formulate common positions and coordinate foreign policies; to develop common policies (e.g. enlargement); and to advance integration in areas related to foreign policy (e.g. defence). On the other, the Commission, and with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty the European Parliament, have become significant actors that affect EFP through their agenda-setting and monitoring prerogatives.

Traditionally, European foreign policy was implemented through the interplay between the Union's three pillars. With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 2009, this structure has been abolished, even if the divisions generated by the pillar structure will probably take some time to disappear. Bretherton and Vogler (2006), for example, have argued that actorness is different both in its nature and effects depending on the issue area examined. In particular, commercial policy is the domain of the Commission, which has the sole right of initiative, even though it is the Council and European Parliament that ratify agreements. This has not changed with the new treaty. Changes took place previously in the so-called 'second pillar', which included the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and from 1998-1999 onwards, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Lisbon has renamed ESDP as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The position of high representative created at the Cologne European Council of 1999 has mutated into a de facto foreign minister, currently Catherine Ashton. In the new European External Action Service (EEAS) in her domain, crisis management (previously in the second pillar) has been merged with related elements at the Commission (e.g. DG Relex) to avoid duplication. The rationale for this was that rivalries amongst the Commission and the Council were commonly assumed to be one of the main problems for the lack of coherence of European foreign policy. Indeed, several observers had identified the rivalry amongst the Council and the Commission as one of the key problems in the implementation of ESDP/CSDP (see: Korski/Gowan 2009). Finally, with the abolition of the pillar system, the third pillar, Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJC) – formerly Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) – has become part of the 'Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice' under the DG for Justice, DG for Home Affairs, and other agencies, such as Europol and Frontex.

Table 1 Actors, issue areas, and policies

Issues	Commercial Policy	CFSP/ESDP	Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice
Main Actor	Commission	MS	Commission/MS
Other Actors	MS/EP	Commission/ Parliament	
Member States veto	No	Yes	Yes
Instruments	Economic sanctions/ economic aid/trade policy	Policy coordination Joint statements Troops/NATO Reaction forces/ Eurocorps	Anti-terrorism measures Intelligence cooperation
Examples	Sanctions on South Africa PHARE/ WTO negotiations	Operations in DRC, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Georgia, Aceh	Anti-terrorism measures

Notwithstanding these changes, the formal separation of economic from political dimensions of policy continues under Lisbon. Enlargement for its part has not been affected by Lisbon. It continues to be a policy in which all three, the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Member States play a role (see table 2 below).

Table 2 Cross-cutting policies: Enlargement

Actors	Commission	European Parliament	Member States
Functions	Assessment, Negotiation coordination	Ratification (simple majority)	Acceptance, negotiation oversight, approval (Parliament/ referendum)
Instruments	Maastricht criteria	Ratification	Veto

A domestic approach to European foreign policy

As was mentioned in the introduction, in developing a domestic approach to European foreign policy I have expanded liberal intergovernmentalism (LI). In doing so, I contrast the impact of economic interest with that of other societal influences, such as public opinion, the mass media, political parties, and veto players. LI is based on a multi-stage model with the interplay of three main elements used to explain integration: preferences, bargaining, and institutions. Given that the aim

of this research is preference formation, I shall focus on the first of these. The theory rests on two main assumptions. The first is that 'states achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, rather than through a centralized authority making and enforcing political decisions' (Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig 2009: 68; Moravcsik 1998). In this sense the EU is understood as an international regime for policy coordination (Moravcsik 1993); and MS are therefore still the main actors. The second is that states are rational.

Taking these theoretical insights into account, the null hypothesis looks at the effects of economic interdependence:

Ho: Strong economic interdependence will translate to support for accession or for ESDP/CSDP operations.

According to liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), the prospect of reaping economic gains from trade and investment provides incentives for those governments likely to gain opportunities for cross-border trade and capital movements (Moravcsik 1998). Accordingly, I expect MS to support the accession of, and to support ESDP/CSDP operations in, states and regions with which they have strong economic links. Other economic factors might also have an effect and I have controlled for them in the analysis. It could be that shifts in wealth or unemployment affect European foreign policies that are perceived to be costly. After all, Member States have to fund the personnel they send to ESDP/CSDP missions themselves, and enlargement (particularly towards a poorer country) might have important economic effects, creating both domestic winners and losers. Of course, this depends on whether the country to which the EU is enlarging to will be a net contributor or not (enlarging to Norway, Iceland, or Switzerland would bring additional resources). However, considering that most possible and current candidate countries would entail net transfers (e.g. countries in the western Balkans or Turkey), enlargement can be considered as an 'expensive' policy. In ESDP/CSDP, costs are related to military expenditure and training. Seconded personnel in civilian and mixed ESDP missions are not replaceable and usually consist of high-ranking officers, such as members of the police forces. While financially these might not be too costly per se (even if seconding scarce personnel entails other types of costs), supporting common defence policies is costly as there is increasing pressure on MS to increase their military budgets. Hence, I expect less-well-off MS and those facing economic difficulties to resist any efforts aimed at further developing ESDP/CSDP, and as a result to be less cooperative when deploying personnel on which ESDP/CSDP missions depend for their success.

However, economic interest is not the only factor I expect to affect support for accession or for ESDP/CSDP operations. Thus, enlarging LI, I contrast economic interest with a cluster of hypotheses on domestic factors:

H1a: Government will support accession and ESDP/CSDP operations if: the main political parties support it; and/or the national media support it; and/or public opinion supports it.

Political parties are considered instrumental in giving cues to citizens, but are at the same time subject to public opinion when developing party platforms in order to attain electoral gains. Anderson (1998) argues that political parties are the main actors informing citizen's attitudes towards European integration. He finds that the most powerful determinants for support of membership in the EU are system and establishment party support. That the causality is elite driven is also supported by Hooghe and Marks (2005), and Steenbergen and Jones (2002). Looking at integration referendums, Hobolt (2006) finds a similar result, arguing that parties are in a privileged position to influence voters. Carrubba (2001) on the other hand suggests that political elites follow the positions of the electorate, while Steenbergen et al. (2007) find evidence of a dual process in which elites both respond to and shape the views of the electorate.

The mass media play an important role in shaping public opinion towards foreign policy; they are also likely to have an impact on the positions that political parties take. At the same time, the mass media respond to the demands of public opinion and receive inputs from the views of political parties. Glyn et al. (1999) argue that the development and generation of public opinion require active communication processes. This involves mass and interpersonal communication and third-person effects from the media. In these, complex psychological processes are involved. Consequently, the mass media play a relevant role in domestic politics through agenda-setting and the effects they have on the public that they inform.

In this context, public opinion is relevant inasmuch as policymakers need to know which policies and initiatives will be supported by voters; interest group leaders need to choose which battles to wage based on the support of their constituents; and the media need to know what their readers and viewers want to know about (Glynn/Herbst/O'Keefe/Shapiro 1999: 3). Of course, this is a two-way street and all of these actors also shape mass attitudinal configurations.

The main idea behind these hypotheses is that domestic actors will influence the position of a government towards accession and ESDP/CSDP operations. However, the degree to which domestic factors affect government actions will depend on the popularity of the government and institutional settings, such as coalition partners. Accordingly, a secondary hypothesis takes into consideration factors that might shield a government from or expose it to domestic pressure:

H1b: Popularity will decrease a government's responsiveness to national media, political parties, and public opinion, while the presence of partisan veto players will increase it.

I expect popular governments to be more likely to distance themselves from domestic preferences than unpopular ones. On the other hand, I expect the presence of partisan veto players (calculated through the number of coalition partners and the distance between parties forming a government coalition measured in terms of their support or opposition to Turkish accession and towards further developing European foreign policy) to increase the government's exposure to domestic pressure.

However, foreign policy decisions might also have an effect on public support. The impact of foreign policy as a determinant of public support has been thoroughly examined by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987). Their main conclusion is that citizens assess foreign policy on the basis of two elements: the first is the retrospective evaluation of foreign policies; the second, the general foreign policy postures of the administration. On the basis of an empirical study, Marra, Ostrom, and Simon (1990) suggest that both environmental factors (such as economic outcomes) and 'political drama' (presidential speeches, travel, and actions) affect the popularity of the executive. Moreover, they show that the executive uses the windows of opportunity provided by foreign policies to increase its popularity. An interesting conclusion they reach is that while 'domestic drama' is associated with decreases in approval, 'foreign drama' is associated with increases in approval. Powlick and Katz (1998) provide a more nuanced approach. In their view, public opinion is latent on foreign policy issues and in order to affect the policies of the executive, public opinion needs to be activated. For this to occur, media coverage is essential. Thus, governments might pursue policies because a demand for such policies exists, or they might actively pursue popular policies in order to increase their popularity with the electorate. The latter might be particularly relevant if a government is confronted with a significant drop in its approval ratings.

Institutional structures might affect policy as well. According to Tsebelis (1995; 2002), institutional approaches vary along three main dimensions: presidentialism and parliamentarism, bicameralism and unicameralism, and two-party to multiparty systems. Shugart and Carey (1995), for example, contend that presidentialism has advantages over parliamentarism because it makes elected officials more accountable, likely winners easier to identify, and provides checks and balances and an arbiter. However, presidentialism suffers from temporal rigidities, majoritarian tendencies, and dual democratic legitimacies. Tsebelis notes that the same kinds of arguments have opposed bicameralism to unicameralism. Bicameralism is seen to provide more checks and balances. Arguments about the effects of two-party systems, compared with multi-party systems, in which two-party systems provide moderation of the parties, stable executives, and clear majorities, have been systematically refuted by Lijphart (1984). Rather than replicating these pairwise structures, Tsebelis compares them all with the capacity for policy change or what he calls the presence and number of veto players. His main findings are that as the number of veto players increases, their congruence decreases, their cohesion increases, and so does policy stability. Given that this approach captures the most

significant effects of institutional factors, I have taken Tsebelis' definition of veto players to account for the effects of conversion functions in determining Member States' preferences.

Tsebelis' main argument is that in order to change policies, a number of actors (individual or collective) need to agree on change. These actors, which Tsebelis calls veto players, 'are specified in a country by the constitution (the president, the House, the Senate in the United States) or by the political system (the different parties that are members of a government coalition in Western Europe)' where the former are defined as institutional and the latter as partisan veto players (2002: 2). Outcomes that may alter the status quo (or win-set) depend on three main things: i) the number of veto players, ii) the ideological distances between them, and iii) their internal cohesion. Given that most EU MS are governed by government coalitions, particular attention is paid to partisan veto players. The cases where institutional veto players exist are also taken into consideration.

Political parties in most European states operate under majority coalition systems; that is, those 'where parties establish pre-electoral coalitions so that voters know which parties will work together to form a government' (Almond/Powell/Strøm/Dalton 2004: 113). In the new Member States – the eastern and southern European states that joined the EU in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements – politics tend to be more factional and new parties arise and disappear regularly. However, even if there is a high turnover of political parties, the personalities behind them tend to be stable. As a result, party positions towards the EU and towards European foreign policy are fairly stable. However, the composition of governments shifts regularly as a result of elections. Hence, one would expect that the stronger Eurosceptic parties become (or at least those opposing ESDP/CSDP and accession), the harder it will be for a given government to support such policies. The same could be said of pressure groups.

The operationalization of these hypotheses is provided in the appendices and in each of the two empirical chapters.

The cases

The main aim of this study is to identify which domestic factors affect cooperation between MS when developing common foreign policies. As a result, areas in which cooperation between the Member States is essential for their development defines the universe of cases. Out of this universe, two issue areas have been selected: enlargement, and security and defence (ESDP/CSDP). The main selection criterion has been the importance of MS in policy-making, their relevance (sensitivity) for voters, and their salience (i.e. regular reporting in the media). Other possible cases for such an analysis would have been: common positions in the CFSP, energy policy, the neighbourhood policy, and perhaps for a smaller sample (the seventeen MS using the euro) cooperation in monetary matters. Due to the complexity associ-

ated with analysing twenty-seven MS as this study aims to do, it is not possible to cover several of the aforementioned areas. However, in selecting enlargement and security and defence not only have two of the most sensitive and salient aspects of EU foreign policy been chosen, but also those that matter most for the EU's actorness in the international arena. Their importance is reflected in the wide literature that already exists in each of these topics. On enlargement, see: Moravcsik/Vachudova (2003); Schimmelfennig (2001); Heinemann (2002); Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2002); O'Brennan (2006). On ESDP, see: Eliassen (1998); Hoffmann (2000); Deighton (2002); Giegerich/Wallace (2004); Wagner (2005; 2006); Biscop (2008); Grevi/Keohane (2009); Cross (2010).

ESDP/CSDP is such a sensitive area that MS continue to exert strong control and oversight. The main actor in ESDP is the Council, which meets in the form of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). It is made up of the foreign ministers of EU MS. GAERC consults with ministers of defence and has political control over all EU-led operations. The EU's decisions relating to crisis management tasks are made in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which requires unanimity for decisions with military or defence implications. Member States may abstain from a vote and are thus not obliged to apply the ensuing decision. *They also retain the right to decide if and when their national forces will be deployed*. This last point is crucial, since it serves as a useful measure of the degree of cooperation of a Member State in furthering ESDP/CSDP.

Both MS and the Commission play a relevant role in developing enlargement policies. The formal structure of the enlargement process involves the Council, which has to take decisions unanimously; the Commission, consulted in the process; and the European Parliament (EP), that assents. Three main actors formally play a main role in the enlargement process. The first is the Council of Ministers and permanent representatives in Coreper, as well as the technical or working groups which report to Coreper. The second is the European Council, or heads of state who meet up to four times a year. The third is the presidency of the EU, which can be critical in unlocking negotiations. According to O'Brennan (2006), in the eastern enlargement key players were the Enlargement Working Group,[1] Coreper 2,[2] and the GAERC.[3] As a result, the preferences of MS play a crucial role in furthering or blocking the policy.

In sum, both enlargement and ESDP are areas in which cooperation between the MS is essential for the continuation and implementation of these policies. For this study I look at the most important aspects related to this cooperation from the perspective of the Member States. In security and defence policies (at least on its civilian component which forms the bulk of its current activities) the most important contribution by the MS is the secondment of personnel. In order to study the effects of domestic preferences on cooperation, I will focus on domestic factors which might affect these deployments.[4] In enlargement, given that the Commission recommends opening or closing negotiation chapters (on the basis of its evaluations of progress meeting its criteria) but that MS may block or veto

the opening of new chapters, cooperation between the MS is essential for the further development of this policy. Thus, the most important contribution by the MS to the implementation of this policy is their cooperation with the Commission. What can explain blockages (or support) is then the focus in this case. Conditionality, as has been extensively covered by the literature (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2008; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004), is the main instrument whereby the EU is able to exert far-reaching domestic reforms in candidate countries. Blockages by MS greatly undermine the effectiveness of conditionality.

3 • Security and Defence Policies

In this first empirical chapter I look at factors that might facilitate or hinder cooperation in the area of European Security and Defence Policy (renamed Common Security and Defence Policy with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty).[1] The chapter begins by providing a brief account of what ESDP is all about, its main actors, and the state of affairs in both its military and civilian constituent parts (3.1). This appraisal is followed by an overview of the stances of the twenty-seven Member States in ESDP and the extent to which they have cooperated in furthering this policy through personnel deployments (3.2). This provides a context for the statistical analysis developed in section 3.3. Finally, on the basis of statistical results, an in-depth analysis of some of the most relevant cases (France, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Romania) is carried out (3.4). Its aim is to clarify the mechanism whereby swings in the popularity of a government translate into the secondment of fewer or more personnel.

3.1 Origins, evolution, and current state of affairs

A common defence policy seemed a remote possibility only a few decades ago, and yet throughout the past two decades it has been one of the fastest growing areas of European integration. What explains this evolution? Stark (2006) argues that ESDP results from the conjunction of several relevant trends. Firstly, the patent failure of European states to avoid warfare in the former Yugoslavia and the awareness of an operative gap vis-à-vis the United States in the ensuing NATO intervention. Secondly, the French rapprochement towards NATO that helped appease British and American suspicions. Thirdly, the acknowledgement by Britain that the European pillar of NATO had to be reinforced. Finally, the culmination of Germany's normalization process and at the same time a realization by neutral states that new challenges emerging from the end of the Cold War required them to play a more active role.

The launching of ESDP, however, was only the start of a process which had no predefined direction. As in many other areas of European integration, the direction ESDP would take in the end would depend on a combination of reactions to external factors and the slow process of reaching agreements between MS. The process is still going on; its most recent additions have been the creation of battlegroups and of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The Lisbon Treaty adds the perspective of permanent structured cooperation, which is likely to add a new dynamism to ESDP cooperation.

The evolution of ESDP has followed two main lines: one civilian, and another military. Certain Member States, particularly the Scandinavian countries, were wary of the militarization of EU foreign policies, and strongly pushed for the development of a civilian component. The civilian component of ESDP was launched in June 2000 at the Feira European Council and has since taken the lion's share of ESDP/CSDP operations. It has 'concentrated on ESDP interventions in the areas of the rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection and policing' (Freire 2008: 12).

The lack of coherence amongst civilian and military components, and particularly the lack of cooperation between the Council and the Commission, has placed significant strains on the missions. Even if nominally the Commission has a right of initiative, it has never used it and tends to concentrate on areas where it is the sole actor (such as external economic relations, development, trade, and humanitarian assistance). As a result, and due to the very different cultures that exist in the Council and the Commission, the problem of coherence has been persistent. One of the aims of the Lisbon Treaty has been to solve this problem by double-hatting (giving two roles to) the new High Representative who will be at the same time Vice-President of the Commission in charge of External Relations. The new European External Action Service (EEAS) is also to include both officials from the Council and the Commission (Grevi 2009).

Operations on the ground also brought to light other types of shortfall. For example, the armies of MS lacked the material that was needed for ESDP operations (crucially, deployment capabilities affecting both military and civilian missions). Given that European armies were conceived for territorial defence, they have lacked the equipment required for overseas missions. For example, European forces own more than 10,000 battle tanks, which are of no use for overseas missions, while there is a huge shortage of transport planes – there are only eight long-range planes currently available (Grevi/Keohane 2009). This situation motivated the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA's main aim has been to provide information and help in the rationalization of military spending amongst MS. It also aims at strengthening common procurement and the common development of military equipment. Given that these aims touch upon sensitive aspects of national sovereignty, its evolution has been slow and controversial.

Another problem that has been present since the inception of ESDP is its relationship with NATO. As the following section (3.2) shows, a significant number of MS have long feared that ESDP would weaken NATO or challenge it. However, ESDP was also seen as a way to strengthen the European pillar of NATO – the main reason for the United States to support its development. In the beginning, ESDP did not pose any significant challenge to NATO. In fact, most high-ranking officers in ESDP were double-hatted and performed similar functions within NATO. Problems began, however, as ESDP-NATO relations were held hostage to the Cyprus conflict.

Turkey is a vital NATO member – it has its second-largest army – and yet a complex partner for ESDP operations because of its opposition to sharing sensitive information with non-NATO members Cyprus and Malta. Moreover, Turkey has

used ESDP-NATO divisions to strengthen its position in both NATO and ESDP frameworks (Missiroli 2002). This partly reflects the fact that with the development of ESDP, the European security architecture that formerly rested on the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – and where Turkey was fully represented – significantly changed. As ESDP took on the roles previously performed by the WEU, and as the OSCE became paralysed due to Russian blockages, Turkey felt relegated in its participation in European security structures (Gözen 2003). The result of this blockage has been that cooperation between NATO and ESDP in Brussels has been difficult, even if NATO and ESDP personnel have managed to work well together in the field. The ongoing Turkish accession negotiations and EU pressure on Cyprus have helped in easing mutual blockages, and cooperation has improved over the past years.

In sum, security and defence policies have suffered from lack of coordination between EU actors (the Commission and Council and civilian and military bodies) but even more from the diverging preferences of MS. The most notable differences between them have to do with the development of civilian or military capabilities and with relations with NATO. These preferences have deeply affected operations, as MS tend to second personnel mainly to the type of missions that fit their national priorities. As a result, explaining what defines national priorities seems particularly relevant. To answer this question, this empirical chapter looks into the factors influencing one of the most crucial aspects affecting security and defence policies, one that relies on MS cooperation: personnel deployment. To gain a better understanding of why cooperation is so important (and why it might be affected by domestic politics), a brief overview of the workings of both military and civilian operations is provided below.

Military and civilian operations

A complex relationship exists between the national capitals and Brussels in which both the Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC) and its civilian counterpart (Civcom) play an important role (Cross 2010). The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence (the highest military authorities) of the Member States and is chaired by a four-star officer. Usually the EUMC meets 'at the level of their military representatives: senior three star officers based in Brussels' (Grevi 2009: 31). Military representatives represent their MS at both the EU and NATO. Civcom is composed of one representative from each Member State, usually career diplomats or members of the interior and justice ministries (Cross 2010: 12). Civilian operations are particularly interesting for the aims of this study as not only do they take the biggest share of security and defence operations, but also they are much more exposed to national capitals and hence to domestic political processes.

A crucial difference between military and civilian planning is that the EUMC enjoys a much higher degree of autonomy. This makes military missions less likely to be affected by domestic dynamics. On the other hand, delegates at Civcom are highly reliant on their permanent representations, making them more likely to be

affected by domestic dynamics. This might be a result of the fact that most meetings at Civcom are formal (taking place every Monday and Wednesday) and that delegates at Civcom tend to be less experienced than those at EUMC. Delegates at EUMC are long-serving military representatives, having spent on average thirty-five years in the Army, whereas those at Civcom tend to be at early stages in their careers (Cross 2010).

While regular informal meetings and sharing of expert military knowledge makes delegates at EUMC a somewhat more cohesive body, at Civcom the lack of regular informal contacts and other forms of socialization amongst delegates makes them more likely to closely follow national lines. Since August 2007 there has been a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability within the Council Secretariat. The expertise of the Council's Directorate General IX (civilian crisis management) helps delegates who lack experience and who may use the Secretariat as a resource (Cross 2006: 26). Nevertheless, Grevi contends that DG IX has persistently suffered from understaffing as well as having no 'ad hoc structure for the planning, guidance and support of civilian ESDP operations' (Grevi 2009: 33). Due to the former differences, it can be assumed that where domestic political processes do not affect civilian operations, they are unlikely to do so in military ones.

Given the focus of this chapter on the operational side of missions, and particularly on the commitment of personnel to ESDP missions, it is important to distinguish decision-making processes from operations on the ground. While the decision to establish a mission, or the planning of operations for an existing mission, takes place in the committees in Brussels, the decision to deploy personnel is taken in the national capitals. Decision-making and the commitment of personnel are nevertheless related in that MS that do not support the establishment of a mission in Brussels are unlikely to contribute personnel. On the other hand, MS that strongly support a mission are likely to match their words with a significant presence in the field.

These decisions entail important costs. Civilian missions, the main emphasis of the chapter, require the secondment of officials who are domestically indispensable, such as police, judges, prosecutors, and prison officers (Cross 2010: 13). Moreover, MS fund the personnel they deploy and their training, even if civilian operations are partially community funded. Thus, participation in a mission entails both financial and political costs. Perhaps the best example of this is the fact that MS have consistently sent fewer personnel than they committed themselves to. In this, however, there are also significant differences. Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are all at the forefront, while Spain has complied the least.

The lack of cooperation between MS is a well-known problem for the effectiveness of security and defence policies. Korski and Gowan argue that the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) was supposed to identify personnel requirements and ensure that Member States would commit and fulfil their commitments in closing these gaps. The reality is that even some of the most high-profile missions, such as

Kosovo and Afghanistan, 'have never reached full strength; the Afghan mission alone is 130 staff short' (Korski/Gowan 2009: 44). The reason for these shortcomings is that personnel are in short supply as they 'tend to have day jobs in courts, police stations or, in some cases, outside the public sector' (Korski/Gowan 2009: 44). Furthermore, unlike military personnel, there is no career track for civilian specialists. Hence, the pool of civilian personnel available is soon exhausted.

The empirical section of this chapter focuses on civilian and mixed civilian-military operations. There are several reasons for this. On the one hand, even if information is not public, it has been easier to obtain data on personnel seconded to civilian and mixed missions than for purely military ones. Furthermore, even if information were available, the very small number of purely military missions (five) would limit its usefulness given that they are not comparable with civilian and mixed missions. Decision-making processes both to establish missions and to deploy personnel differ. Finally, military operations are dominated by the 'Big Three', especially by France and the UK. Hence, explaining the role of domestic politics in these cases would require another methodology, namely case studies.

This type of study already exists. Matlary (2009) has made a thorough examination of the motivations of the Big Three to develop ESDP, in which she argues that for both Britain and France it made sense to pool sovereignty in order to reduce the influence of domestic actors in their defence policies. In her view, the development of ESDP allowed for blame to be shared with other Member States, the EU, or other international actors. Her conclusion is that this two-level game, in which national executives can blame other actors, occurs mainly in cases where the government is weak such as in Germany and Italy; but that stronger governments, such as the French and the British, occasionally use them, too. It thus shows that both domestic political processes and structural variables such as parliamentary oversight affect the participation (and motivations) of MS within ESDP. This offers some support to the hypotheses that have been proposed in this study.

State of affairs

The current operational set-up of ESDP is one in which financing is carried out by the Member States that contribute to a mission. This principle is known as 'costs lie where they fall'.[2] This issue is only partially solved in civil operations (which are in part funded from the community budget). In this case, Member States still have to fund the personnel they second as well as their training (Grevi/Keohane 2009). Klaus Brummer argues that this principle encourages free-riding and is problematic for several reasons. To begin with, to start a mission Member States need to agree or abstain since decisions are taken unanimously. Those members abstaining do not have to shoulder financial burdens or participate in a mission. This is not the only opt-out that exists. Given that MS finance the personnel they send to ESDP missions, it is for them to decide the extent of their cooperation. All of these elements encourage limited participation (one might even say free-riding). Currently, 'it is too easy for Member States to agree on an ESDP operation

on the political level and then opt out when it comes to following up the talk with actions' (Brummer 2006: 7). At the same time, the secondment of personnel is the most important asset in ESDP missions; as Grevi and Keohane argue:

> The main shift in the debate since the end of the CHG [Civilian Headline Goal] 2008 consists in the clear understanding that the solution to this serious problem lies at the national level. It is a question of enhancing the political commitment of Member States to make available more and better resources, some of which at short notice. Overall, progress at national level in the last few years has been slow at best, with most national rosters of civilian capabilities still to be completed, where they exist. The problem is compounded by the drastic budgetary cuts that are envisaged as a consequence of the current economic downturn and will affect the financing and availability of national capabilities. (Grevi/Kehonane 2009: 109)

The Lisbon Treaty: from ESDP to CSDP

European policies are continuously evolving, and even European institutions are often subject to change. As a result, it is important to consider to what extent recent institutional changes affect security and defence policies and whether they help solve some of the problems that have been mentioned above, in which case the problem of the lack of cooperation between MS might be less challenging. Changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty mainly affect the military components of ESDP. In this sense, they can be seen as a response by the bigger MS who have traditionally aimed at strengthening the military dimension of ESDP. Moreover, a symbolic change has also been introduced, namely, the clause of mutual defence and the solidarity clause. This was a major demand by several MS, such as Greece and the Baltic States, who continue to see NATO as the ultimate guarantor of their security. Nevertheless, this clause was opposed by Scandinavian countries who saw this move as a threat to their neutrality. In the end, in typical Brussels fashion, a compromise was reached in which the mutual defence and the solidarity clause would also consider the foreign policy positions of MS (hence recognizing neutrality). Ultimately, this denotes the political and mainly symbolic meaning of this provision.

The principle of structured cooperation aims to overcome a major weakness of both ESDP and NATO, which is the plethora of small-scale capabilities that make up the bulk of European armies (Biscop 2008). According to Sophie Dagand, the aim behind permanent structured cooperation is to create a hard core of the six biggest MS: France, the UK, Spain, Germany, Poland, and Italy. This G-6 would devote at least 2 per cent of GDP to defence, establish a common procurement market, further develop the battlegroups, and launch major defence infrastructure projects. This position is likely to cause the opposition of other MS as it involves the risk of creating a two-speed Europe. According to Dagand, the way to avoid this would be to use the G-6 as the engine that would push other MS to increase their commitments to ESDP. However, considering the significant number of MS that

view the ongoing militarization of ESDP with suspicion, it is likely that structured cooperation will also provide a new impulse to integration in the area of civilian operations.

Beyond structured cooperation, the Lisbon Treaty also introduces significant changes to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that affect the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as ESDP has been renamed. The new Treaty has reformed the different aspects of external action of the Union profoundly, establishing a common set of principles and objectives for the first time (Grevi 2009). To achieve this, the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security (HR) will not only continue to have the functions of the previous HR in CFSP, but also become the Vice-President of the Commission in charge of foreign relations (RELEX). The HR, currently Catherine Ashton, will be assisted by a newly created European External Action Service (EEAS) which will draw on personnel from the Council and the Commission, as well as staff from the national diplomatic services.

Grevi notes that, on the whole, the main aim of the reform has been 'overcoming the rigid distinction between the Community and intergovernmental dimension of EU foreign policy and ... providing more continuity to policy-making over time' (Grevi 2009: 62). In operational terms, the main change involves the possibility for the Council to entrust the implementation of a mission to a group of MS. Operations are also likely to be affected by permanent structured cooperation, as this could mean a reinforced military amongst the six biggest MS. Also, the new HR has a stronger profile in operations, in terms of policy initiative, direction, and coordination. It is expected that the new HR will be able to minimize the problem of coherence amongst the Council and the Commission.

While these changes might mitigate coherence problems among institutions in Brussels (particularly the Commission and Council), they do not solve the problem of lack of cooperation between MS, which ultimately lies in diverging preferences. What are these diverging preferences? The next section looks at some of the most relevant differences that exist in terms of national priorities and capabilities when developing defence and security policies. It is intended as a framework coming before the empirical analysis of the influence of domestic politics in personnel deployments that is provided in section 3.3.

3.2 National priorities and capabilities[3]

National priorities and capabilities are likely to have a strong effect on security and defence policies. The heterogeneity of military capabilities and cultures among Member States, for example, has led to the formation of subgroups within ESDP. These respond to either geography or capabilities, but also might stem from domestic factors such as parliamentary oversight. Parliamentary control over the deployment of defence forces is uneven amongst Member States, and this might

affect deployment decisions (Wagner 2006). Former colonial powers, for example, are able to deploy troops without parliamentary consent. This tends to translate into higher activism (Born/Urscheler 2004: 64). No parliamentary control is required in France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, or Greece. Most new MS (such as Hungary) require parliamentary approval, as do older MS (such as Germany, Austria,[4] Sweden,[5] and Ireland). Furthermore, several MS that are not constitutionally required to seek parliamentary approval nevertheless pursue it. This is the case in Italy and the Netherlands. This, however, only affects military or mixed missions, as the deployment of civilian personnel does not usually require parliamentary approval.

Deploying troops or seconding personnel implies costs and risks. In the case of seconded personnel, it means deploying domestic human resources that are in short supply and cannot be easily replaced. ESDP requires the secondment of senior and well-trained personnel and this further increases the strain on limited resources in many Member States. It is thus likely that ESDP deployments are not without political risks for governments participating in such missions. Political parties, the national media, or public opinion might affect the decision to do so, or the extent of contributions made by Member States. Popular missions should face fewer problems, and might even prove an incentive, whereas unpopular ones are likely to be avoided.

Given that subgroups exist in ESDP, it seems useful to examine not only individual traits but also commonalities that might exist between MS. Following this logic several subgroups are examined below: The so-called 'Big Three' or the main contributors to ESDP missions (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom);[6] southern MS; Nordic States; and MS that joined the EU in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, usually referred to as 'new MS'.

France

France, as Hans Stark argues (2006), has a long-standing tradition of using European integration and European defence as a means to strengthen its own position on the international stage.[7] Hence, one of France's main aims has been to create a strong and independent European defence policy. This idea is nevertheless rejected by most other Member States that are suspicious of a French instrumentalization of ESDP. In particular, the UK is fervently opposed to the idea of establishing an alternative to the transatlantic alliance. A few other MS support the French federalist approach to ESDP. These states are Belgium, Luxembourg, and Cyprus, the latter with the aim of counterbalancing the close alliance between the United States and Turkey, as well as Turkey's NATO membership (Molis 2006: 12).

Stark contends that French public opinion and French observers of ESDP tend to view the evolution of European defence capabilities towards civilian goals negatively (Stark 2006). They tend to blame other MS (in particular the UK) for not supporting a strong and independent European defence policy. The result of this negative opinion is the indifference of French public opinion towards defence mat-

ters. In turn, this allows the French executive to develop defence policies almost unconstrained by domestic debates. Moreover, it fits within the peculiar 'political culture of the French Fifth Republic, where the executive accords very little power to parliamentary debate on defence issues. Essential decisions [are] made by the head of state and prime minister without arrangement with the political class' (Stark 2006: 18). The particular conditions of France make it a case where, at least on defence matters, domestic factors are likely to play a minor role at best.

When looking at French participation in ESDP civilian or mixed civilian-military missions on the basis of data obtained from the Council's Secretariat, it seems obvious that France is a global player. Nevertheless, even if Paris has seconded personnel to a wide variety of missions, during the period covered by this study, its deployments focused on three main scenarios: Bosnia, Rafah in the Gaza Strip, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Both Bosnia and Rafah were important missions for EU prestige. This might explain a strong French commitment to them. In the case of the DRC, it is an area where France has long held strategic interests. It is not surprising that it was precisely Paris that sought EU involvement in the DRC.

Germany

Germany is strongly constrained by its reluctance to use its power. That is, Germany is enmeshed in an internal debate 'concerning its commitment to and participation in international crisis management and stabilization operations led by the United Nations, NATO or the European Union' (Algieri/Bauer/Brummer 2006: 23). The main drivers for German foreign policy over the past two decades have been furthering (together with France) stronger political integration in the EU, its own unification process, and at the same time maintaining good transatlantic relations. This delicate balancing of the Franco-German relationship and transatlantic ties (including the UK) has been the cornerstone of German foreign policy. Mostly, it has been a successful policy, even if sometimes hard to maintain. Notwithstanding, Germany has increasingly played an active role in multilateral operations.

Public opinion in Germany remains sceptical about a more active German role on the world stage. The main concerns of the German public comprise economic and social rather than security issues. In a poll conducted in 2005, only 34 per cent supported such a role, while 43 per cent supported the view that Germany should focus on domestic affairs and avoid international involvement (Algieri/Bauer/Brummer 2006: 26). While military involvement is strongly opposed, non-military actions, such as those envisaged by civilian missions on ESDP, enjoy much stronger support. This is the main reason why ESDP is generously supported in German public opinion. However, this support might change if ESDP were to focus more on its military component or if casualties were to occur. The strong opposition to German participation in NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan attests to this. Nonetheless, most political parties favour a

more active foreign policy role. One good example of this has been the strong parliamentary support of German participation in the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. This operation was only opposed by the Liberal and Left parties (Algieri/Bauer/Brummer 2006: 31). Given that any German participation in a multilateral mission requires parliamentary consent, this last element should not be underestimated. German secondments have been significant and have covered very different areas, such as Bosnia, FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Iraq, Sudan, Aceh, DRC, and Palestine.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom plays a much more active role in expeditionary tasks. Indeed, military intervention and the development of an expeditionary warfare capability have been two of the main elements of the UK's international role since New Labour came to power in 1997 (Whitman 2006). The UK's policy towards ESDP has been to ensure that it will neither conflict with NATO nor create transatlantic tensions, while at the same time helping to rationalize its military forces. The latter policy results from personnel and expenditure cuts which have led the defence community to espouse the view that 'ESDP is adjunct to the wider reforms of UK defence policy and restructuring of the British Armed Forces' (Whitman 2006: 41). Concerns amongst defence experts and practitioners about the overstretching of UK forces has led to a consensual and favourable view among the different parts of government towards ESDP.

Nevertheless, most political parties and public opinion seem to devote little attention to what happens in ESDP. This stems mainly from the Iraq crisis and the reduction in military forces, which are much more contentious topics. It might also reflect a long-standing and deep scepticism towards the EU, present in large segments of the British public and elites. The Conservative Party is hostile towards ESDP 'objecting to the future aspirations of ESDP and expressing the fear of competition and dilution from the ESDP diminishing NATO capabilities' (Whitman 2006: 43). For the Conservatives, the EU should focus on civilian aspects of ESDP and leave all military components to NATO. The rapprochement with France that began in St Malo and gave birth to ESDP is also seen by the Conservatives as a threat to the long-standing 'special relationship' between the UK and the United States. Given that the UK is a central actor in ESDP, the Conservative government that emerged victorious from the elections of May 2010 might have important effects on the future evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy. However, the unusual coalition between the Tories and the Liberal Democrats seems to have reduced the chances of any radical change.

A final aspect to be taken into consideration is the importance of the UK's defence industry. As Whitman argues, 'the UK is the second largest market for defence products in the world, with an annual budget of €22 billion, in addition to being the second largest exporter of military equipment' (2006: 46). Moreover, this is one of the most important industrial sectors left in the UK. As a conse-

quence, the UK has a strong interest in developing an integrated European defence market and hence the government has been a strong supporter of the European Defence Agency (EDA). That said, the Conservatives are staunchly opposed to EDA. Even if the UK has been a crucial player in ESDP, a radical shift in public opinion, so far largely absent due to low salience and little information on issues related to ESDP, or a radicalization of the Conservative government, could change the UK's position. London's secondments have covered almost every ESDP mission, with a strong presence in Bosnia and Sudan.

Table 3.1 The 'Big Three'[8]

	France	Germany	UK
Political Parties	Strong support	Strong support	Labour in favour Conservatives against
Public Opinion	Indifferent	Sceptical	Against
Mass Media	Supportive	Against	Against
NATO/ESDP	ESDP	Balance	NATO
Civilian/Military	Military	Civilian	Military
Key Missions	Bosnia, Rafah, DRC, Aceh, Sudan, Palestine	Bosnia, FYROM, Aceh, DRC, Sudan	Almost every ESDP mission

The southern European states and ESDP

Most southern European countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus) tend to act in similar ways when it comes to defence issues. Their shared concerns have much to do with their geographical location and with perceived security problems arising, for example, from illegal immigration and organized crime in the Mediterranean basin. Most of them actively support the development of ESDP. France, given its size, wider interests, and strong military capabilities, is the least similar amongst them, and has accordingly been treated as a separate case. The case of Malta is not described in detail, as this small neutral state has only participated in one ESDP operation in the period comprised by this study. It sent and maintained two officers to the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Greece is also a somewhat special case in that the long-standing rivalry with Turkey has led to high levels of military spending (the highest in relative terms amongst MS). This affects Greek participation in ESDP missions, as military spending is already considered to be at an almost intolerable level, and thus any extra financing is met with resistance. This situation is likely to be aggravated by the financial debacle that has recently affected Greece. Most Member States fund ESDP missions from their existing defence budgets. Given the priority Greece gives to its territorial security, supporting ESDP missions is of a low priority for the Greek mili-

tary. That said, ESDP is also seen as a means of ensuring Greek security and its territorial integrity (e.g. Greece has exerted significant pressure to include a solidarity clause within ESDP). This leads, as Ioannis Parisis (2006) argues, to a high degree of support for ESDP from both the main political parties and public opinion.

Athens has tended to focus its personnel deployments in areas where it has a strategic interest, such as Bosnia or FYROM. However, it has also participated in other missions where its interests are less clear, such as Rafah, Palestine, and Sudan. Cyprus shares many similarities with Greece, given the partition of the island and its security concerns vis-à-vis Turkey. Its deployments have focused in two missions, Bosnia and FYROM. Its participation has continually decreased in the period covered.

Italy enjoys a strong parliamentary consensus on security issues (Gasparini 2006). Public opinion is strongly favourable towards (humanitarian) interventions as long as they take place under a multilateral framework. Public opinion is more hostile towards military-only missions. A further domestic constraint is the high number of veto players owing to the fragmentation of the Italian polity. These include Eurosceptics who at times have been highly influential. One example is Antonio Martino, who was minister of defence for five years, and 'contributed with actions and omission to a marginalization of Italy from multilateral European forums' (Gasparini 2006: 22). However, fear of exclusion from ESDP and the domination of defence operations by the Big Three (France, the UK, and Germany), is a major concern for Italian military planners. As consequence, there is a strong interest in participating in European operations.

As in other cases, Italy aims at establishing a balance between its participation in NATO and in ESDP. Given limited resources and a long-standing pro-NATO tradition, Italian planners are confronted with the challenge of avoiding duplicating assets. It is important to note that alongside other southern states, Italy would like to see the EU become more involved in areas related to energy security or immigration policy. French domination of the EU's southern/Mediterranean policy has been resisted, as France has much broader interests and thus incorporates regions that are not the main priorities of Italy and most other southern MS. In its deployments to the ESDP missions covered by this study Italy has had a strong presence in areas of immediate interest to it, such as the Balkans, or when supporting allies, for example, its participation in Iraq. On the other hand, Rome has also participated in other operations where it has had less strategic interests, such as Rafah, DRC, Aceh, and Sudan. These deployments might follow public preferences for humanitarian interventions as well as Italy's strong Atlanticist tradition.

Portugal shares with Italy a concern regarding the domination of ESDP by the biggest MS and a strong pro-NATO tradition. Historically, it has been very close to the position of the UK, and only came to accept the idea of establishing ESDP once the British came to support it. Portugal's support for ESDP remains conditional on its complementarity and reinforcement of NATO. As Laura Ferreira-Pereira contends (2006), Portugal's ties with its former colonies also exert a strong influence

on its foreign policy. In effect, Portugal sees itself 'at the center between Europe, the United States and Africa' (Ferreira-Pereira 2006: 35). Consequently, Portugal considers both transatlantic relations and those with the Portuguese-speaking countries (including Brazil) a priority, while at the same time seeking to improve its role within the EU.

Within ESDP Portugal has been mainly, although not exclusively, active in African missions, as could have been expected given previous colonial ties. Nonetheless, as Korski and Gowan (2009) argue, it remains uncommitted as to the value of civilian missions, showing little willingness to participate or plan this type of mission. Perhaps this reflects the strong cooperation it has with the United States in policies directed towards Portuguese-speaking countries. Ferreira-Pereira (2006) also contends that a stronger participation would be more likely if the distribution of costs did not follow the 'costs lie where they fall' principle. Looking at the deployment of Portuguese personnel in the missions covered by this study confirms this view. Portugal was mainly involved in the Balkans and in Africa, particularly Congo and Sudan.

Unlike Portugal, Spain has had a complex relationship with NATO and towards transatlantic relations (Barbé/Mestres 2006). This results mainly from the fact that NATO membership was hotly contested. The referendum that legitimized membership in NATO also had the effect of keeping Spain out of NATO's military command structure (Spain only joined the command structure in 1997). The Spanish have been categorized, according to Barbé and Mestres, as semi-aligned, and to a certain extent as free riders by other NATO members. However, since the end of the Cold War, and following its incorporation into NATO's military command structure, Spain has played a much more active role. Spanish participation has focused mainly on UN-mandated peacekeeping operations, especially in areas of traditional Spanish concern, such as Latin America, but also in several African countries. Nonetheless, over the past years a shift seems to have occurred, as Spain has gradually increased its resources and participation in ESDP missions.

In ESDP, Spain was an early supporter of closer integration, calling together with France and Germany for the inclusion of a common defence policy within the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in 1991 (Barbé/Mestres 2006: 53). However, as the same authors argue, Spain has lacked the economic, military, and diplomatic power to be considered a major player in the political design of ESDP. Spanish limitations became clear once politics shifted to policy. Indeed, authors such as Korski and Gowan consider Spain as 'the greatest perpetrator of broken promises' (2009: 50). The central reason for this is the lack of deployment and training of personnel made available to ESDP civilian missions.

Historically divided between left and right, the Spanish political landscape has seen some of its most significant confrontations in matters of foreign policy. The two most notable examples – membership of NATO in the 1980s and supporting the Iraq intervention in 2003 – broke the consensus between the main political parties. In the case of NATO, public opinion was strongly divided, while in the case

of Iraq 91 per cent of the population opposed Spanish participation (Barbé/Mestres 2006: 56). According to the same authors, this division consolidated the split between the Conservative and Socialist parties. As a result, foreign and security policy became a crucial battleground in the campaign leading to the general election of 2004. The Conservatives pleaded for a distancing from the Franco-German axis and a rapprochement with the United States. On the other hand, the Socialists aimed at returning to the traditional Spanish position of following a domestic consensus on European foreign policy, re-establishing privileged relations with France and Germany, and reorienting transatlantic relations. The Conservatives won the 2004 election and this had an important impact on Spanish foreign policy. The terrorist attacks in Madrid, which were allegedly a response to Spanish pro-American policies, notably its participation in the Iraq War, again brought a dramatic shift in the electorate leading to the electoral victory of the Socialists in 2008. This shifted Madrid's stance towards ESDP again. Spanish deployments reflect these divisions. They are similar to those of Italy, on the one hand supporting American-led operations as in Iraq and Afghanistan, while on the other participating in humanitarian operations as in Aceh or Sudan.

Table 3.2 The southern MS

	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain
Political Parties	Favourable	Mostly favourable	Favourable	Split between Conservative and Socialist parties
Public Opinion	Favourable	Favourable towards civilian operations	Divided	Divided
Mass Media	Favourable	Not favourable	Not favourable	Favourable
NATO/ESDP	NATO	Split	NATO	ESDP
ESDP: Civilian/ Military	Military	Civilian	Civilian	Civilian
Key Missions	Bosnia, FYROM	Bosnia, FYROM, Rafah, DRC, Sudan, Aceh	Bosnia, FYROM, DRC, Iraq	Bosnia, FYROM, Aceh, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan

Amongst the northern European states there are two clearly distinct groups. In fact, one could also separate the Baltic countries from Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, as the Nordic countries share common and distinct characteristics that differ from those of the Baltic States. These differences result mainly from dissimilar historical experiences; in particular the annexation of the three Baltic States by the USSR continues to influence security perspectives in that region. That said, given

the strong ties that Baltic States have developed with their Scandinavian neighbours, they also have shared strategic interests.

The Baltic States

As a result of their geopolitical situation and historical experience, the Baltic States have been amongst the staunchest supporters of both NATO and EU integration (Kasekamp/Veebel 2006). Public opinion in these countries is amongst the most pro-European in the whole of the EU. All mainstream political parties are solidly pro-EU. Defence matters are strongly supported; in fact ESDP is 'the most popular EU policy' in the Baltic States (Kasekamp/Veebel 2006: 11). Military spending reflects this, as proportionally it is amongst the highest in the EU (at 2 per cent of gross domestic product). Strong defence spending also results from the fact that these states had no military establishment or diplomatic service during the Cold War.

Paradoxically, even if there is strong support for ESDP, the Baltic States are not major players in European defence. Indeed, the main factor motivating the participation of the Baltic States in defence missions is the transatlantic alliance. As Kasekamp and Veebel argue, the main criterion for participation in defence missions is the priority of US security needs and the transatlantic alliance. Capabilities are made available to ESDP only if they are not needed by the US or NATO (2006: 17). The reason for this is a strong belief that NATO is the only actor which will guarantee the security of the Baltic countries. Moreover, the fact that crucial Baltic interests, such as territorial defence and energy security, have not been included in the aims of ESDP or the European Security Strategy (ESS), has reinforced scepticism of these MS as to the value of ESDP. This feeling has not been helped by the agreement reached by Russia and Germany to build the Nord Stream pipeline, which revived old historical memories and greatly unsettled the three Baltic MS as well as Poland.

Because of these issues, the Baltic States have concentrated their efforts on ESDP military missions (particularly the formation of battlegroups), on NATO-led missions, and on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The need to 'support post-Soviet republics in their transition and integration processes' has been a foreign policy priority for these states (Kasekamp/Veebel 2006: 15). They have been among the staunchest supporters of further EU enlargement (including Turkey), and have strongly pushed for EU policies directed towards Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. In their analysis of Member States' positions towards EU civilian capacities, Korski and Gowan (2009) label these three countries as indifferent. As could be expected from these factors, there is no serious attempt to develop civilian capabilities. This constitutes a major difference from Scandinavian countries. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are at the forefront in developing EU civilian capabilities.

Secondment of personnel confirms this trend. From September 2005 to December 2007, according to data from the Council's Secretariat, Estonia seconded personnel to Bosnia and Georgia where it had a strategic interest (and only briefly to

FYROM). The only other secondment followed NATO priorities and took place in Afghanistan. In the case of Latvia, its secondments also reflected these priorities as they took place in Bosnia, FYROM, and Georgia. Lithuania, even while participating mainly in the same missions (e.g. Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia, Afghanistan, and Ukraine), has followed a somewhat different path and has also participated in missions beyond its immediate interests, such as Aceh and Rafah.

Table 3.3 Baltic MS

	Estonia	**Latvia**	**Lithuania**
Political Parties	Favourable	Favourable	Favourable
Public Opinion	Very favourable	Very favourable	Very favourable
Mass Media	Favourable	Favourable	Very favourable
NATO/ESDP	NATO	NATO	NATO
ESDP: Civilian/ Military	Military	Military	Military
Key Missions	Bosnia, Georgia, Afghanistan	Bosnia, FYROM, Georgia	Bosnia, Kosovo, Rafah, Aceh, Ukraine

The Nordic Countries

The five Nordic countries have had a particular security arrangement since 1945. This 'Nordic balance' meant Sweden would not join NATO in order to avoid Soviet actions that could have compromised Finland's independence, while at the same time it would closely collaborate with NATO through back channels (Bailes/Herolf/Sundelius 2006). This arrangement brought with it a high degree of defence collaboration and the development of parallel defence cultures. The creation of the Nordic Council in 1952 reinforced cooperation between these countries, but due to the delicate position of Finland it avoided defence issues. The end of the Cold War changed this strategic environment, allowing for membership of both Sweden and Finland in the EU. Unlike the Baltic States, neither Sweden nor Finland applied simultaneously for NATO membership. Instead, they developed, as with other neutral states such as Austria, a close cooperation with NATO through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Within ESDP, the Nordic countries' concern has been to avoid its militarization. Accordingly, they have been the main proponents for the build-up of civilian capabilities through the establishment of 'capability goals and planning and deployment options for non-military as well as military crisis management tools' (Bailes/Herolf/Sundelius 2006: 12). Finnish and Swedish elites have been particularly keen in avoiding the development of something similar to 'Article 5' of NATO, since this would put them at a disadvantage with respect to other non-neutral MS (Matlary 2009). This in turn puts them at odds with MS such as Greece and the Baltic States who have long sought for guarantees in case of an attack.

Public opinion in Scandinavian countries has strongly supported defence activities with either national or global aims. Consequently, the Nordic countries have participated 'in just about every operation set up in a European institutional context' (Bailes et al. 2006: 21). Sweden even provided the commander for the Artemis operation in the DRC in 2003. According to an expert interviewed on this issue,[9] this considerable Swedish involvement in the DRC was partly motivated by domestic factors – in particular due to the Swedish former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who devoted enormous efforts to furthering peace and ultimately lost his life in a tragic air accident in that country. Hence Swedish public opinion was particularly favourable towards a substantial involvement in the Artemis operation.

Denmark is a special case given its opt-out from ESDP, even though the country actively participates in ESDP operations. As Rye Olsen argues (2006), this opt-out needs to be put in perspective. In reality, Denmark participates in all working groups dealing with defence issues with the exception of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The opt-out resulted from the referendum held prior to entry in the EU, which was rejected by a small margin. Given this rejection, the government felt it necessary to carry out a second referendum, leaving to one side the most contentious issues related to membership in the Maastricht Treaty. The other MS agreed to the opt-outs requested by the Danes (four in total), and a second referendum obtained a comfortable majority in favour of membership.

Rye Olsen (2006) shows that the opt-out has been interpreted permissively by successive Danish governments. This has allowed Denmark to participate in Council debates on defence issues. Moreover, the opt-out does not affect civilian operations. That said, in cases such as that of the Concordia mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the Danish opt-out has had consequences (Olsen 2006: 24). As the NATO-led operation, in which Danish troops took part, was taken over by the EU, Denmark had to withdraw its deployed personnel. Once Operation Concordia became a police mission (i.e. a civilian one), Denmark renewed its participation. The main consequence of the Danish opt-out has been a certain reserve on the part of other members of the alliance towards Danish participation in NATO missions that could eventually be taken over by the EU. This happened in Kosovo, where several other countries expressed reservations about Denmark's playing a leading role in KFOR (Olsen 2006: 25). Most MS prefer deployed troops to be available to both NATO and the EU.

Nevertheless, public opinion seems to have become more favourable towards ESDP, as Eurobarometer surveys show a significant increase in support over time. Olsen (2006) explains this as a result of the evolution of ESDP itself. Indeed, ESDP has not evolved into the much feared European army, but has instead devoted considerable focus to the kind of missions that are strongly supported by the Danish electorate. Danish public preferences are very similar to those in the other Scandinavian countries. Hence, it is not surprising that as ESDP has reinforced its civilian capabilities, Danish public opinion has become more favourable towards this pol-

icy. It seems puzzling that even when public opinion is favourable, and when there is a real concern in the government and military about the costs of the opt-out, it still exists. The main reason for the preservation of the opt-out according to Olsen results from 'the special parliamentary situation that has characterized Denmark since the fall of 2001 … [t]he government is technically a minority government that bases its policy on support from a right-wing party, the Danish People's Party (DPP)' (2006: 31). In this case, the presence of a strong Eurosceptic party in government seems to be the main reason for the preservation of the status quo, which impedes a stronger Danish participation in ESDP.

Danish participation in civilian and mixed civilian-military operations has been extensive and has not focused on strategic interests. Thus, if one looks at data obtained from the Council's Secretariat, Danish personnel were seconded to Bosnia, FYROM, Iraq, DRC, Sudan, Indonesia, Palestine, Rafah, and Sudan.

Ireland is in many ways a very similar case to Denmark. It has a long tradition of participation in humanitarian missions, and at the same time forcefully defends its neutrality. The issue of neutrality, and the role of Ireland within ESDP, was one of the main reasons behind the original rejection by Irish voters of the Lisbon Treaty. As with other northern states, Ireland has strongly supported the development of civilian components within ESDP and resisted its militarization. Its secondments of personnel also follow a similar pattern to those of Scandinavian countries, and it has participated in a wide variety of missions, such as Bosnia, Aceh, Palestine, Sudan, and Georgia.

Finland has pursued a very active policy within the EU, as it has pursued the strategic aim of being at the core of the Union. This has also affected its approach to ESDP. Hanna Ojanen (2006) argues that even if Finland has declared itself a militarily non-aligned country, following a long-held defence doctrine, it has played an essential role alongside Sweden in the intergovernmental conference leading to the Amsterdam Treaty that incorporated the WEU into ESDP. It has also been a crucial player in the development of EU (civilian) crisis management capabilities. In 2003, when the issue of common defence was brought into the draft Constitutional Treaty, Finland cooperated closely for the first time with other non-aligned countries (Austria, Ireland, and Sweden) to resist this attempt. This embryonic group might continue to work closely together in the future, given that they succeeded in obtaining an exception to the defence clause which commits MS to provide aid and assistance by all means in their power if another Member State were to be attacked. This provision, or mutual defence clause, has been incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty with the previously mentioned exception.

Ojanen suggests that there are no splits among political parties over ESDP. Moreover, ESDP has gained in salience, and with it, it has become more closely associated with the government and parliament, as opposed to the presidency, as was traditionally the case. Finnish public opinion is also largely positive towards ESDP; in particular towards its present peacekeeping and crisis management functions. This reflects a fifty-year-long tradition of UN peacekeeping with over 40,000

people sent on these kinds of missions (Ojanen 2006: 40). That said, an overwhelming majority in public opinion is in favour of military non-alignment. As in Sweden, the development of ESDP towards a European army is strongly resisted. Membership of NATO is equally unpopular. According to Ojanen, this results to a large extent from perceptions of threats. Neither territorial integrity nor the aims of the European Security Strategy (ESS) resonate strongly with the electorate. The main threats, in Finnish perception, relate to climate change and organized crime. However, Finland also shares with the Baltic countries concerns over energy issues, in particular over-dependency on Russia.

Data used in the model developed in section 4.4 supports the arguments advanced by Ojanen. In the period covered by this study, Finland participated in every ESDP civilian or mixed mission with the exception of that to the DRC. The lack of participation in the DRC might be explained by the fact that some Member States were worried that France was using ESDP to pursue its own interests (see the description of EUPOL Kinshasa and the DRC in the next section).

Finland and Sweden have cooperated closely, presenting joint initiatives at ESDP, forming battlegroups (alongside Estonia and Norway), and deepening the Nordic framework. Hence, the two countries share many characteristics in their approach to ESDP. Gunilla Herolf (2006) shows that Sweden also has some particularities. A first one of these is institutional, as ESDP policies in Sweden are formed and implemented by the government in consultation with the Swedish parliament and the Committee on EU affairs. This gives political parties a particular weight, even if no substantial differences amongst them exist towards ESDP. As in Finland, however, NATO is a divisive issue with the main political parties holding opposite views on joining the alliance. This reflects the traditional view which prevails in other non-aligned MS. Swedish public opinion continues to strongly support non-alignment, and is consequently opposed both to joining NATO and to a common European defence force.

A major difference with Finland has been the motive for joining the EU. Herolf argues that it was the economy, and not security, that led to EU membership, whereas in Finland it was the opposite. Perhaps a more significant difference is Sweden's long international tradition, which has made the country one of the most active UN members. Strong Swedish participation in peacekeeping missions since 1948 attests to this. It could be the result of the strong support Swedish participation in UN-led military interventions enjoys among the population. This also reflects another Swedish particularity, which is the strong support the UN enjoys with the Swedish electorate.

Herolf argues that in Swedish public opinion, the UN 'is the only organization or body that may give international legitimacy to the use of force' (2006: 51). Hence, support for UN operations is highest in the electorate, followed by that towards EU-led operations, with NATO only in third place. That said, Sweden collaborates closely with NATO through both the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace program. As a consequence, there is strong collabo-

ration with NATO, and Sweden has previously participated in missions under NATO command.

In ESDP, Sweden has advocated a stronger link between ESDP and other Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) areas. Under this view, 'foreign development, trade and security policies are seen as closely interlinked and capable of contributing to poverty reduction and sustainable peace' (Herolf 2006: 51). This also reflects Sweden's position towards enlargement, which considers such a policy to be closely connected to security. As a result, Sweden is amongst the strongest supporters of further enlargement, including Turkey and Ukraine. Amongst the most significant contributions to ESDP are Sweden's initiative related to the Petersberg tasks and towards civilian crisis management. These initiatives met certain resistance from other Member States who interpreted the Petersberg tasks 'as a proposal to divert military obligations from the EU, and the civilian crisis management initiative … as created at the expense of military crisis management' (Herolf 2006: 53). The fact that Sweden has participated in every single ESDP operation has been a strong signal of its commitment to this policy.

Table 3.4 Nordic MS

	Denmark	Finland	Sweden
Political Parties	Favourable	Favourable	Favourable
Public Opinion	Somewhat favourable	Somewhat favourable	Somewhat favourable
Mass Media	Not favourable	Favourable	Not favourable
NATO/ESDP	ESDP	ESDP	ESDP
Civilian/Military	Civilian	Civilian	Civilian
Examples	Bosnia, Indonesia, FYROM	All missions except for DRC	All missions

New Member States and ESDP

An important characteristic shared by both eastern and south-eastern European states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (henceforth labelled as new Member States) is their strong emphasis on transatlantic ties. As Kerry Longhurst argues,

> the new members from Central Europe brought into the EU a strong attachment to the notion of national sovereignty, a desire to continue and extend the enlargement process, and last but not least, a fervent Atlanticist perspective based on the belief that the United States remains the ultimate guarantor of Europe's security. (Longhurst 2008: 63)

Poland is, in this sense, the most extreme example.

The Visegrád ms

Poland, in large part due to its size and relative economic strength, has played a leading role amongst the newcomers. This was already visible in the run-up to accession. The Visegrád Declaration, pledging mutual support for integration in the EU and NATO in 1991, and with it the formation of the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and eventually Slovakia), pushed these Central European states to the forefront in the enlargement process of both the EU and NATO. In this sense, the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles reinforced each other and established strong cooperation amongst themselves. Since Slovakia became an independent state in 1993, it has followed a mixed path, somewhere between that of the Central European and the south-eastern European countries (Bilcik 2003).

What are the aims of Polish foreign policy? Longhurst argues that Polish foreign policy is driven by three main objectives: i) a strong Atlanticism; ii) a hard-nosed approach to Russia; and iii) the aim of bringing Ukraine into the EU, making Poland one of the most pro-enlargement Member States. Behind these objectives lies a strong domestic consensus aimed at avoiding being treated as a second-class Member State; preserving national sovereignty; applying a realist perspective to foreign policy; considering the United States as the ultimate guarantor of Europe's security; implementing realpolitik towards Russia; and bringing closer and stabilizing neighbouring former Soviet states (Longhurst 2008).

For these reasons, Poland was initially mistrustful of the objectives of ESDP and saw it as a threat to NATO (Trazakowski 2002). Given that ESDP was launched before the Central and Eastern European MS joined the Union, but shortly after they had joined NATO, these countries, together with Turkey, felt excluded from the decision-making process (Longhurst 2008). A further element which distanced Poland from ESDP was its strong reaction to the attacks of 9/11, as it became a crucial ally of the United States. Warsaw, for example, played a central role in supporting the US-led war in Iraq. Moreover, other factors affected the Polish position towards ESDP; in particular, Poland was highly suspicious of structured cooperation which 'was believed to be a Franco-German attempt to sideline the pro-US new EU member states' (Longhurst 2008: 67). Political parties, while sharing a common view on foreign policy, diverge on European foreign policies. Notably, on the basis of the Chapel Hill Survey, the Law and Justice party that won the parliamentary elections of September 2005 is much less favourable towards European foreign policy than its predecessor, the Alliance of the Democratic Left. This position was reversed with the electoral defeat of Law and Justice in 2007.

Notwithstanding the position of Law and Justice, the Iraq debacle and the proliferation of EU-led missions, alongside the recognition by Warsaw that it could play a crucial role even under structured cooperation, brought a sea change in Polish attitudes towards ESDP. This change also seems to have affected public perceptions, as the 2007 election brought the pro-European Civic Platform party into power. Recently, Warsaw has been very active in the formation of battlegroups, and under the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, is to form part of the so-called G-6

(the biggest and most committed MS which, under structured cooperation, aim to strengthen European defence capabilities). Thus, Poland epitomizes the new perspectives brought into the EU by its recent waves of enlargement. In its deployments, Poland has mainly followed its strategic interests, participating in missions in the Balkans, Georgia, and Ukraine, though keeping a small presence in Sudan.

The Czech Republic, as part of the Visegrád countries, shares many characteristics with Poland. There are, nevertheless, certain important differences that need to be considered. A first one has to do with history. The rapid transition to post-communism in Czechoslovakia inspired what some observers call an 'idealistic foreign policy' that aimed at the dissolution both of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the support of pan-European security structures, in particular the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (see Bilcik 2003). The war in Yugoslavia changed this perception and led to a reassessment of the Czech position towards NATO. That said, Czech policy towards NATO and ESDP has been, perhaps as a result of its particular historical experience, less Atlanticist than that of Poland. Prague has aimed at balancing participation in both organizations. Put another way, the Czech Republic, like most new MS, perceived ESDP and NATO as separate and to a certain extent competitive structures and at the same time aimed at taking part in both of them.

The main aim of the Czech Republic has been to strengthen European capabilities for crisis management and ensuring that the EU and NATO develop 'non-competitive structures and open and transparent consultation and cooperation processes' (Khol 2004: 2).[10] The differences between Warsaw and Prague might result from differences in their respective political systems. While in Poland a consensus on foreign and security policy exists, in the Czech Republic there is a strong division between the main political parties on ESDP (Khol 2008). So, the Czech Social Democratic Party on the one hand – the main party between 2002 and 2006 and second in the 2006 election – has been a strong supporter of ESDP. The Civic Democratic Party, on the other hand, which won the most votes in the 2006 election, has been much more Eurosceptic and Atlanticist. The deadlock that emerged from the 2006 election is unlikely to bring any radical changes in the field of security and defence policy. A further element that affects Czech politics is the figure of the Czech president, Václav Klaus. A former chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, the president is known to pursue independent and at times radical positions. His remarks at the European Parliament where he compared the EU to the Soviet Union, and his long-standing battle against the Lisbon Treaty, are well known.

More concretely, Khol argues (2008) that if one looks at the deployment of Czech forces, NATO is clearly the priority. Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan have been the most significant recent deployments. In ESDP, Prague has been active in those operations more closely related to Czech traditional interests: mainly ESDP missions in the Balkans, but also in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the South

Caucasus. Public opinion might influence this even if there is not much factual knowledge about ESDP. An example of this is NATO's bombing of Kosovo, which spurred a strong reaction in the Czech public, polarizing it. The Balkans has been the most important area for Czech participation in ESDP. Right-wing parties have strongly opposed Czech participation in other areas, particularly Africa (Khol 2008: 96). This is confirmed by personnel deployment data that has been obtained from the Council's Secretariat. Throughout the period covered by this study, the main areas of deployment of Czech personnel were Bosnia and Iraq, and the only other areas where Prague seconded personnel were Palestine and Afghanistan, all areas where the United States had a strategic interest.

At the same time, Czech policy has come to welcome developments in the civilian components of ESDP, considering these as complementary to NATO, and thus avoiding conflict between the two organizations. It can be said that '[t]he Czech approach therefore finds an interest primarily in strengthening the alliance through the ESDP by providing better European capabilities for crisis management' (Khol 2008: 80). The importance of domestic factors is also obvious when comparing the Czech positions with those of Hungary, where the executive has much more leeway in the conduct of foreign policy.

Hungarian foreign policy enjoys the 'strong co-ordinating role of the Prime Minister on issues regarding external relations and relatively high levels of apathy among the general public towards foreign policy issues' (Kral 2005: 13). Thus, it seems that neither political parties nor public opinion exert much influence in this area. Khol (2002) argues that Hungary can be seen as the most pro-EU-oriented amongst the Visegrád countries. This reflects Hungarian concerns about its immediate neighbourhood, which have motivated Budapest to strongly support crisis management operations, particularly in the Balkans. In the same way as the Czechs, Hungary aims at a division of labour between NATO and ESDP, where ESDP focuses on crisis management.

In the missions covered by this study, Hungary, as Kral argues, has focused on those where it has a strong interest, such as Bosnia, FYROM, and Afghanistan (transatlantic ties). However, it has also participated, albeit less intensively, in other missions, such as the DRC.

Slovakia too has been less Atlanticist than Poland. Like the Czechs, Slovakian political parties have been split in their positions concerning NATO and ESDP. Kral (2005) argues that the Slovak political elite is divided into three different positions between: i) those favouring a stronger and independent role for the EU in the world; ii) those aiming at a balance between the EU and NATO; and iii) Atlanticists who would support US policies even if this meant not acting along with other European states. The right-wing nationalist Slovak National Party (SNP) has been the strongest supporter of ESDP, but its support is a result of its scepticism towards NATO and the United States (Bilcik 2002).

The most important difference when compared with other Visegrád countries is the fact that Slovakia was not included in the first round of NATO's enlarge-

ment. The reason for this was 'the questionable political developments under the coalition government led by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar' (Bilcik 2002: 32). The result of this was that Slovakia fell behind in its integration of the alliance's military structures. Most importantly, the country came to see membership of the alliance as a crucial objective. As a result, ESDP has been much less important in Slovakian priorities (Khol 2002). Public opinion has been mostly uninformed on developments within ESDP and does not seem to play an important role in defining governmental policies in this domain. Nevertheless, as in other Visegrád states, ESDP is strongly supported among the electorate. The secondment of personnel by Bratislava has focused on its immediate strategic interests: Bosnia and FYROM. It maintained a small contingent in Sudan.

Table 3.5 The Visegrád countries

	Poland	Czech Republic	Hungary	Slovakia
Political Parties	United on NATO Divergent on ESDP	Split	Split on ESDP	Split
Public Opinion	Very favourable	Very favourable	Favourable	Very favourable
Mass Media	Supportive	Supportive	Supportive	Very supportive
NATO/ESDP	NATO	Split	Split	Split
Civilian/ Military	Military	Balanced/ESDP Civilian	Balanced/ESDP Civilian	Split
Examples	Bosnia, FYROM, Georgia, Ukraine	Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan	Bosnia, FYROM, Afghanistan, DRC	Bosnia, FYROM

The South-eastern European MS

Bulgaria and Romania are the most similar amongst south-eastern European States. In this sense, Slovenia, even if geographically near to these two, has more in common with other smaller MS than with either Bulgaria or Romania.

Plamen Pantev (2008) argues that geopolitics has played a central role in shaping Bulgaria's position towards NATO and the EU. Particularly important are the transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, and the tensions that this might generate with Russia. Moreover, geographical proximity to both Greece and Turkey, and the long-standing rivalry between these two countries, has permeated Bulgarian security conceptions. It is also the main reason why Bulgaria has been a strong supporter of Turkish membership of the EU.

Its particular geopolitical situation has been a major motive behind integration of Bulgaria into the Euro-Atlantic community, and the establishment of a strategic alliance with the United States. The existence of close ties to the United States has motivated Bulgarian participation in US- or NATO-led military operations, and

since 2006, the establishment of shared military facilities on Bulgarian territory. This arrangement allows for 2,500 American troops to be permanently based in Bulgaria and rotated every six months. Romania established a similar arrangement at the end of 2005 (Pantev 2008). Due to the importance of transatlantic relations, Bulgaria, in a similar way to other newer Member States, has aimed at balancing its contributions between NATO and ESDP while at the same time giving priority to US-led operations. This puts Bulgaria in a similar category to Poland, the Czech Republic, and other MS that view civilian operations within ESDP with indifference. As a result, there is little public salience or discussion of ESDP topics, and it remains largely a domain of the foreign policy and defence ministries and the executive. Moreover, the main political parties are all strongly in favour of European foreign policies.

When looking at Bulgaria's participation in civilian missions on the basis of the data that has been obtained from the Council's Secretariat, it becomes clear that these have not been a priority for Sofia. During the period covered by this study, Bulgaria seconded and maintained personnel in one single mission (the EU police mission in Bosnia EUPM) and participated very briefly in Sudan in the EU support mission to the African Union mission in Darfur (AMIS). In both cases, participation was minimal.

Romania had the highest level of public support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration amongst the candidate countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement (Calin 2002). Public support has continued to be strong towards European foreign policies, even if it has somewhat diminished after enlargement. The position of Romania is similar to that of other new MS in that it still considers NATO as the primary guarantor of European security, and sees ESDP as complementary to NATO. In this sense, while supporting the development of ESDP, Romania aims at focusing ESDP operations on crisis management. Furthermore, Romania has a particular interest in Moldova, given historical ties and the conflict in Transnistria. Its foreign policy priorities are thus focused on the Balkans, the CIS, Russia, and the Caucasus (Calin 2002: 50).

The main political parties, the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Liberal Party, and the National Liberal Party, are strongly pro-European. The nationalist and anti-European right-wing Greater Romania Party has lost the large share of vote it won in the 2000 election (almost 20 per cent). It won a little less than 13 per cent in 2004, and less than 4 per cent in the 2008 election. As a result, over the past decade the Romanian political landscape has become much more favourable towards the EU.

Slovenia views NATO and ESDP as complementary, but favours NATO as the main actor in ensuring European security (Hostnik 2002). However, Slovenia was the only state amongst the new MS to oppose the US-led operation in Iraq (Molis 2006). Hence, while it favours strong ties with the United States, its support is not unconditional. The main political parties are strongly pro-European, as are media coverage and public opinion. Ljubljana's deployment of personnel has followed

Table 3.6 South-eastern MS

	Bulgaria	Romania	Slovenia
Political Parties	Strong support	Strong support	Strong support
Public Opinion	Favourable/ indifferent	Favourable/ indifferent	Favourable
Mass Media	Strong support	Favourable	Favourable
NATO/ESDP	NATO	NATO	NATO
Civilian/Military	Military	Military	Military
Examples	Bosnia	Bosnia, Rafah, Iraq, Afghanistan	Bosnia, FYROM, Kosovo

its immediate strategic interests, concentrating on the Balkans in Bosnia, FYROM, and Kosovo.

As this brief overview of the Member States has shown, there are significant differences in the aims and capabilities amongst them. Given that ESDP is in many ways still embryonic, these differences matter as they affect the direction and evolution of security and defence policies.

The commitment of Member States towards ESDP is in most cases split, either because of wider global ambitions (e.g. the UK and France), or because of fears of undermining transatlantic ties (e.g. Portugal, the UK, and most new MS). So, for example, both the UK and France have been very active in missions on the African continent, such as DRC or Sudan, while most of the new MS have shied away from this region and focused their deployments in the immediate neighbourhood, as in Bosnia and Macedonia. The only exceptions have been missions where the United States has had a strong interest, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. These differences become evident when one looks at recent operations (this study includes the period starting with the first mission in 2005 to 2007,[11] which covers most operations to date).

The missions

The first operation launched under ESDP was the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[12] As Michael Merlingen (2009) shows, it acted as both a trailblazer and a guinea pig, demonstrating that the EU was capable of putting its words into action. The mission followed a United Nations international police task force (UN-IPTF) that had been deployed in Bosnia between 1996 and 2002. The UN mission was created after a NATO intervention put an end to the brutal civil war that had been ravaging the country since it declared its independence in 1992. This was a high-visibility operation, given that it was the first mission ever, and that it took place in a theatre which had grabbed the world's attention. One would expect as a result a high degree of cooperation between MS.

However, this was not the case. A major problem that has affected both EUPM 1 and EUPM 2 has been the unwillingness of Member States to second personnel to this mission (a crucial aspect that this study aims at explaining). The lack of seconded personnel – or rather the lack of well-trained seconded personnel – has been a major drawback in EUPM operations, as they form the backbone of the mission (Merlingen 2009: 167; Mühlmann 2008: 58). EUPM operations were to involve 512 police officers as well as sixty international civilians (Mühlmann 2008: 47). The secondments fell well short of these objectives.

The second ESDP mission was deployed (EUPOL PROXIMA) in FYROM and also posed a significant challenge, since unlike EUPM (which had followed a UN mission) this one was to start from scratch (Ioannides 2009). Another relevant difference was that the mission followed a small peacekeeping force that had been sent to Macedonia by the EU; thus, for the first time, demonstrating the EU's capacity to combine military and civilian crisis management (Flessenkemper 2008).[13] Again one might assume that the novelty of the mission and its complexity would encourage broad support by the MS. Twenty-four MS participated, together with four third countries – Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine (Ioannides 2009). The mission was considered a relative success in terms of cooperation, even if there were other problems, such as a lack of preparation, insufficient knowledge of the situation in the field, and insufficient coordination between the Commission and the Council.

Kosovo, alongside Bosnia, has been one of the top priorities for the EU. Unlike Bosnia, however, important differences have persisted amongst Member States. Giovanni Grevi argues that the need to establish a mission became apparent after Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari began exploring options to settle the future status of Kosovo (Grevi 2009). The results of the Ahtisaari report suggested a supervised independence as the only feasible option for Kosovo. This led the EU to envisage an ESDP mission (EUPT Kosovo) which would 'mentor, monitor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo' (Grevi 2009: 355). The Ahtisaari report provoked strong reactions from Serbia and Russia, and this created important divisions among MS, some of which persist.

A careful examination of personnel sent by Member States reveals that with the exception of Greece and Romania, those MS that would not recognize Kosovo's independence (on February 2008) did not participate in the mission.[14] This clearly reflects domestic dynamics at least in the cases of Spain and Cyprus; after all, it is well known that these MS have not supported Kosovo's independence for fear of legitimizing the claims of their own separatist regions. Moreover, neighbouring states (such as Slovenia) and other Central and Eastern European MS (such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia) also failed to participate, perhaps not wishing to provoke Serbia. The MS that participated were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, and the UK.

ESDP missions beyond the European continent are likely to make it harder for MS to cooperate as they imply higher costs and bigger logistical challenges and might be more controversial among domestic constituencies. As a result, it is not surprising that EU involvement in Africa, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), has been driven by long-held interests from a few Member States – France and Belgium in particular, but also the UK, whose main interests are in West Africa but which nevertheless has supported Belgian and French ambitions with the aim of reciprocity, and the Netherlands (Martinelli 2008). As expected, the EUPOL Kinshasa mission[15] included personnel from Belgium and France, but also from Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. Interestingly, as of June 2007 additional personnel were deployed by Germany, Spain, Finland, and Romania (Vircoulon 2009). Hence, contrary to what one might have expected, a wider number of MS participated in the operation. This was perhaps in part due to the visibility of the conflict in the DRC after the disastrous consequences brought about by the mismanagement of the Mobutu regime. Another factor likely to have increased the visibility of the conflict was that in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, Hutu militias established themselves on the eastern border of Congo in the Kivu region, recruiting Congolese Hutus to launch raids on Rwanda (Martinelli 2008).

Sometimes MS have decided to participate in operations in cases where they were initially sceptical. The continuation of the DRC mission in the form of EUSEC RD Congo[16] is a good case in point. By March 2009 it comprised about fifty seconded personnel (out of sixty planned) from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, and it is seen as particularly successful (Clément 2009; Martinelli 2008). Clément argues that 'the successes of the mission would in time make it attractive to new SSR [Security Sector Reform] players, such as Germany and Italy' (2009: 246). This seems to confirm that Member States are affected by perceptions of the success or failure of missions, and this in turn might suggest domestic dynamics coming into play. If participation were based exclusively on strategic decisions, one would not expect this to happen. Even the initial players involved in the mission – Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Sweden – might have been influenced by domestic factors in participating. In the case of Belgium, previous colonial ties make the DRC salient, and in Sweden the loss of former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld as part of his efforts in Congo had a significant emotional component which resonated with domestic audiences.

Other missions in Africa also found support, for example, the AMIS and AMISOM support missions in Sudan and Somalia saw deployments from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK (in the former) and by Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK (in the latter). Again this might result from their visibility. As Franke (2009) argues, the situation in Darfur had gathered enormous international attention, given the significant num-

ber of refugees it created, as well as the seriousness of violence by Darfuri rebel groups, government forces, and proxy militias known as Janjaweed. The EU supported the African Union (AU) from the outset both diplomatically and on the ground by providing equipment and training for AU personnel. The AMIS support mission included thirty civilian police, fifteen military experts and two military observers (Franke 2009: 255). It also provided financial support to the amount of more than one billion euros.

Other deployments, however, seem more likely to have followed strategic considerations, particularly those where the United States has been involved. A good example is the EUJUST LEX mission in Iraq. The aim of the mission was to support security sector reform (SSR); particularly the training of senior cadres in the Iraqi police, judiciary, and penitentiary sectors. As Daniel Korski notes, from the outset the mission was one of the most politically contentious operations as it was deployed only two years after the American-led operation had created deep divisions in the continent (Korski 2009). These divisions became most apparent in the set-up of the mission. States that had supported the US (e.g. the UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands) pushed for the mission to be established, whereas those that opposed the intervention (e.g. France) aimed at establishing training facilities in Europe and elsewhere but not on site.

The mission ensued from the lawless environment that followed the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the enormous difficulty of reinstating the rule of law in the country. The UK and Denmark seconded their own personnel and established a police academy in Basra as early as 2004. They were followed by others, such as Germany, which established a training programme in the United Arab Emirates, and other countries who deployed troops in Iraq, such as Italy; the Czech Republic also sent police personnel. In the end, eighteen MS contributed to the mission: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, while Jordan and Egypt hosted three conferences. The mission is still continuing and to date it has trained over two thousand Iraqi officials. Particularly interesting when compared to other missions was the presence of the 'new MS', which seems to be largely a result of the importance these countries assign to keeping good relations with the United States. Even so, domestic dynamics seem to have had some effect as some of the countries where public opinion was most vocal against the US intervention (e.g. Spain and France) have been amongst the most reluctant to operate on site.

Another good example of the importance of transatlantic relations is EUPOL Afghanistan. This mission, established in June 2007, came as a response to the significant international presence in the country since 2001 due to the NATO operation that followed the 9/11 attacks. The United States has exerted enormous pressure for its European allies to do more in the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. At the same time, the ISAF-NATO military operation in Afghanistan has been extremely unpopular in several Member States, particularly in Germany. There

has been a vocal debate within Germany on the role of the country in Afghanistan. In this sense an ESDP civilian operation would be easier to establish than the deployment of troops. This might explain why Germany was amongst the MS that most ardently supported establishing a police mission in Afghanistan. Such an operation would simultaneously allow the further development of ESDP, placate domestic concerns, and show Germany's willingness to share the burden with its other NATO partners.

Given the above-mentioned elements, it comes as no surprise that the main contributor to the EUPOL Afghanistan mission has been Germany. Nevertheless, fifteen further MS have participated in the mission (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Again it is significant that MS that usually are less active in ESDP operations participated.

The EU has strategic interests that go beyond transatlantic ties. This applies not only to the Balkans but also to the Palestinian territories, where both the MS and Brussels have deployed extensive efforts.

A good example of this is the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories – EU Coordinating office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) – which resulted from the long-lasting involvement of Member States and the EU in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its aim was to support Palestinian civil policing. The mission was established in November 2005 in Ramallah and is still in force. As Esra Bulut notes, the ESDP mission was established in a delicate position between the power struggles amongst Palestinian factions, the conflict between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, and the presence of other international actors, in particular the US (Bulut 2009). Notwithstanding this, the mission has enjoyed wide support amongst Member States (with the participation of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK). Perhaps such wide participation reflects the importance that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has for the US. Consequently, it seems this is one of the few missions where both Atlanticist and federalist camps within ESDP coincide.

Another example of EU involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict was the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Border Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), following the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. The mission was suspended after Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007. It was meant to allow for the re-opening of the border crossing point without an Israeli presence. Given the smuggling of goods and weapons from Egypt to Gaza, it was a politically sensitive issue. Nevertheless, as with EUPOL COOPS, there was wide agreement amongst MS on the establishment of the mission. Twenty-one states contributed to the operation (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK). The mission was initially successful in that it managed to double the number of crossings compared with the fig-

ures under Israeli control. Nevertheless, the electoral success of Hamas reversed the situation and the abduction of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit on June 2006 led to the almost total closure of the border crossing (Bulut 2009). The takeover by Hamas on June 2007 led to the suspension of the mission. However, recent events have led to discussions on the reactivation of the mission, even if they have not as yet materialized.

There has only been one mission beyond the traditional theatres in the Balkans and Africa: the Aceh monitoring mission (AMM) established between September 2005 and December 2006. It is likely that domestic factors played an important role in its establishment, given wide public sympathies and concerns for the region in the aftermath of the tsunami that swept through the region in 2004. The mission's main objective was supporting the implementation of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement insurgents (GAM). The devastating tsunami of 2004 had pushed both sides to reach a solution to the conflict. The EU mandate consisted in monitoring the demobilization of the GAM, decommissioning its weapons and ensuring its reintegration into society, ensuring the redeployment of the Indonesian military, and monitoring the human rights situation and legislation agreed under the MOU, which would give Aceh wide-ranging autonomy (Schulze 2009). It was the first mission in which the EU cooperated with another regional organization (ASEAN), with the former contributing 125 personnel and the latter 93.

The Member States participating in the operation were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Those that sent the most personnel throughout the mission were Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, Spain, and Denmark.[17] As in other similar cases, this suggests a willingness by Scandinavian countries to participate in humanitarian operations in far-flung scenarios. In the case of the Netherlands, its strong presence on the ground might be a result of the country's being the former colonial power in the region, much like the roles of France, Belgium, and the UK in Africa.

Paul Kirwan notes that the Aceh mission was characterized by its uniqueness. It was the first mission set up in Asia; the first launched in cooperation with another organization; and the first one to be fully operational from the outset. Moreover, it was very different from other missions as 'it had a very active part to play in the Aceh peace process, a significant departure from the role of a conventional monitoring mission' (Kirwan 2008: 128). This was particularly evident in the fact that the head of the AMM had the authority to take binding rulings to resolve disputes between the two parties. The main challenge for the EU in Aceh was the speed required to deploy the mission, the distance from EU support structures, and the need to coordinate with ASEAN partners: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

Overall, the AMM mission is considered an important success for the EU. It engaged in a conflict that had grabbed the world's attention in the aftermath of

the tsunami, and managed to successfully accomplish its mandate. The mission enjoyed a high level of societal support, and the problems of having to deploy in a far-flung region in little time were overcome particularly thanks to Finnish and Swedish activities that readily made funds and personnel available. Moreover, Kirwan argues that leadership also played a crucial role, particularly, as the head of mission was also deputy director-general in charge of ESDP, and as the chief of staff, seconded by the UK, had ample operational experience in the Balkans and the Middle East. This allowed for close cooperation between the Council and the Commission. A crucial problem present in most other ESDP missions was thus avoided.

From this brief overview of the missions, several relevant characteristics can be identified. Perhaps the most important of these is the fact that there seems to be a clear distinction amongst the types of missions the different Member States engage in. Thus, as could be expected, Member States with a colonial past and global ambition are much more active on a global scale, whereas those that do not have a colonial history are less so. Nevertheless, there are notable exceptions, such as the Scandinavian countries. This seems to reflect the humanitarian dimension that guides foreign policy in these countries and the strong domestic consensus behind it. At the same time, it seems that new MS have less interest in other regions of the world and concentrate on their immediate interests in the neighbourhood. Thus, most eastern and south-eastern MS have actively participated in missions in the Balkans, but have been much less active in Africa and other regions, except for those where the United States has high stakes.

A careful examination of the missions suggests that domestic preferences are relevant. It seems clear, for example, that MS that are more Atlanticist and where public opinion, the mass media, and most political parties are pro-US, are much more likely to participate in missions where the US has strategic interests. These include Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq. At the same time, these same MS seem to have much less interest in other missions where the EU has high stakes, such as those in Africa. Besides this, MS where domestic preferences support an active humanitarian policy, such as the Scandinavian countries, are actively involved in almost every type of mission. Finally, a third category is that of MS that follow what could be dubbed a more realist foreign policy. That is, those MS that participate in missions which directly affect their strategic interests, be it because the missions take place in neighbouring areas or because they are deployed in regions where they have economic or political interests. These last are likely to be less influenced by domestic dynamics.

Considering the significant diversity that exists when observing Member States' preferences, it seems there are few common factors that might affect the behaviour of most, if not all, Member States participating in ESDP missions. The next section, with the help of statistical analysis, aims to uncover common patterns that might exist.

3.3 Statistical analysis

This section develops an empirical analysis of the defence case. The section begins by describing the data used in the statistical analysis, it then explains the different models applied, and finally it presents and discusses the results obtained.

Data sources

Information on personnel seconded to civilian and mixed military-civilian missions on which the outcome or dependent variable relies has been obtained from the Council's Secretariat. While extremely helpful in many ways this data presents several challenges. The main challenge is the fact that in order to include all MS it is necessary to aggregate the data on a country basis, thus losing some information on the participation of MS in particular missions. The time series cover fourteen data points between September 2005 and December 2007. Overall, there are 378 observations (fourteen times the twenty-seven MS). In each one of these data points the number of personnel deployed by each Member State in the missions deployed by the EU is aggregated.

There is significant variance as some MS participate in several missions at any given time, while others tend to focus on one or two missions. The most extreme case is Malta, which participated in a single mission throughout the time period covered. Also, variation occurs between the missions as some are being closed and others started at any given time. In order to avoid losing what would be otherwise useful information on particular missions, a 'dummy variable' that measures whether increases in personnel deployed at a given time by a Member State relate to historic or strategic interests has been included. To do so, the composition of personnel seconded by each Member State to the different missions at any given time has been examined. This information is also included when looking at each of the MS (in section 3.4), and is taken into consideration when interpreting the results.

Figure 3.1 shows the aggregated personnel seconded by MS in the missions covering the period from September 2005 to December 2007. The data is bi-monthly (every two months) and is used as the outcome variable in the model. A first evaluation shows that the MS that have the biggest populations and armies are unsurprisingly those that contribute most to ESDP operations. Nevertheless, in almost all cases (except Malta) there is significant variation as to the personnel sent over time. Given that the models are controlled for size (measured by population), and that one of the models used is a panel, the biases that these differences in size might induce are avoided.

Independent variables

The independent variables follow the justification outlined in the second chapter. The main actors that are expected to have an effect in the position of a given Member State are public opinion, the national mass media, political parties, and the

Figure 3.1 Seconded civilian and military personnel. Contributions by MS to ESDP missions from September 2005 to June 2007 (bi-monthly figures)



Source: Author's elaboration based on data provided by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union DG E IX – Civilian Crisis Management

strength of governments themselves (in terms of their approval by the electorate). On the structural side, I expect the number of veto players, economic conditions (measured through GDP, budget deficits, unemployment, and trade dependency), the occurrence of elections, duration of membership, size, and strategic interests to have an effect on the secondment of personnel. The independent variables are described in some detail below.

Public opinion

Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of public opinion towards ESDP in a few representative Member States.[18] It suggests that significant variation exists amongst public attitudes in MS towards ESDP. So, while in some cases public attitudes have become more favourable towards ESDP (e.g. Austria and Denmark), others (such as Sweden and the UK) have become more sceptical. This variable is measured through Eurobarometer surveys (QA31_3).[19]

Mass media

The mass media is also liable to affect the positions of the executives, and to have an indirect influence through opinion-shaping in public opinion, in politi-

Figure 3.2 Public Opinion: in favour of ESDP (selected MS)



Source: Author's elaboration based on Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer 64 October-November 2005 to Eurobarometer 68 September-November 2007)

cal parties, and by affecting the popularity of a government. This variable has been obtained from the Eurobarometer. It captures the percentage of respondents who consider the EU to be covered positively by their respective national mass media.[20] Unfortunately, this was a one-time question. However, this fact is not as problematic as it would initially appear, given that big changes in media coverage are unlikely to occur within such a short time span. As with other variables, significant variation exists. The well-known Eurosceptic position of the British media is reflected, as is that of Ireland, Portugal, and perhaps more surprisingly Belgium. Amongst the most EU-friendly media are the Slovakian, Lithuanian, Greek, and Bulgarian.

Figure 3.3 Mass media coverage of the EU (in percentage/selected MS)[21]



Source: Author's elaboration based on Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer 61 February-March 2004)

Political parties

This variable relies on data from the Chapel Hill Survey of the University of North Carolina, which estimates party positioning in matters related to European integration (Hooghe et al. 2010). The survey was carried out in 1999, 2002, and 2006. The data used stems from the 2002 and 2006 surveys. With the survey data (which shows the degree of support of a party for European foreign policies on a scale from one to seven, seven being the greatest support) a weighted index that represents the degree of support European foreign policies enjoy at a given time in the parliament of a Member State has been created (see Appendices 7 and 8). The case of Belgium is provided as an illustration in table 3.7 below.

Table 3.7 Party support for European foreign policy (weighted index)

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Belgium	Socialist Party (Walloon)	6.33	14.9	14.9	10.86	0.94317	0.94317	0.68744
Belgium	Socialist Party (Flemish)	6.55	13	13	10.26	0.8515	0.8515	0.67203
Belgium	Ecolo (ecologist)	5	3.1	3.1	5.1	0.155	0.155	0.255
Belgium	Agalev (ecologist)	5.1	2.5	2.5	3.98	0.1275	0.1275	0.20298
Belgium	Flemish Liberals and Democrats	6.82	15.4	15.4	11.83	1.05028	1.05028	0.80681
Belgium	Reformist Movement	6.89	11.4	11.4	12.52	0.78546	0.78546	0.86263
Belgium	Christian Social Party	6.44	5.5	5.5	6.06	0.3542	0.3542	0.39026
Belgium	Christian People's Party	6.63	13.3	13.3	18.51	0.88179	0.88179	1.22721
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance	5	3.1	3.1	w.FA	0.155	0.155	
Belgium	Flemish Block	2.75	11.6	11.6	11.99	0.319	0.319	0.32973
Score						**5.6229**	**5.6229**	**5.43408**

I would expect that the stronger Eurosceptic parties become, the harder it is for government to enact pro-European policies. The results show that in the period covered by this study, parties that tended to oppose European foreign policies gained in strength, even though in cases such as France (due to losses by the Front National) the opposite trend was observed (figure 3.4). The election of the Polish Eurosceptic Law and Justice Party and the subsequent victory of the liberal Civic Platform Party illustrate the clearest swing in the period covered.

Figure 3.4 Political parties' support for European foreign policies (selected MS)[22]



Source: Author's elaboration based on data from the Chapel Hill Survey (2002 and 2006)

Government approval

Government approval is measured by Eurobarometer surveys. I have relied on question 7_11 of the survey: it asks respondents the degree of trust they have in their government.[23] There is significant variation in terms of approval within and between MS. Both the Netherlands and Sweden experienced the strongest gains in approval, while Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania experienced some of the heaviest losses.

Veto players

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, structural variables (such as the type of political system or the composition of parliament) are likely to affect governmental policies. Tsebelis' concept of veto players (see chapter 2) is a useful way of capturing these structural differences. I have constructed a dummy variable that measures whether a significant number of veto players exist or not. Tsebelis (1995; 2002) identifies two types of veto players: institutional and partisan. 'Institutional' refers to those set by the constitution of a state; this is particularly relevant in countries such as the United States where the constitution ensures the separation of powers (checks and balances) between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In the EU, it is not institutional veto players that dominate, but partisan veto players, that is, 'the different parties that are members of a government coalition' (Tsebelis 2002: 2). Tsebelis considers three main aspects: firstly, the number of parties that form a government; secondly, the ideological distances

between them; and thirdly, their internal cohesion. The measure of veto players is based on the first two of these elements, since internal cohesion is harder to measure in all twenty-seven MS. However, for the coding of the variable, a careful examination of the political landscape in each Member State has been made, which should provide a good measure of the existence (or not) of partisan veto players (see Appendix 4 on veto players).

When forming an index, I have considered the number of parties that form a government and the ideological distances between them. Where veto players exist, the condition has been coded as one. In those cases where no significant veto players exist, this has been coded as zero. I look at the number of coalition partners that formed a government during the time frame covered by the study (2005-2007). I use the data of the Chapel Hill Survey on party positions towards European foreign policies, in order to measure ideological distances between coalition parties. A full description of these is made in Appendix 4. The examples of Greece and Estonia are provided below. The next chapter also looks deeper into the effects of veto players in the Netherlands and Denmark.

Greek general elections took place in 2004, 2007, and 2009. Greece has a constitutional provision that reduces the number of veto players, since the winner of the parliamentary election is given a 40-seat premium. Parliament also elects the President. Moreover, recent elections have been fought between two main parties. The 2004 and 2007 elections brought the New Democracy Party into power (headed by Kostas Karamanlis), and the 2009 election George Papandreou from the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). For these reasons, parties in power tend to have strong majorities, and consequently the influence of veto players is greatly limited.

General elections took place in Estonia in March 2003 and March 2007. The 2003 elections led to a coalition between the Estonian Centre Party (EK/25.4 per cent of the vote), the Estonian Reform Party (ER/17.69 per cent), and the Estonian People's Union (ERL/13.03 per cent). The coalition nominated Andus Ansip as Prime Minister. The ideological differences between these parties on European foreign policy are moderate. The coalition partners also won most votes in the 2007 election. However, Prime Minister Ansip from the Estonian Centre Party formed a new coalition with the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union Party and the Social Democratic Party. Ideological differences are not wider than those in the previous coalition.

It's the economy…

Since Member States fund the training and deployment of personnel they second, it is likely that economic factors such as unemployment, wealth (measured in per capita GDP), and the budget deficit affect the decision to do so. Economic conditions during the period covered by this study were very favourable. Hence, it is possible that economic effects were not very significant, as it is usually during hard times that governments make budget cuts and not during booms.[24] However,

a strong trend towards budget consolidation took place in the period 2005-2007. This can be seen in figure 3.5 below (euro countries), which has been generated using data from the European Central Bank (ECB).[25] This type of fiscal consolidation might imply significant budget cuts and hence might have a negative effect on the secondment of personnel.

Figure 3.5 Government debt to GDP (euro area)



Source: ECB

Unemployment dramatically decreased during 2005 and 2007 – in some cases, such as Poland, from nearly 18 per cent to 8! This trend was generalized, and the UK was the only Member State to experience a slight increase in unemployment. GDP growth was also significant and generalized, with some MS (such as Luxembourg, Latvia, and Sweden) experiencing significant growth rates. Bulgaria and Hungary were among the only Member States where growth stagnated. This was also a period of deficit consolidation. Some MS (such as France, Portugal, the UK, and Greece) did so very timidly. Others (such as Hungary) started the period with significant deficits (almost 9 per cent of GDP) and were – or had to be – more aggressive.

Another economic variable that has been tested is the openness of the economy of any given Member State. The aim was to test whether the degree of dependency or autonomy of a Member State in terms of trade had any effect on its foreign policy. Most trade-dependent economies are smaller open economies, such as Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Among the

larger MS, the UK is the most trade-dependent, even if (given the size of its economy) much less so than in the cases of smaller MS.

Other variables

There are several other variables which have been accounted for, as they could have biased overall results. The first of these was whether an election was taking place. Given that ESDP is a fairly popular policy, it could be the case that governments increase the personnel they second to display activism before an election, or on the contrary that given the risks of a fiasco in an operation taking place they would decrease the number of personnel sent in the run-up to an election. To control for this effect, dummy variables that take the value of one in the period immediately before, during, and after an election have been included.

Another variable that might be of relevance is duration of membership. Thus, it is possible that states that have been members of the Union for longer display a higher activism than those that joined recently. To control for this, another dummy variable was created, which takes the value of one if the Member State joined the Union in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, and of zero if it was already a member.

The size of a Member State is also likely to affect the personnel seconded, as bigger MS have more resources at their disposal. Population has been used as a measure for size. Finally, given that at least some Member States have had strategic interests in some of the missions in which they participated, I created a dummy variable which takes the value of one in those cases where strategic interests were present. Criteria for coding whether a strategic interest existed were based on three main aspects: previous colonial ties, economic interests, or if the operation supported close allies (particularly the United States). In the last category, the most relevant operations were missions where NATO had also been involved, such as those in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If a Member State concentrated its deployment of personnel in missions in which any of these three conditions were present, the variable was coded as one.

Model

I used both a fixed effects panel, which groups the cases together, and a multivariate regression that does not aggregate cases. In the case of the panel, the data has been grouped according to the Member State it belongs to. Thus, variations both between and within MS were accounted for (see table 3.8). Given that data is in the form of time series, I have also controlled for time effects, that is, for any exogenous effect which might have affected all MS and that is not related to the model (see table 3.9). Finally, I have compared the results of the panel with those of a regular regression. In this case, cases were not grouped, and as a result the overall effects of variables can be seen without taking into consideration the Member States to which they belong – for example, whether an overall decrease in unemployment has any effects on personnel deployments taken as a whole.

Table 3.8 ESDP: Seconded Personnel. *Panel Regression (Fixed Effects)*

	Model 1[26]	Model 2[27]	Model 3[28]	Model 4[29]
Government approval	-.23** (.09)	-.22** (.09)	-.16* (.09)	-.17** (.07)
Deficit	–	-1.12**(.33)	-.57* (.36)	-.76* (.42)
Public opinion	–	–	.33* (.17)	.35* (.18)
Political parties	–	–	-5.57 (5.37)	-5.32 (5.59)
GDP	–	–	-2.14**(.70)	-2.4** (.80)
Media	–	–	–	(dropped)
Unemployment	–	–	–	-.73 (.59)
Open economy	–	–	–	.032 (.44)
Size	–	–	–	(dropped)
Veto players	–	–	–	-.31 (2.34)
Duration of Membership	–	–	–	(dropped)
Elections	–	–	–	-.10 (2.17)
Strategic interest	–	–	–	-2.12 (2.19)
R^2 Within	0.03	0.06	.13	.15
Between	0.02	0.01	.25	.26
Overall	0.02	0.01	.18	.19
Number of observations	378	364	322	322
Number of groups	27	26	23	23

Notes: *p≤ 0.1; **p≤ 0.05. Unstandardized beta coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses.

Results

Results confirm something that could already be foreseen by looking at Member State preferences in the previous sections. Member States have significantly different and in many occasions opposed preferences. This makes it unlikely for common factors to affect all or most of the twenty-seven at the same time. Thus, most of the variables that have been tested did not prove to be significant. However, the statistical analysis did uncover some variables that seem to affect if not all MS, then most.

Somewhat surprisingly, all the different models tested showed that the single most relevant variable which affects the number of personnel seconded to ESDP missions by the MS is the level of approval of a given government. Adding other variables capturing either the influence of actors or structural variables did not have any impact on this result, making it very robust. Moreover, all the different techniques tested led to the same result. The causal mechanism for the effect of popularity in secondment of personnel is nevertheless not very clear. As a result, and following the mixed methodology that has been suggested for this study, the last section of this chapter (3.4) looks at the issue of government popularity and the secondment of personnel in depth.

Results show that both government approval and positive deficits (that is: smaller deficits or surplus) have negative effects on the number of personnel deployed. These results are somewhat paradoxical. The case studies (developed in the next section) suggest an answer to the paradox of the negative relation between approval ratings and personnel. The negative impact of the deficit can be explained by cost reductions. Given that this period was one of budget consolidation (see figure 3.5), it seems logical that states which significantly reduced their budgetary deficits were those that seconded the least personnel. Given that fixed effects look at variations both between and within Member States (the members of the panel), it is not too surprising that as deficits diminished, making the deficit variable positive or less negative, the number of seconded personnel fell. The negative effect of GDP also seems paradoxical. This might reflect the fact that countries closest to the EU average are the most active in ESDP missions (e.g. Germany, France, the UK, Italy) while the wealthiest MS (e.g. Austria, Ireland, Denmark) are much less so. This can be seen in figure 3.6 (below); both those MS that are above as well as below the EU average tend to send the least personnel. Thus, as wealth increases, so do personnel deployments, until they reach a threshold around the figure of 30,000. From then onwards the relation is inverted. A table on the GDP per capita of the different MS is provided in the appendices.

Given that the model in table 3.8 is a panel, variables in which there was little variation automatically dropped out. Since the panel measures the effects not only between MS but also within MS, variables such as size, media, and duration of membership were dropped by the model.

As expected, public opinion has a positive effect indicating that the more favourable public preferences towards ESDP in a given Member State, the higher

Figure 3.6 GDP per capita and seconded personnel



the proportion of personnel a given Member State is likely to deploy in ESDP missions. However, at the 0.1 significance level this falls short of the customary 0.05 level for inferring statistical significance.

Table 3.9 ESDP: Seconded Personnel. *FE Panel Regression (Time Effects)*

	Model 1	Model 2[30]	Model 3[31]	Model 4[32]
Government approval	-.17** (.08)	-.19** (.09)	-.17* (.10)	-.20** (.08)
Deficit	–	-.33 (.33)	-.55* (.37)	-.63* (.40)
Public opinion	–	.26* (.19)		.35* (.18)
Political parties	–	-7.35 (5.88)	-7.31 (5.62)	
GDP	–	–	-1.19 (1.86)	-.77 (1.73)
Media	–	–	–	(dropped)
Unemployment	–	–	–	-1.11* (.72)
Open economy	–	–	–	.37 (.50)
Size	–	–	–	(dropped)
Veto players	–	–	–	-1.88 (2.46)
Duration of Membership	–	–	–	(dropped)
Elections	–	–	–	.15 (2.21)
Strategic interest	–	–	–	-2.61 (2.43)
R^2 Within	0.25	0.27	.31	.32
Between	0.01	0.01	.20	.24
Overall	0.05	0.05	.12	.12
Number of observations	378	364	322	322
Number of groups	27	26	23	23

Notes: *p≤ 0.1, **; p≤ 0.05. Unstandardized beta coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses.

Results are similar to those of the panel without time effects, with the exception of GDP and unemployment. Controlling for external shocks makes results more robust. In this case, the effect of GDP has disappeared, and instead that of unemployment seems to be relevant, even if at the 0.1 significance level it may not be statistically significant. The relationship between unemployment and seconded personnel moves in the expected direction: the higher the unemployment rate in a given MS, the less likely it is for it to second personnel.

Results of the simple regression analysis largely confirm those of the panel. This measure is not very reliable, given that it does not take into consideration that the data belongs to particular MS. It treats the data as if the EU were a single country, though this may nevertheless be of interest for observing overall patterns. It might also shed some light on the variables that were dropped by the panel analysis, given that little variation occurred (media, and duration of membership). I have not included size in this case since, as the data is not aggregated

Table 3.10 ESDP: Seconded Personnel. *Multivariate Regression*

	Model 1	Model 2[33]	Model 3[34]	Model 4[35]
Government approval	-.18** (.05)	-.19** (.06)	-.49** (.07)	-.38** (.08)
Deficit	–	.05 (.32)	-.66** (.28)	.21 (.25)
Public opinion	–	–	.19** (.10)	.099 (.10)
Political parties	–	–	2.72**(1.03)	-2.24** (1.1)
GDP	–	–	1.15** (.09)	.02 (.17)
Media	–	–	–	6.9** (2.0)
Unemployment	–	–	–	-.09 (.32)
Open economy	–	–	–	-.47** (.07)
Veto players	–	–	–	5.25** (1.77)
Duration of Membership	–	–	–	-22.27** (3.8)
Elections	–	–	–	-.05 (1.78)
Strategic interest	-	–	–	-10.65** (2.0)
R^2	0.2	0.2	.39	.60
Number of observations	378	364	322	322

Notes: *p≤ 0.1, **p≤ 0.05. Unstandardized beta coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses.

at the country level, size becomes logically the single most important explanatory factor eclipsing all others: the bigger countries are those that second the most personnel. Government approval is still the most significant variable, but unlike the panel, the deficit is no longer significant (except for the third model). The effect of GDP is in this case positive (although only significant in the third model). Also, the effect of political parties is not very clear given that once the rest of the variables are aggregated (in model 4) it becomes negative, which is counter-intuitive. Most other variables produce expected results. Positive mass media coverage leads to a higher secondment of personnel. New MS second less personnel than the previous fifteen MS (hence the negative effect of duration of membership); pursuing strategic interests leads to smaller personnel deployment; and more open (smaller) economies also second fewer personnel. This last measure is also a good proxy for size without being so dominant as to eclipse all the other ones. Another counter-intuitive result was that of veto players. The presence of veto players was expected to lead to fewer personnel deployed, and not to a positive relationship.

As mentioned earlier, the results of table 3.10 should be interpreted carefully, as they reflect disaggregated data and hence do not take into consideration membership or time effects. The results of table 3.9 (which include both membership and time effects), are those that can be considered to be most robust. From these results, economic variables (e.g. budget deficits or unemployment) seem to have a certain weight; perhaps some domestic factors (such as public opinion) have as well, although most of them do not reach the 0.05 threshold customary for infer-

ring statistical significance. Most results then are to be interpreted carefully, except for one. All of the models showed a paradoxical (and statistically significant) relationship between popularity and secondment of personnel. This result is very robust and hence it is the main conclusion that can be drawn from the quantitative analysis. It seems nevertheless puzzling. To clarify this occurrence the next section looks in more depth at four specific cases.

This selection of cases was made on the basis of two main criteria. The first was that they should represent the main splits existing within the EU. The second was that the cases should show a strong link between government support and the secondment of personnel. Following this logic, the cases selected are: France (one of the Big Three), Sweden (one of the northern MS), the Czech Republic (a Member State from the 2004 enlargement, part of the eastern dimension), and Romania (part of the 2007 enlargement and the southern dimension). These cases go some way towards capturing the full diversity that exists among the members of the Union: the bigger and globally active players, smaller neutral states with a strong humanitarian foreign policy, a recent Member State with a strong interest in the eastern dimensions of European foreign policy, and a new Atlanticist (pro-US) Member State with a strong interest in the southern dimension of EFP.

3.4 Instrumentalizing foreign policy? Government popularity and ESDP in France, Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Romania

I expected domestic factors to play a relevant role mainly in smaller and mid-sized MS. The logic for this was that the Big Two (or Three) should have much broader interests and hence realpolitik and strategic considerations should be paramount, this particularly since France and the UK have a long tradition of external involvement. It was then surprising to find France amongst the cases where government popularity seems to be strongly related to secondment of personnel. On the other hand, this made it easier to include a representative sample in the case studies.

France

The substantial reduction in seconded personnel towards the end of 2005 (see figure 3.7) is almost entirely a result of an overall reduction in personnel for the EUPM operation in Bosnia and hence cannot be ascribed to domestic factors. The overall figures for EUPM were reduced from over 300 to about half that figure; it remained at that level for the entire period covered by the study. Since France was the main participant in the mission (alongside Germany and the UK), reduction in troop numbers for the Bosnian missions strongly affected the overall presence of French personnel in ESDP missions.

There is, however, an interesting trend from around February 2007 until June of the same year. This trend, which is in line with the main result of the statistical model, shows an increase in the approval ratings of the government, while at the

Figure 3.7 Civilian personnel and government approval (France)



same time there is a decrease in personnel being deployed to ESDP operations. As in the Swedish case (below), the reason for increased popularity seems to be the campaign leading to the general election in June 2007.

This rise in government popularity is not unusual in the run-up to an election, as campaigning tends to be associated with higher spending and stronger activism from the executive. Rogoff and Sibert explain that while in theory voters should be aware of this 'suboptimal tax distortions over time', in reality the executive can use information asymmetries to benefit from higher spending during electoral cycles (Rogoff/Sibert 1998). In an analysis of Dutch electoral cycles, Van Dalen and Swank find evidence that during the period 1953-1993 government expenditure in all categories increased during electoral cycles (Dalen/Swank 1996). Thus, the reason for France deploying fewer personnel during an election might reflect the aim of concentrating resources domestically or of avoiding the risks of something going wrong in an operation that might backfire against the government. Another reason might be related to the fact that senior police officers are deployed in civilian missions. It is reasonable to expect that they would be recalled during electoral cycles. No relevant effects from negotiations with other Member States or third-party actors were found when looking at possible further factors that might have affected deployment of personnel.

Sweden

The Swedish case is puzzling in that there is a significant and short-lived drop in personnel around December 2005 (see figure 3.8) at a time where there were no significant domestic or international factors to explain it.[36] A more careful examination, however, suggests that a sudden drop in Swedish personnel always occurs around the end of the year. Sweden is one of the most active participants in ESDP, and at any given time there are a significant number of Swedish personnel deployed. Moreover, the regularity of the swings in personnel suggests something else at play. Given that swings always occurred around the Christmas period it is likely that Sweden allowed its personnel to return home for the holidays. A

smaller but similar swing seems to happen during the summer holidays. Once the holiday period is over, personnel have been re-deployed. Since this seasonal effect was likely to occur in other Member States I have examined deployments during that time of the year for all MS. Most other MS have not experienced such swings, with the exceptions of Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Belgium, and Austria. These are all Member States with strong welfare provisions, which might explain why they allow for more flexibility in their personnel deployments.

Figure 3.8 Civilian personnel and government approval (Sweden)



There is, nevertheless, another part of the puzzle which needs to be explained. This is the drop in personnel as approval ratings soared around the period August to October 2006. In this case, the explanation is similar to that for France. Increases in popularity are likely to reflect the political campaign leading to general elections in October 2006. As in the French case, it is likely that resources deployed abroad, particularly senior police officers, would be recalled during an election. There is also the element of risk, as having personnel deployed does not automatically win votes, but a fiasco could easily translate into a loss of support. In the Swedish case, the election was the most bitterly fought in the recent history of the country. Eventually, the centre-right coalition of Fredrik Reinfeldt defeated the incumbent Social Democrats who had been in power for the previous twelve years, and sixty-five out of the previous seventy-four years (*The Economist* 2006). Public opinion surveys were confirmed as the Social Democrats achieved their worst electoral result since 1921. Even though the election focused on domestic issues, such as a significant disguised unemployment figure (particularly among youth), important differences regarding foreign policy existed between the two candidates. The most important discrepancy was the issue of NATO membership. Even though aware of the difficulty of achieving it, the new Prime Minister has been a strong supporter of NATO membership. Furthermore, he is strongly Atlanticist and stoutly supported the Bush administration. The significant swing from the strongly pro-European Social Democrats to the more Atlanticist conservatives

of the Moderate Party might also explain why the number of personnel deployed remained low after the election.

The Czech Republic

A combination of internal and external factors over the summer of 2006 seems likely to have influenced both the government's popularity and its secondment of personnel. The Czech Republic was in the midst of an election campaign as general elections took place in June, and local and Senate elections in October. While party manifestos did not provide a clear perspective on foreign policy positions, these loomed large throughout the campaign (Berdych/Nekvapil 2006). However, unlike the Swedish and French cases, the electoral cycle led to an increase and not to a decrease in personnel. Why was this the case? A careful evaluation of this case shows that there was an external factor that played a major role in this occurrence: participation in the US visa waivers programme.

Negotiations to extend the visa waivers programme, which until then covered only sixteen Western European countries, had been going on for some time. However, a resolution by the US Senate created a stir in the Czech Republic. The resolution would allow for a temporary (two-year) test period of visa-free access to the United States for those countries that significantly supported US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The only country which fulfilled this criterion was Poland. The Czech government initially alleged it would not increase its commitments to these two missions in response to this. However, its secondment of personnel suggests otherwise (see figure 3.9).

Figure 3.9 Civilian personnel and government approval (Czech Republic)



The spike in the number of personnel deployed that occurred towards August 2006 is fully a result of the reinforcement of the mission in Iraq. The fall in numbers of seconded personnel that can be observed towards the end of that year results from a departure from Bosnia (figures for Iraq remained unchanged). This significant drop in personnel is likely to be a result of the political crisis that erupted after the general elections (in June 2006) failed to produce a clear winner. A government was not formed until January 2007. Precisely this period saw the biggest drop

in personnel secondments. In February 2007, once the political crisis had been overcome, Prague renewed its commitments to Bosnia, albeit with a smaller component. The previous pro-US trend was again visible with another strong deployment, this time to Afghanistan, towards December 2007. The only other mission in which Prague participated during this period was Palestine.

Transatlantic relations also played an important part in domestic politics for a second reason: the Bush administration's aim of establishing a missile-shield system in Central Europe. While negotiations on the establishment of the system had been kept secret throughout the election campaign, the visit by American military experts in July 2006 to explore possible sites received a strong echo in the media. This occurred in the context of a political deadlock, as the elections held on 1st-2nd June had failed to produce a clear winner. The deadlock was broken when the Liberals formed a weak coalition. As has been mentioned in section 3.2, the Liberals are much more Atlanticist (pro-US) than the Social Democrats. It is not surprising, then, that the missile shield became a major topic in domestic debates. The Social Democrats, knowing that public opinion was strongly against the missile defence shield, demanded a popular vote on the issue. A rapid loss in the popularity of the new government ensued.

Both international and domestic factors seem to have reinforced one another in the Czech case. The visa-waiver debate that came to the fore in the midst of the election campaign seems to have affected secondments in the Iraq and later Afghanistan missions. The only country which fulfilled the criteria demanded by the American Senate (support to US operations overseas) for the visa-waiver program was Poland, leaving the Czechs out. Prague may have considered that augmenting its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan would persuade the US government to grant the visa waiver to Czech citizens. The Czech government also linked the issue of missile defence with obtaining the visa waiver.[37]

Transatlantic ties (strategic interest) and domestic political crises thus provide a good explanation for personnel secondments. This case seems a good example of Putnam's (1988) two-level game, as the agreement at the international level (in this case with the US), had important reverberations in the domestic arena. At the same time, changes in the domestic arena (particularly the demand for a referendum by the Social Democrats) reduced the win-set, that is, the set of possible agreements in international negotiations. This might have increased the pressure on the American administration to increase the win-set through side-payments, which ultimately might explain why the American administration granted Czech nationals a visa waiver as plans to install the missile shield system went ahead.

Romania

As with previous cases, an in-depth look at Romanian politics provides a good explanation of the negative relation between government approval and seconded personnel. A first factor that seems relevant was achieving EU membership. As can be seen in figure 3.10, Romania was participating in ESDP missions even before it

joined the EU in January 2007. However, since joining, it has augmented its participation both in terms of personnel sent to existing missions and by deploying personnel in new operations. This is not too surprising since the main foreign policy aim of Romania has been 'becoming a good European' by eschewing the labels of 'Eastern European' or 'Balkan' and becoming a stable and reliable partner within both NATO and ESDP (Micu 2010). A political crisis that culminated with the suspension of the President in April 2007 put a temporary halt to this trend, which nevertheless continued once the crisis was solved.

Figure 3.10 Civilian personnel and government approval (Romania)



On 19 April 2007 the Romanian Parliament voted to suspend President Băsescu on the grounds that he had overstepped his constitutional powers. In reality, infighting between the (Liberal) Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu and the (Democrat) President Băsescu was of long standing. The conflict exploded as the foreign minister was asked to resign by Prime Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu (following a scandal involving the detention of two Romanian workers by coalition troops in Iraq), and the President refused to confirm the new minister who had been nominated by the Prime Minister (*The Economist* 2007a). The President, a staunch Atlanticist, had from the outset strongly supported Romanian participation in both the War in Afghanistan and the Iraq War. The Liberals used this opportunity to threaten to bring the government down if troops were not withdrawn from Iraq. At the same time, they were aiming to remove three ministers from power, in particular the Minister of Justice, Monica Macovei, who had, thanks to the EU conditionality criteria, made important inroads in the fight against corruption. Since the Democrats refused to budge, the government fell apart. The new minority government suspended the President from office and launched a referendum on whether or not to impeach Mr Băsescu.

The political crisis seems a good explanation for the freezing of new personnel for operations, as no new personnel were sent (or removed) from ESDP missions until the political crisis ended. This happened when President Băsescu was reinstated after comfortably winning the referendum. The political crisis coincided

with a strong drop in government support. Considering the result of the referendum (74 per cent in favour of Băsescu), it seems justifiable to explain the fall in support as a rejection by the electorate of the government's policies. The Prime Minister himself admitted defeat by declaring that the vote had been a 'waste of energy and money' (*The Economist* 2007b). Thus, it seems that the political crisis affected both secondment of personnel and the popularity of the government. As soon as the crisis was resolved, the previous trend in secondment of personnel continued as Romania increased its participation in ESDP missions. The government's popularity, on the other hand, stagnated.

Preliminary conclusions

What the case studies show is that even if a strong (negative) relation exists between secondment of personnel and the approval of a given government, the reasons for this can be very different. Overall, the cases selected show that electoral cycles have important effects and partially explain the negative link between popularity and secondment of personnel. This factor was overlooked in aggregated data, since the dummy variable for electoral cycles did not prove to be significant. Nevertheless, the finer picture shows that domestic dynamics have a strong effect on the deployment of personnel, be it political crises or electoral cycles and even more mundane factors, such as holiday seasons.

Statistical analysis also suggested some relevant trends which might be at play, such as the fact that the MS that are involved in budget consolidation are less likely to second personnel, that public opinion may have a positive influence on the secondment of personnel, and that higher unemployment may lead to less foreign policy activism. Perhaps also, though less certain as the data is not aggregated, is that MS following strategic objectives tend to second fewer personnel, that new MS are much less active, and that small, open, and wealthy MS are extremely reticent to participate in ESDP missions. Thus, the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods seems to be a useful approach for understanding the complexity of EU policies that require strong cooperation between MS, such as ESDP.

Linking the results to the hypotheses formulated in the second chapter, the outcomes provide some evidence for the influence of both economic and domestic factors in the degree of cooperation between MS in advancing common defence policies (measured through secondments of personnel). Economic and strategic interest play a role in particular missions. In particular, new MS tend to deploy personnel only in areas where they have strong economic interests (e.g. south-eastern Europe) or in support of the United States (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq). Former colonial ties also seem to affect personnel deployments, particularly for France, the UK, Belgium, and the Netherlands. These ties are also likely to follow economic interests. Hence, both the statistical analysis and the cases provide some evidence supporting the null hypothesis.

On the other hand, the influence of domestic factors seems more complex than what was initially hypothesized. They have a strong effect on personnel deploy-

ments. Of those which were expected to have an effect, a favourable public opinion seems to translate into foreign policy activism, particularly for Scandinavian countries. However, the main cause for shifts in deployments seems to be not domestic actors, but electoral cycles and political crises. Both affect popularity and personnel deployments. Electoral cycles tend to reduce personnel secondments and to increase a government's popularity. I expected popularity to shield the government's responsiveness to the media, public opinion, and political parties; and the presence of veto players to increase it. This relationship, however, seems to be more complex, given that popularity does not directly affect personnel secondments but electoral cycles do affect both deployments and popularity. On the other hand, political crises exert the expected effect, decreasing both popularity and negatively affecting troop deployments (usually frozen until the crisis is resolved).

The overall picture suggests that economic, strategic, and domestic factors do play an important role in affecting cooperation between MS in furthering defence policies. This in turn suggests that the effect of the Almond-Lippmann thesis is less clear than might be expected. Not only was public opinion stable and followed expected patterns, but at least for some MS it seems to have led to stronger participation and hence had a positive effect on cooperation. The liberal approach followed in this book seems thus appropriate. Whether it helps explain cooperation in other relevant foreign policy areas is tested in the next chapter which looks at the effect of economic and domestic factors in another crucial foreign policy area: enlargement.

4 • Enlargement

This chapter weighs the effect of domestic factors in facilitating or hindering cooperation between MS in enlargement policies. The chapter begins by looking at the reasons why domestic factors (particularly public perceptions) are likely to affect cooperation in this area by evaluating the previous two rounds of enlargement (in 2004 and 2007), as well as examining attitudes towards and challenges faced by current accession candidates. It then provides an overview of the workings of the policy itself and the reasons why cooperation between MS is essential for its success. In order to test whether and which domestic factors have an impact on the stances of Member States towards accession, an empirical analysis of the Turkish case (the most contentious and hence the one where such effects are most likely to be found) follows. Results of the fsQCA and regression analysis are discussed in the final section.

4.1 Domestic factors and enlargement

Enlargement is probably the most successful European foreign policy to date. It continues to be (as stated by the European Security Strategy) a crucial component of European foreign policies and affects some of the EU's most important strategic interests. In addition, enlargement (particularly towards Turkey) has a major impact on both transatlantic relations and energy policy. On the other hand, the last two rounds of enlargement provoked a strong backlash in the electorates of several Member States, making the continuation of this policy controversial. It may also have contributed to the rise of populist and Eurosceptic parties throughout Western Europe, even in some previously pro-European MS, such as the Netherlands. Hence, there seems to be a strong link between enlargement and domestic political dynamics.

Enlargement is one of the areas where domestic debates have been vigorous and where they are likely to have important effects in shaping European foreign policies. This is not what one would expect if one follows the Almond-Lippmann consensus, which says that foreign policy should be shielded from public debate and little influenced by public attitudes. While this may be true in certain European countries, it is certainly not what happens in MS such as France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland, and, more recently, Italy.[1] It is therefore relevant to look at the effects of public perceptions on accession policies. Before that, however, it is pertinent to emphasize that throughout the period following

Maastricht, support for European integration has remained stable and high overall as can be seen in Eurobarometer surveys so that lack of support for enlargement cannot be directly attributed to a lack of support for the EU.

Support for enlargement has been low (and continues to be so). Moreover, it has been selective, with some candidate countries enjoying stronger backing than others. This becomes clear when looking at candidate countries from the previous enlargement processes. What is most surprising is that, with the exception of Cyprus,[2] this approval (or lack of it) is remarkably stable and has remained so over time: exactly the opposite of what one would expect from the Almond-Lippmann consensus. This is shown below in figure 4.1 and table 4.1. Disaggregated data for each candidate country is only available up to 2002.

It can be seen from figure 4.1 that support for particular countries in years preceding the 2004 enlargement was remarkably stable in both absolute and relative terms (exact figures are shown in table 4.1). Variations in overall support have affected all countries equally (with the exception of Cyprus).[3]

Figure 4.1 In favour of EU enlargement with regard to Eastern enlargement candidate countries in per cent



Source: Author's elaboration based on Eurobarometer data (1996 to 2002)

Table 4.1 In favour of EU enlargement with regard to Eastern enlargement candidate countries in per cent

Country	EB 44.2bis Jan. 1996	EB 47.1 Apr. 1997	EB 48.0 Nov. 1997	EB 49 May 1998	EB 50.0 Nov. 1998	EB 51.0 Apr. 1999	EB 52.0 Nov. 1999	EB 53 Jun. 2000	EB 54.1 Jan. 2001	EB 56.2 Nov. 2001	EB 57 May 2002	EB 58 Nov. 2002
Malta	50	49	n/a	n/a	52	49	49	50	48	51	47	52
Hungary	51	49	47	53	50	46	47	46	46	50	48	52
Poland	48	46	43	49	47	43	44	44	44	47	44	48
Czech R.	44	43	41	48	45	40	42	41	42	45	43	46
Cyprus	43	40	40	46	45	42	43	44	42	46	43	41
Slovakia	37	36	36	43	39	35	37	37	38	40	38	41
Estonia	37	36	35	41	39	35	36	36	37	40	37	41
Latvia	38	36	35	41	39	35	36	35	37	39	37	41
Lithuania	37	35	35	41	38	35	36	35	36	39	36	40
Slovenia	34	34	32	39	36	32	34	34	35	37	35	38

Source: Author's analysis based on Eurobarometer data (1996 to 2002)

What is noteworthy from the previous table is that the states where the lure of enlargement was most important in achieving EU foreign policy objectives such as democratic consolidation or regional stabilization were also the countries towards which public support was at its lowest.

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 669) argue that the effectiveness of EU strategy depended crucially on initial conditions. Thus, for both completely undemocratic countries or for 'democratic front runners' (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, where conditionality was *unnecessary* for democratization and democratic consolidation), EU external governance was ineffective. Democratic front runners are amongst those who enjoyed the strongest support in public preferences. Also, public support was at its lowest for those countries which were particularly relevant to EU security aims and where success in promoting reforms was most evident (i.e. Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovakia).

These candidate countries were of major concern for the EU, given the aim of stabilizing the eastern and south-eastern regions. Each of these countries presented important challenges. The countries in the Baltic faced the challenge of integrating large Russian-speaking minorities, whereas EU accession was relevant in bringing about democratic consolidation in Slovakia. Slovenia was the first country in the Balkans to be admitted, and consequently a first step in consolidating the EU's aim of eventually integrating and ensuring the democratization and stability of other former Yugoslav states. Public attitudes towards these countries, however, tended to oppose membership. The way differences in support were

Table 4.2 In favour of EU enlargement for possible new MS

Country	EB 44.2bis Jan. 1996	EB 47.1 Apr. 1997	EB 48.0 Nov. 1997	EB 49 May 1998	EB 50.0 Nov. 1998	EB 51.0 Apr. 1999	EB 52.0 Nov. 1999	EB 53 Jun. 2000	EB 54.1 Jan. 2001	EB 56.2 Nov. 2001
Bulgaria	37	37	36	42	39	35	36	36	35	38
Romania	38	35	33	39	37	33	34	33	33	36
Turkey	36	32	n/a	n/a	n/a	29	30	30	30	34
Croatia	31	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	33
Bos.-H.	29	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	30
FYROM	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	29
Albania	26	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	27

Source: Author's elaboration based on Eurobarometer data, January 1996 (EB44.2) to November 2001 (EB56.2); in percentage

stable throughout the whole period covered (in both absolute and relative terms) was repeated for the next wave of candidate or new member states (see table 4.2).

Differences between Member States regarding enlargement were also significant. Figure 4.2 looks at public preferences before the 2004 enlargement for each of the then 15 MS (see figure 4.3 for current candidate countries).

As with the 2004 enlargement, important differences exist between MS. In the EU-25 (or EU-27), however, these differences have become more pronounced. It is interesting to note that there are groups of countries where public opinion

Figure 4.2 In favour of eastern enlargement (EU-15 countries)



Source: Author's elaboration based on Eurobarometer data (2002 to 2004)

Figure 4.3 In favour of further enlargement (EU-25 and EU-27)



Source: Author's elaboration based on Eurobarometer data (2004 to 2007)

towards enlargement reacts in similar ways (figure 4.3); particularly in some new MS (e.g. Lithuania, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Malta). Moreover, there is a clear difference between older and newer MS. In the former, public opinion is much less favourable to further enlargement. What all of the previous graphs show is that public opinion follows coherent and consistent patterns. This clearly goes against the expectations of the Almond-Lippmann consensus.

Challenges for current accession candidates

The international community, and in particular the EU, has played a major role in the stabilization of the western Balkans following the demise of the former Yugoslavia. In this sense, the lure of enlargement has been crucial in providing incentives for reform, and in containing the radical nationalist forces still present throughout the region. As Bogzeanu contends, integration is conditional on the achievement of good neighbourly relations between countries in the western Balkans. This aim is nevertheless complicated by an environment in which states

are still claiming territories and establishing a national identity; and in which the international community continues to play a major role in maintaining stability and security (Bogzeanu 2010). Progress is therefore uneven. Croatia and Albania, for example, are now NATO members. In theory, this should mean that they are more closely integrated into Western structures, and this in turn should facilitate their accession bids. In reality, however, important differences exist between the two cases. Thus, while Croatia seems poised to join the EU in the near future, the situation of Albania is much more complex, particularly because of corruption and organized crime.

Whitman and Juncos (2010) note that 2009 was one of the most dynamic years in enlargement negotiations in recent times. Four new applications for membership were submitted (Montenegro, Albania, Iceland, and Serbia), and ongoing negotiations have been substantially advanced with Croatia. There are, nonetheless, important disputes affecting the enlargement process. Croatia's accession has been halted due to a border dispute with Slovenia; the Netherlands have placed a veto on the EU's agreement with Serbia; Macedonia's accession talks have also been blocked due to its ongoing dispute with Greece; and negotiations with Turkey have been blocked by its dispute with Cyprus. Even though negotiations with Iceland have advanced swiftly (raising protests from other candidates to accession), its ongoing disputes with the UK and the Netherlands are likely to delay accession talks. The lack of reform in several candidate countries has further bogged down the enlargement process.

In Bogzeanu's (2010) account, the two countries which face the biggest challenges in the western Balkans are Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the case of Kosovo, its main problem is achieving recognition by the international community and membership in international institutions, such as the United Nations. Moreover, relations with Serbia and with the Serbian minority within Kosovo remain tense. Furthermore, the fact that internal security is assured by external actors might lead to long-term dependency. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the success of nationalist parties has led to continuous blockages and a severe political crisis. The intended constitutional reform has failed, as the different parties have been unable to reach any agreement. Tensions amongst ethnic communities have also impeded the implementation of the reforms required for EU membership. The situation is further complicated by struggles between the High Representative (HR) and the Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska.[4] The very existence of the HR points to the instability and fragility of the state. The aim of closing the Office of the High Representative has been impeded by failure to achieve constitutional reform. Croatian leadership within the Bosnian Croat Federation also contributes to the political deadlock, as it aims to achieve some sort of territorial autonomy. This combination of factors makes progress in the implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), signed in 2008, almost impossible.

For their part, Whitman and Juncos (2010) contend that the main problem among candidates and potential candidates to accession has been a lack of imple-

mentation of the rule of law, together with a failure to establish an independent judiciary capable of fighting organized crime and corruption. The same authors note that lack of freedom of expression in the western Balkans and media censorship have been particularly significant during recent elections. The economic crisis has also had important effects, with Serbia requiring assistance from the IMF and the EU creating a crisis package to support the western Balkans.

Serbia has managed to come closer to its goal of becoming an official candidate for the EU, as the Danish veto has been lifted following Belgrade's cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Bogzeanu 2010). Serbia has also come closer to NATO with the signing of an Individual Partnership Program (IPP) with the Atlantic alliance. Even though Serbia continues to oppose the secession of Kosovo, the fact that it has done so through diplomatic means and on the basis of international law has also supported its membership bid.

Montenegro submitted an application in 2008 and progress has been made in fulfilling the political criteria for membership (Bogzeanu 2010). Macedonia has made steady progress in the pace of its reforms. Nevertheless, the dispute with Greece over Macedonia's name continues to affect accession negotiations to both the EU and NATO.

Croatia has advanced furthest in accession negotiations. Its border dispute with Slovenia seems to have been finally resolved. The two parties have agreed to submit the dispute to international arbitration, and an arbitration agreement was signed in November 2009. In most other areas, Croatia has made significant progress, even though challenges remain. So far, it has closed seventeen out of thirty-five negotiation chapters, while eleven remain open, and seven have yet to be opened. The opening of new chapters is still being blocked by Slovenia, the Netherlands, the UK, Belgium, Finland, and Denmark (Whitman/Juncos 2010).

Given the technical nature of the accession process, domestic actors may appear unlikely to affect this policy. This is misleading since, as Müftüler-Bac and McLaren (2003) argue, the preferences of Member States have played a crucial role in previous accession rounds. Even though the Copenhagen criteria play a relevant role, the process is highly political and the Commission has been criticized on previous occasions for lacking objectiveness (notably in the case of Slovakia). Moreover, as the cases reviewed above suggest, the vetoing of negotiation chapters is a common practice among MS. That said, interviews with MS representatives suggest that in the meetings of working groups, particularly enlargement working groups, Member States do not like to be isolated since they have to face the Commission (see next section). Since the Commission is working towards the goal of accession, coalitions are formed between MS in order to block or delay parts of the procedure. This was summed up by an interviewee representing a Member State in Brussels as follows: 'If you say no to a position of the Commission, you try to get two or three other delegates to also say no – then you are much stronger. If you are the only one left, it's not very good. You do not stay very long ... If you have three or four, then you can move.'

The EU and Turkey

Turkey is the most controversial candidate for accession and hence the most likely case where domestic factors will have an effect on enlargement policies. If domestic dynamics do not play a role in this case, they are unlikely to do so in the case of other accession candidates; as a result, this case is given particular attention. It is, so to say, a most-likely case which makes it ideal for testing the impact of domestic factors on EU foreign policies.

Negotiations between the EU and Turkey are complex and of long standing. An association agreement between the EC and Turkey (Ankara Agreement) was signed as early as 1963. However, until 1980 relations were somewhat distant. Not until the coup staged by the military in September 1980 did the EU take a strong interest in bilateral relations as the socialist faction in the European Parliament (EP) sought to suspend the association agreement and the Council of Europe threatened to expel Turkey. The Turkish military faced a dilemma: on the one hand its aim of reforming Turkish society and leading Turkey towards modernization and eventual EC membership; and on the other, in doing so through a coup, risking losing the very possibility of EC membership. For this reason, it has been possible to identify a strong European dimension within Turkish politics since at least the 1980s. This factor was to become essential in allowing the rise to power of the mildly Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), which used Europe and the reforms demanded by the EC to further contain the power of the generals and to continue wide-ranging reforms in the Turkish state.[5]

The importance of this European dimension for domestic reforms became even clearer towards the end of the nineties. The perceived lack of interest of the EU and the increasing strength of Islamist and Kurdish parties put the generals back on the offensive. They used the Constitutional Court to declare the Refah Party (a predecessor of the AKP) illegal and to force the resignation of the Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, who had led the first successful attempt by an Islamist party to come to power. The postmodern coup, as it was characterized by the press, also led to the incarceration of several key figures within Islamist parties, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, mayor of Istanbul, amongst them. Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül would continue to fight against the military, founding the Virtue Party, which was nevertheless also banned in 2001. In this context, the decision of the European Council of Luxembourg in 1997, which de facto excluded Turkey from the list of accession candidates, reinforced the resolve of the military to roll back the reforms that had been carried out over the past two decades.

However, the same European dimension would play a major role in legitimizing the forces that aimed at reducing the influence of the military. After Virtue was banned by the Constitutional Court, Erdoğan and Gül formed the AKP, which rapidly gained popularity and achieved a landslide result at the 2002 elections. The AKP began a set of profound reforms which on the one hand allowed Erdoğan to become Prime Minister (he had been banned from doing so) and on the other aligned Turkey on the path of reform demanded by the EU (*The Economist* 2003).

This period was characterized by a strengthening of civilian rule over the military and by significant advances in the protection of minorities.

Paradoxically, the forces that the secular establishment and the military had repressed in their aim of modernizing the Turkish state became those that contributed the most to enacting the reforms demanded by the EU. In this sense, the impact of enlargement has been immense. The EU, recognizing this, reversed the Copenhagen decision and granted Turkey candidate status at the Helsinki European Council of 1999, and agreed to start negotiations at the Helsinki European Council of 2004. This dynamic, however, has changed over the past few years, given the vocal resistance of several MS. As both Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel came to power in France and Germany, their strong opposition to Turkish enlargement has had a significant impact on Turkish politics. Public support within Turkey has withered and the pace of reform has slowed. Turkish foreign policy has also become more diversified and assertive, which may or may not be a result of what is perceived as European indifference towards its membership bid.

Turkish reforms on the political front began in October 2001, when the Turkish parliament began discussing the implementation of the Copenhagen requirements (which are the cornerstone of accession negotiations). Amongst the thirty-seven reforms being debated, the most important was an increase in the number of civilians in the National Security Council (MGK). This body had served as the main instrument through which the military exerted its control over the government. With elections looming, and public opinion strongly supporting EU accession (65 to 70 per cent), even nationalist parties such as ANAP and the MHP supported the reforms. Reforms not only transformed the MGK, but even included the abolition of the death penalty (from 2002 during peacetime and from 2004 even during war), as well as lifting the state of emergency that had existed in the Kurdish provinces and allowing broadcasting and education in Kurdish (*The Economist* 2002). For a state that had been built on the idea of ethnic and cultural homogeneity, these changes were unprecedented.

In its 2002 progress report, the Commission emphasized that the decision of granting Turkey candidate status had promoted fundamental reforms. These reforms had strengthened respect for human rights and fundamental liberties, while at the same time significantly reducing the number of offences incurring capital punishment. Furthermore, the Commission welcomed the lifting of the state of emergency in the south-east of the country (European Commission 2002). In its 2003 report, the Commission further emphasized the importance of reforms in the fields of freedom of expression and assembly, cultural rights, and civilian control over the military.

Turkey aimed at obtaining a clear date for the start of accession negotiations during the Helsinki Council of 2004. For this reason, the AKP government pushed and was successfully able to introduce the reforms just described. However, a major impediment remained: the conflict in Cyprus. The issue of Cyprus is of extreme sensitivity within Turkey as it is considered a matter of national security. At the

same time, with the entry of Cyprus into the EU, not only would Cyprus (and Greece) wield the power of veto over negotiations with Turkey, but the conflict automatically became a territorial dispute within the EU. In this context, Erdoğan exerted significant pressure on the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to restart negotiations. This pressure, alongside the electoral success of the moderate faction led by Ali Talat in the 2003 elections, was successful in restarting peace negotiations under the auspices of the UN's Annan Plan for Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots strongly endorsed the plan in an ensuing referendum, which nevertheless failed to win the support of Greek Cypriots.

Reforms on the economic front, while less controversial, have been equally challenging. The Turkish economy has had a long history of boom and bust, high unemployment, and high inflation. In this sense, the reduction of inflation from over 50 per cent in 2001 to single-digit numbers is perhaps the biggest success. There have also been significant changes resulting from the privatization of state assets, the strengthening of property rights, and overall macro-economic and financial stability. Thanks to these reforms, the Turkish economy has experienced strong growth over the past ten years.

The main advances made by Turkey in the incorporation of the *acquis communautaire* are those related to the customs union (established in 1995), even though problems persist in the areas of customs control and smuggling, in particular. Other aspects where progress has been identified by the Commission are the free movement of goods and services, industrial policy, and agriculture. Areas lagging behind have been business and property rights protection. Until recently, Turkey had aligned itself with the main foreign policy positions of the EU. However, more recently, Turkey has displayed a more autonomous foreign policy. Some observers attribute this new activism to the lack of progress on membership negotiations.[6]

Current status of Turkey's EU membership bid

According to the most recent progress report of the Commission,[7] Turkey has opened less than half of the thirty-five negotiation chapters. Eight of them remain blocked, five by France, three by Austria and Germany, and two by Cyprus.[8] Whitman and Juncos (2010) show that negotiations made little progress throughout 2009. Only two new chapters (taxation and environment) were opened during this period. Moreover, only one chapter (science and research) has been closed since the start of negotiations in 2005. The refusal by Turkey to normalize relations with Cyprus, and in particular the non-implementation of the Additional Protocol, which would open access to Greek-Cypriot vessels and planes, has been used as the main justification for blocking eight negotiation chapters. In reality, a significant number of MS are happy to hide behind this excuse for blocking progress in accession negotiations.

A further aspect which impacts negatively on negotiations is the shift that has occurred in the European Parliament (EP). The current centre-right majority means that the EP, formerly a staunch advocate of Turkish enlargement, is now

applying a brake to the process (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2007). For its part, Turkey has taken some positive steps. It has adopted a National Programme for the adoption of the *acquis* and named a full-time negotiator; it has undertaken significant reforms 'of the judiciary, civil-military relations and the Kurdish issue' (Whitman/Juncos 2010: 188). Turkey has also signed an agreement on the Nabucco gas pipeline, an important geopolitical reason for the support of a significant number of MS. A further significant occurrence was the signing of an agreement normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia in October 2009. This is relevant inasmuch as the Armenian diaspora has been influential in opposing enlargement towards Turkey, particularly within France. However, the freezing of negotiations (due to blockages by several MS) have stalled reforms throughout 2011, as the Commission's latest progress report shows. [9]

4.2 The workings of the enlargement process

The enlargement process involves all main actors of the EU: the Commission, the Member States, and the European Parliament (EP). The EP, however, is not a party to the negotiations and its main role is to assent before a Treaty of Accession is signed.[10] As a result, most interactions throughout the enlargement process take place between Member States and the Commission. Enlargement is an area where the Commission has significant leeway: it is the Commission which assesses progress in the implementation of the *acquis* and the so-called 'Copenhagen Criteria'. The Commission also suggests the opening or closure of negotiation chapters on the basis of these assessments. O'Brennan, for example, argues that this, together with significant divisions between Member States, gave the Commission an enormous influence in the 'big bang' 2004 enlargement (O'Brennan 2006). For their part, Member States have to unanimously agree on the opening of negotiations with a third country (giving the latter candidate status). At a later stage, they have to agree on the opening or closure of the thirty-five negotiating chapters.

In order to examine the impact of domestic actors (e.g. public opinion, political parties, the mass media) in the enlargement process, it is necessary to first understand the complex dynamics taking place in Brussels, particularly the interactions between Commission and MS representatives in Brussels. A main arena for these negotiations is the Enlargement Working Group (WG) and Coreper.[11]

The first phase for each negotiation chapter consists of a screening process whereby the Commission explains the *acquis* to the candidate state. A second screening phase follows in which the candidate country shows its level of alignment with the *acquis*. This is followed by a screening report by the Commission. The screening report is submitted to Member States, and includes the Commission's recommendation on whether to open the negotiation chapter or not.[12] The Enlargement Working Group (WG) of the Council then discusses this report. The WG is attended by the representatives for enlargement from MS' permanent repre-

sentations in Brussels. These decide either to open a negotiation chapter or to set opening benchmarks (i.e. conditions to be fulfilled before a chapter is opened). This decision is followed by a decision by Coreper, that is, by the permanent representatives of MS in Brussels.

Once Coreper has reached a decision, the presidency of the Council sends a letter to the candidate country asking it to submit a negotiating position for that chapter. Once the candidate country has submitted its negotiating position, the Commission prepares a 'Draft Common Position' (DCP) which either includes closing benchmarks (i.e. criteria for the closure of a chapter) or suggests the provisional closing of the chapter. The Enlargement Working Group then discusses the DCP; that is, MS deliberate on the adoption or not of the DCP and on possible amendments to the closing benchmarks. As in previous phases, Coreper has to adopt the EU Common Position prepared by the WG. The formal opening of a chapter takes place during an intergovernmental accession conference. The closing process might require additional positions from both the candidate country and the EU; the Commission then assesses the fulfilment of the closing benchmarks and adopts a closing DCP. This is discussed by the Council, and if the benchmarks are considered fulfilled, the Council adopts a closing DCP. The formal provisional closing of a chapter takes place at the next Intergovernmental Accession Conference. These are usually attended by representatives at the deputy level of the candidate country or at the ministerial level, with representatives from the Commission also present.

As the previous overview shows, MS have plenty of occasions to block or derail a given accession process (or alternatively to speed it up if they so desire) through the Enlargement Working Group and Coreper. It is here that MS try to influence or change the Commission's positions. In order to have a clearer picture of these complex interactions, I conducted semi-structured expert interviews with high-ranking representatives of the Commission and representatives of MS at the Enlargement Working Group. The analysis which resulted from these interviews suggests that three main dimensions define accession outcomes. A first takes place at the individual level and involves representatives of MS and the Commission. A second has to do with domestic dynamics and sets the general tone in the positions of MS. Finally, a third one has to do with power dynamics between coalitions of MS and the Commission.

The first dimension has to do with the attitudes of individual representatives of MS, who play an important role in the process since they are the link between the capitals and the Commission. Representatives enjoy a certain leeway as they can report what occurred during the meetings in different ways. So, for example, as an interviewee noted: 'We see that under pressure of explanation from other delegates they have to report that at home and this feeds into the instructions of the country for the next time.'

The most significant factor in the attitudes of representatives is, nevertheless, time. The longer the representatives are in Brussels, the more they are willing to

use their leeway. This factor has been addressed by social constructivist approaches focusing on the socialization that occurs through interactions between diplomats in Brussels (e.g. Tonra/Christiansen 2004). As previously mentioned, representatives can present what happened in meetings in quite different ways. They can argue that they were isolated in a position or not. A diplomat explains: 'If you are freshly arrived you read the instructions; you say these are my instructions and there is nothing I can do … Once you have been here longer, however, usually you become more cooperative and this is the main reason why representatives are rotated.' There are other elements which are important at the individual level for such activism. An interviewee suggested that 'if you have an active ambassador … if he is reporting a lot … then the national capital needs to take positions more often.' These positions are nevertheless based on broad lines and it is here that domestic factors play a relevant role.

However, the general position of a Member State is set by domestic factors, and this has been suggested as a second dimension. As an interviewee explains:

> The general position is always to a large extent based on the opinion of the population and the media, whether it is overall positive or overall negative. This is an important framework, and within this framework there are many differences. One example: Slovenia has a largely positive view of Croatia and particular problems, fishery and an ecological zone. Croatia says that EU vessels cannot fish in this area, which is not against the *acquis* per se, but it affected Italy and Slovenia who naturally pushed for this issue. Hence, both were overall positively for accession but this point had to be solved; and if it's not solved they block.

This general position affects negotiations in subtle ways. One interviewee gives the example of the EU perspective on the western Balkans that was agreed in 2002 and 2003. He explains that those countries that were somewhat less positive towards enlargement wanted to delete the wording 'European perspective'. Instead, they sought to include more neutral language which would entail the preparation of the countries for accession. These small changes in the common positions taken by the EU reflect domestic dynamics within MS: 'If you don't want to get in trouble at home, when you know that public opinion, the media and so on is not favourable, you try to get this out, or not to mention it six times, or to put it in a footnote.'

This complex and dynamic process is summed up by another interviewee as follows. Essentially the permanent representative tends to have the most pro-European view and has to approach the capital saying: 'Come on, it looks ridiculous. I'm the only one saying no and the people at home will say … "Well, maybe we can find a compromise."' At the same time, there are a number of compromise systems in the EU, such as internal notes or bilateral declarations. For example, if one country is against a position, it is possible to reach a compromise whereby that particular Member State agrees but is allowed to make a declaration: 'So we call it fair, the country only agreed to this because, however, and so on … and here

it comes for home consumption again where the politician can play at home, yes we agreed BUT we had a declaration.' Furthermore, the positions of MS are well-known and hence well understood. Thus, if an ambassador makes a declaration, both the Commission and other MS usually know what that means: 'so you can see, "Aha, he had to bring it for home consumption but he can go along with it."'

There is another important aspect: power relations. This third dimension is present both in relations between the Commission and MS and between MS themselves. A representative from the Commission explains: 'There should be a healthy disagreement on issues where the Commission proposes something that probably goes too far; it's not acceptable for delegations, not acceptable for individual MS, what the Commission is proposing and they can make their cuts and changes.' However, the Commission is in a strong position as it can always withdraw its proposal:

> We can say: forget the whole thing, most of our ideas are gone, you have messed the thing so much most of our original ideas are gone … Commission proposals are always based on the requests of industrialists, unions, chambers of workers, chambers of doctors, so we always get from the industry, from NGOs, or whatever, where they tell us 'this should be regulated at a European level', 'we really need a directive there' … Even the stupid thing of the cucumbers that the media always comes after, the proposal came from the industry.

The positions of the MS are not only affected by domestic factors but may also reflect the intensity of relations with candidate countries, both positively and negatively. MS with strong economic or strategic ties to candidate countries are likely to push for negotiations, while conflicts such as those existing between Greece and Cyprus with Turkey naturally influence the positions these MS take. Beyond that, however, there are other significant elements that need to be taken into consideration, such as size or distance, but also interests which might be economic, strategic, or humanitarian. An interviewee from the Commission explains:

> My experience is that bigger countries – probably because of the sizes of their foreign services – have more information, also more often a position … so all in all I can say that the big five and Poland, to a certain extent, are very much involved in the debate; of course the UK has a general view positive towards enlargement and the accession of Turkey or Croatia, and Germany maybe in the middle, and France a little bit more … with Turkey, we know. Italy – fairly open – or Spain actually very open, so there you have the big players … and then with regards to the mid-sized or smaller countries there it really depends; on the one hand on their relationship with the countries involved, so Austria very close to Slovenia, Hungary close to the western Balkans, of course these countries have positions on Croatia they have instructions … Quite often these countries are very well informed … It's also a struggle of who is better informed; the Commission has a delegation there … We have, I guess, a hundred people in Croatia or eighty

> or something like this in Zagreb … but MS have also embassies there and at times we assess situations differently than they do … but the geographic and economic intensity of relations plays a role in the process. So, countries a little bit further away most of the time agree and say: 'We have no objections', take Ireland, take Portugal, take Sweden. Sweden is already – because of the last enlargement with the Balkan countries – somewhat more involved, but as I said, it's [different] from country to country … and then, as I said, it depends on their foreign service. The three Baltic countries, their foreign service is just building up and their embassies are being built up slowly. They just don't have the information, hence, the involvement and the engagement is quite different … In the case of the smaller countries, Slovenia plays a particular role in the enlargement towards Croatia, as much as Greece and Cyprus play a particular role in the enlargement towards Turkey.

The Commission, on the other hand, is strongly pro-enlargement. It also enjoys a particular structural advantage: once agreements have been reached, it is hard to change them. A good example of this is provided below; it stems from an interview with a representative of the Commission:

> Now, for example, France does not want to open five certain chapters that are not in their favour. So sooner or later we have to say, why not? Excuse me; the framework says once the country is prepared and so on, we can open a chapter. So there the French would have to insist that the framework has to be changed, but because they agreed to the framework they can't do it, and we couldn't care less that there is another President, that's irrelevant, a country is … if Mr. Chirac agreed in 2005 … to the framework, that's what we are working on … so if they change their position, which is contradictory to the framework, they have to ask for an amendment of the framework and that would be a difficult negotiation. On the other hand, in the end, you'll need ratification and also from the EP, so it's difficult … here there is no qualified majority.

The previous analysis has focused on the interaction between the Commission and the MS; however, there is another aspect that needs to be considered, the negotiations with the candidate countries. Here domestic dynamics also play a role, and particularly public opinion. An interviewee notes that:

> After every accession negotiation there is a press conference; maybe not at the deputy level but certainly at the ministers' level where the Croatian or Turkish foreign ministers are there, and the Commission is in, and then all these questions are asked, and then it often makes it to the front page in the country concerned – not here but in the country concerned – 'chapter has been closed', 'not closed' if any declaration was made … If the media – bad news is good news – has a way of saying Croatia did not negotiate very well in Brussels then … bang! This is known in the Council and people are aware of this.

Public opinion is particularly relevant where public support towards joining the Union is low. In these cases, certain issues might be negotiated so as not to alienate electorates in candidate countries. In the example of Croatia mentioned before, the ecological reserve was a sensitive issue, as Croatians are barely favourable to joining the EU. This was a very difficult issue which could have ended in a lost referendum, and hence had to be treated very carefully. This has occurred previously, for example, regarding Austria's position on the transit treaty where Vienna argued that if they could not get an exception from the EU rules on free movement, they would lose the referendum on accession. In the end, a solution was found whereby Austria was given a nine-year transition period. Another interesting case from this perspective is Malta. Malta argued that even though English was an official language of Malta, if Maltese were not also recognized as an official language of the EU then the referendum on accession would be lost. Eventually, Maltese was recognized as an EU language with all the costs this implied. As can be seen, sometimes public opinion plays a big role in candidate countries as well. The approach of the Commission has generally been to be open to negotiating transition periods, but not the rules themselves. As a diplomat puts it, 'sooner or later you have to accept the rules as they are'.

There is another influence which has not been discussed, namely that of interest groups. Interviews carried out suggest their influence is limited, but it is nevertheless important to mention this. Lobbying usually occurs in the first stage, when the Commission is preparing its reports. Interest groups send their proposals in written form to the Commission's President, or through meetings with the Commission. One example mentioned by a diplomat was that of the European chemical and pharmaceutical industry with regard to Turkey. The industry lobbied the Commission to include certain aspects that would ease entry into the Turkish market in its reports, and these were taken into consideration. National lobby groups also send letters to the Commission, as they hope that if they lobby at an early stage, the Commission will take these elements into consideration in its proposals. Lobbying MS is usually of little advantage since at this stage the Commission already has a strong proposal and MS find it difficult to change it. On some occasions, European lobbies also target the twenty-seven; they send a letter to all MS. However, as an interviewee from the Commission explains:

> All in all it's not that much. One should not overdo the influence of lobbies … I would not say that lobbies on enlargement are very influential. Overall, yes we hear from them … we even invite them: NGOs, the UN, or the Council of Europe. We ask them: how do you assess the human rights situation in Turkey? … We invite them to discuss for our progress reports … Hence, lobbying should not be seen as negative. Strong lobbying only really occurs in a few areas.

Based on this, it would seem that the main influence of lobby groups occurs at European level rather than at national level. The reason for this is twofold. On

the one hand there are strong European organizations (such as BUSINESSEUROPE or the European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies) which can be much stronger than their individual members (national). On enlargement, their lobbying is directed at the Commission, since the Commission makes the proposals which are then discussed with representatives of Member States. In other areas, they also strongly lobby the European Parliament (EP). However, on enlargement, the EP enjoys less influence than in other areas, since it only ratifies agreements. Given that this study focuses on the positions of Member States, and not on those of the Commission, the influence of lobby groups as such has not been included. Moreover, as has been previously mentioned, interviews carried out with representatives of the Commission all suggested that, even if it exists, the influence of lobbying on enlargement is limited.

Figure 4.4 Enlargement dynamics

Perspectives	Individual	Domestic	Power
Impact	Subtle shifts in Member States' positions	Member States' general position set	Ability to change Commission's proposals (MS) Ability to resist changes (Commission)
Instruments	Reporting/use of information asymmetries	Political demands Political mobilization	Use of information and coalition building (MS) Use of structural advantages (Commission)

4.3 Testing the argument

Liberal intergovernmentalism suggests that economic interdependence should explain government support for accession. However, considering that public opinion, political parties, and mass media in a significant number of Member States are strongly against Turkish accession, domestic politics are likely to play an important role in explaining support as well. This seems particularly important as MS who have much to win from accession, and hence should be its biggest supporters, oppose it (e.g. Germany and France). This suggests that factors other than economic interdependence are in play. This raises an important question: if this is the case, which domestic factors best explain support for or opposition to Turkish accession? The hypotheses that have been suggested in the second chapter are tested below through a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) and regression analysis. An fsQCA uses substantive and theoretical knowledge to assign fuzzy-set membership scores to both the outcome and causal conditions covered by the analysis and then evaluates these conditions in light of patterns of causal necessity or sufficiency. This method is ideal for situations in which the number of cases is moderate (as is the case with twenty-seven MS), and where mul-

tiple and conjunctural causation is likely to occur (see Ragin 2000; Ragin 1987; Rihoux/Ragin 2008; Koenig-Archibugi 2004).[13] A full description of the coding is provided in the appendices.

Before testing any hypotheses, a crucial first step is to clarify the positions of the MS towards accession. After all, this is what allows for or hinders cooperation and the further development of enlargement policies. In the case of Turkish accession, the opposition of an important number of MS has led to a standstill in the accession process and with it of the EU's ability to promote further reforms within Turkey. It also affects other accession candidates (and thus the whole policy) who for the first time face the prospect of accession negotiations which might not lead to accession in the end, thus substantially weakening the effectiveness of conditionality, the cornerstone of enlargement policy (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004).

Member States' preferences towards Turkish accession

Only a few Member States have strongly displayed either support for or opposition to the enlargement to Turkey. Most are favourable, even if the reasons for support tend to vary. Preferences of MS towards accession thus fall into three main categories: those opposing, those supporting, and those supportive but indifferent. I have taken Schimmelfennig's (2001) definition of 'drivers' and 'brakemen' and added 'neutral' to capture these three positions.

Brakemen

One of the Member States that has most openly and vocally opposed the Turkish enlargement is Austria. Austria's former Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel was the only head of state to openly oppose granting Turkey candidate status during the Helsinki European Council of 2004. Domestic debates on Turkish membership have played an important part in political campaigns, particularly in campaigns of the far-right Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bundnis Zukunft Österreich) party. The arguments against Turkish membership are also particularized, as they take a culturalist approach. Turkey is considered to be too alien to be integrated into the European Union (Günay 2007; Bürgin 2007). It is important to note that while Austria is strongly opposed to enlargement towards Turkey, it consistently favours enlargement towards the western Balkans – its traditional sphere of influence. The Austrian government also made the issue of 'absorption capacity' a central theme during its presidency of the Council in the first half of 2006 (Kramer 2009).

French governments for their part have displayed contradictory policies towards accession. Jacques Chirac decided from early on to support Turkish membership despite strong opposition from within his own party (Le Gloannec 2007). However, as his popularity plummeted and in conjunction with the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, he made an amendment to the French constitution that would make any new enlargement (except that of Croatia, which was already being negotiated) subject to a referendum. In recent times, the most visible fig-

ure opposing Turkish membership has been French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Hence, a dramatic reversal has occurred in the French attitude towards enlargement. The issue of Turkish accession played a central role in the successful campaign that took Sarkozy to the presidency. Once in power, the French President has used every possible opportunity to derail Turkish accession negotiations. The most dramatic step came – notwithstanding that it was a clear violation of the EU's agreed principles for accession negotiations – when the French government refused to open several negotiation chapters such as 'economic and monetary matters' on the grounds that these would only apply to a full member (Kramer 2009).

Germany performed a similar U-turn. The Chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder in Germany was openly favourable to the enlargement. Both the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens supported this aim. The positive attitude of Germany helps explain to a certain extent the 1999 decision in Helsinki to give Turkey candidate status. The succeeding government headed by Angela Merkel and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with its partners the Christian Social Union (CSU), have long been opponents of Turkish membership. The CSU is a particularly vocal opponent. Since Angela Merkel became Chancellor in 2005, Germany's position has shifted towards supporting 'privileged partnership' instead of enlargement.

Both in Denmark and in the Netherlands (and to a lesser degree in Germany), the domestic debate about Turkey tends to focus on the failure to integrate Muslim immigrants in these countries (Jung 2007). This alleged failure is equated with the difficulty of integrating a large Muslim country within the EU. This has strongly influenced the position of the Danish government, which can be defined as reluctant (Kramer 2009). Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers (2010) show that in the case of the Netherlands, a major shift has occurred towards the EU. This change in attitude is explained as a result of the introduction of the euro and of shifts in media attention towards the EU. Interviews with officials from different MS in Brussels confirm this surprising trend, as the Dutch used to be amongst the strongest supporters of European integration. It reflects a domestic debate on European integration that has become enmeshed with debates about the integration of minorities. This discourse has been fuelled by radical right parties in Denmark (Rydgren 2004) and in the Netherlands (Pennings and Keman 2003), where the debate has become particularly inflamed by the rhetoric of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, leader of the right-wing Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) and a major opponent of Turkish membership of the EU.

While bigger MS tend to make their positions on controversial issues known, the positions of smaller MS are harder to ascertain. The reason for this is that enormous pressure exists in the different working groups of the Council. Unless coalitions are formed, opposing a position of the Commission is hard. For example, even though former Belgian Prime Minister and current EU President Herman van Rompuy publicly expressed his doubts concerning Turkey's joining the EU – a view shared by a significant part of the Belgian political elite – the Belgian

position has been one of support. Hence, paradoxically, Belgium has acted as a 'driver' and not as a 'brakeman'. The last administration (which held the rotating EU Presidency in the second semester of 2010) vowed to make enlargement one of its priorities, particularly towards Croatia, Iceland, and Turkey. Moreover, at the Laeken Council of December 2001, the Belgian Presidency inserted a sentence in the conclusions supporting Turkey's membership bid that went even further than the Commission felt was merited (Ludlow 2005). However, as we shall see, Belgium is a special case. In the case of Luxembourg, as José Casanova (2006) argues, the decision to keep the promise of starting negotiations in October 2005 with Turkey was extremely contentious even within the Commission. Viviane Reading, the Commissioner for Luxembourg (then at Information Society and Media) took the lead amongst the various commissioners opposed to the start of negotiations. The opposition of the commissioners was only overcome when the Commission's President Barroso presented a strong defence of the need to begin negotiations. In theory, of course, commissioners are independent of their national capitals. However, it is highly unlikely that Viviane Reading would display such a strong opposition without the support of her government, and hence the position of Luxembourg would seem rather averse.

Drivers and neutrals

Most governments in Central and Eastern European countries are supportive of Turkish enlargement. In Bulgaria the significant Turkish minority in the country and the importance of this minority in forming coalition governments (through the Movement for Rights and Freedoms Party) makes it a salient issue for domestic politics and public opinion. The Romanian government also strongly supports Turkish membership. Its close economic and strategic ties (e.g. Turkish membership would reinforce the Black Sea dimension of the EU) also exert a strong appeal on public opinion (Grgic 2007).

Likewise, the support of Budapest for Turkish enlargement resonates in public opinion and mass media. There is strong support for extending membership to the rest of the western Balkans. As with other 'new MS', in the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) Turkish accession is mainly seen through the lens of security concerns in domestic debates. The geopolitical aim of diversifying energy supplies and breaking Europe's dependence on Russian gas and oil are paramount in countries that have had such a complex relationship with Russia, and are full of memories of Soviet occupation. In a similar vein, Grgic (2007) argues that in Slovenia, domestic perceptions towards Turkish enlargement have to do with security and not with economic or sociocultural aspects. The justification for this is that new MS have had little contact with Turkey, both economically and in terms of migration. However, for the same reasons, support remains to some extent conditional on perceived security gains. That being said, one should be careful of putting all new MS in the same basket; some differences exist as well.

At the one extreme, Polish authorities are among the strongest supporters and hence can be considered to be 'drivers'. On numerous occasions, they have stated their strong support for Turkish EU membership. This is primarily in response to security considerations (Ananicz 2007). As has been mentioned, Turkey has NATO's second biggest army and is a crucial gateway to alternative sources of energy (gas and oil). Breaking the dependence on Russian oil and gas is a crucial objective of Warsaw, as it is for the Baltic States. Enlargement towards Turkey also fits well with Polish views towards the EU, that of a loose confederation of nations. These elements might explain why public opinion is very favourable. A further aspect that might explain the strong public support in Poland for Turkish enlargement is its long-held aim of extending EU membership to Ukraine. Slovakia, also a strong supporter, has close economic ties with Turkey, particularly in the gas sector (Grgic 2007).

At the other extreme is the Czech Republic. As Radek Khol (2008) argues, the Czechs are somewhat different from most other new MS in that while public opinion is strongly in favour of enlargement towards the Balkans (a long-term priority of Czech foreign policy), its support for Turkish enlargement is split. Disagreements about this issue have existed between coalition partners, which is not the case in other new MS. That being said, President Václav Klaus openly supports Turkish membership. This lukewarm support would place the Czech Republic among the 'neutrals'.

Nordic countries are amongst the keenest supporters or 'drivers' of Turkish accession. Sweden and Finland have deployed an active foreign policy in favour of Turkey. Hanna Ojanen (2007) argues that two factors explain why Finland has been among the most positive MS in the question of Turkish membership. The first is that the Finnish government has retained a positive attitude towards further enlargement of the EU in general. The second is that crucial milestones in the opening of accession talks with Turkey were reached during Finnish presidencies of the EU. Furthermore, amongst the strong backers of Turkish membership are former Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, former president and Nobel Prize winner Martti Ahtisaari, and the former Commissioner in charge of enlargement Olli Rehn. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that preceding a recent meeting of the EU's foreign ministers on Turkey (11-12 September 2010), the foreign ministers of Finland and the UK wrote an article in the *Financial Times* strongly arguing for a speeding-up of the Turkish accession process.[14] These factors might explain a favourable public opinion in these Scandinavian countries.

Greece and Cyprus are special cases. For strategic reasons they have become strong supporters despite long-standing rivalry and hostility towards Turkey; however, their support is strongly conditional. Kostas Infantis (2007) contends that Greece has experienced a major shift in terms of its security perspectives towards a more Europeanized, multilateral outlook, whose most relevant component is relations with Turkey. The 'Aegean Cold War' that dominated Greek security perspectives from 1970 to 2000 has shifted towards a new strategic view in

which a policy of détente has emerged hand in hand with a rapprochement with Turkey. The process of Greek accession to the EU has reinforced this trend through various mechanisms, one of which has been the need to undertake painful economic reforms to meet accession criteria. The enormous military spending that the rivalry with Turkey imposed was a relevant determinant for change in this direction. This is likely to be further reinforced as a result of Greece's recent economic meltdown. This new strategic perspective makes Athens a strong supporter of Turkish membership of the EU. Nevertheless, support is conditional on Turkey's fulfilling the membership criteria, and these include its approach to Cyprus.

Not surprisingly, even though Greece is one of the strongest supporters of Turkish membership, it has also been among the staunchest of those members demanding that Turkey open its ports and airports to traffic from southern Cyprus. The failure to do so has recently resulted in the suspension of eight negotiation chapters – a measure which Greece supported. Accordingly, both Cyprus and Greece support Turkey's membership of the EU as a means of solving their main security concern and achieving a solution to the long-standing occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkish troops and the partition of the island. Cyprus has repeatedly warned that if Turkey does not open its ports and airports, it would continue to block accession talks. These blockages are tactical and hence neither Greece nor Cyprus can be considered to be 'brakemen' as such; they are 'drivers' but of a particular kind. Knowing their centrality in the accession process (due to the partition of Cyprus), these two MS link their support to obtaining a maximum number of advantages in the process.

The position of Malta is also related to this environment. It is strongly influenced by security considerations, in particular with the aim of solving the long-standing Greek-Turkish animosity and creating stability in the Mediterranean basin. However, since one of its main parties is strongly Eurosceptic, Malta's support is fragile, and this would place it among the 'neutrals' (Fenech 2003).

Finally, other 'drivers', strong and vocal supporters of Turkish accession, are Spain, Portugal, Italy, and the UK (and Ireland). For example, the current UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, gave a speech in Ankara criticizing those who were blocking Turkey's bid. As previously mentioned, the UK's foreign minister and his Finnish counterpart have also renewed efforts to exert pressure on the rest of the MS to speed up the process. Ireland is a special case in that it shares a common travel area with the UK. According to officials interviewed on this issue, this has had a strong effect on Irish foreign policy positions as they tend to be influenced by those adopted by the UK. This was especially the case with regard to enlargement. For example, when the UK decided not to impose any temporary limits on the free movement of people of the 'new MS', Ireland – given the common travel area – followed this policy too.

Table 4.3 MS preferences on Turkish accession

'Drivers'	Bulgaria, Finland, Germany (Schröder), Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK
'Brakemen'	Austria, Denmark, France (Sarkozy), Germany (Merkel), Luxembourg, Netherlands
'Neutrals'	Czech Republic, Estonia, France (Chirac), Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia
Special cases	Belgium, Cyprus, Greece

Data and method

The coding of the conditions included in the analysis was carried out as follows: the outcome (degree of support for Turkish accession) is measured by applying a scale ranging from zero to one, with anchor points at 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8. One represents full support, zero full opposition, and the intermediary categories circumstantial support (0.8), constrained support (0.6), constrained opposition (0.4), and passive opposition (0.2). To test for economic interdependence I included a measure for trade patterns between a given Member State and Turkey.[15] The conditions that measure the role of domestic actors are: mass media,[16] public opinion,[17] political parties,[18] government approval,[19] and veto players.[20] The resulting truth table is provided below.

Table 4.4 Truth table

Country	Outcome						
	Support	**ME**	**PO**	**PP**	**GA**	**VP**	**ID**
Austria	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Belgium	0.8	0.0	0.4	0.4	1.0	1.0	0.0
Bulgaria	1.0	1.0	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.0
Cyprus	0.8	0.6	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0
Czech Rep.	0.6	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0
Denmark	0.2	0.4	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Estonia	0.8	1.0	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0
Finland	1.0	1.0	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
France (Chirac)	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
France (Sarkozy)	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.6
Germany (Schröder)	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.6
Germany (Merkel)	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.0	0.6
Greece	0.8	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.0	1.0
Hungary	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ireland	1.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.0

Country	Outcome						
	Support	ME	PO	PP	GA	VP	ID
Italy	1.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.6
Latvia	0.8	1.0	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Lithuania	0.8	1.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Luxembourg	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0
Malta	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0
Netherlands	0.2	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Poland	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Portugal	1.0	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
Romania	1.0	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.0
Slovakia	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.0
Slovenia	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.0
Spain	1.0	1.0	0.6	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
Sweden	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
United Kingdom	1.0	0.0	0.4	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Notes: Outcome measures support for the Turkish enlargement. ME refers to mass media, PO to public opinion, PP to political parties, GA to government approval, VP to veto players, and ID to economic interdependence.

Results

The fsQCA results show that political parties play an important role. They are present in three out of four solutions.[21] Favourable political parties (*pp) together with either the absence of veto players (~vp), economic interdependence (*ei), or a supportive mass media (*me) translate into support for accession. The fourth solution consists of the absence of veto players (~vp) together with favourable public opinion (*po) and mass media (*me).[22] The importance of political parties also reflects the fact that it is almost a sufficient condition as shown in the tests for necessity (there is no single case opposing enlargement in which political parties are favourable and only a few cases support enlargement notwithstanding the opposition of political parties). This result was corroborated by regression analysis. A full description of the fsQCA is provided in the first and second appendices.

When looking at the individual cases (table 4.5), two aspects seem particularly relevant. The first is that there is no single case (or Member State) opposing enlargement in which a majority of political parties represented in parliament are in favour. That is to say that all MS in which political parties are in favour have supported Turkish accession, this notwithstanding a reluctant electorate. Indeed, it is the case in the Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, and the United Kingdom. This would make support from political parties almost a necessary and sufficient condition. However, as table 4.5 also shows, there are a few cases in which,

Table 4.5 MS supporting accession: political parties and veto players

Political Parties	Veto Players	Cases
Oppose	No	France (Chirac), Poland, Lithuania
Tend to oppose	No	Germany (Schröder), Hungary, Romania, Slovakia
	Yes	Belgium
Tend to support	No	Bulgaria, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia
	Yes	Italy
Support	No	Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
	Yes	Czech Republic

despite the opposition of political parties, a Member State may be in favour of enlargement. Nevertheless, and this is the second aspect that appears relevant, this is so *only* in the absence of veto players (with the notable exception of Belgium). The case of Belgium is exceptional, since being the capital of European institutions might make it hard for this country to oppose European policies. Thus, even when public opinion, political parties, and the mass media are opposed to enlargement towards Turkey (and even major political figures such as the current EU President Herman Van Rompuy have expressed their reticence), Belgium continues to support accession.

Finally, MS oppose accession only if political parties are not favourable, irrespective of the role of veto players (table 4.6).

Table 4.6 MS opposing accession: political parties and veto players

Political Parties	Veto Players	Cases
Oppose	No	France (Sarkozy)
	Yes	Germany (Merkel), Austria
Tend to oppose	No	Luxembourg
	Yes	Denmark, the Netherlands

The epistemological foundations of fsQCA are somewhat different from those of other quantitative methods, in particular regression analysis, and thus rather than testing for the effects of independent variables fsQCA looks at conditions and their combinations in the light of criteria of necessity and sufficiency. Even so, it is possible to interpret these results as offering only limited support to the null hypothesis; economic factors are relevant only in combination with favourable political parties. This is further evidence that Turkish accession tends to be seen through the prisms of culture and identity rather than from a cost-benefit perspective, as has also been emphasized elsewhere in the literature (Günay 2007; Bürgin 2007; Jung 2007; McLaren 2002). The cluster of hypotheses comprising domestic actors

is supported by the results of the analysis. When looking at individual cases (e.g. the Netherlands and Denmark), it would seem that the presence of veto players does expose a government to domestic demands. However, rather than exposing governments to general demands (emerging from public opinion or mass media), veto players seem to strengthen important minorities who oppose accession and who are mobilized by these (mainly radical right) parties.

The fsQCA was complemented by regression analysis. Even though the epistemological foundations of the two methods are different, they can be considered to be complementary, and together help present a fuller picture (Schneider and Wagemann 2010; Rihoux and Ragin 2008). Since the fsQCA showed that political parties were almost a necessary and sufficient condition, it is perhaps not surprising that this variable appeared as the only significant one in regression analysis (see table 4.7 below). By itself the variable of political parties explains almost 40 per cent of variance.

Table 4.7 Regression analysis

	Model 1		Model 2	
Political parties	.54*	(.13)	.45*	(.13)
Media	–		.00	(.12)
Government approval	–		-.29	(.13)
Public opinion	–		.19	(.14)
Veto players	–		-.11	(.11)
Economic interdependence	–		-.06	(.15)
R^2	0.37		0.56	
Number of observations	29		29	

Notes: *p≤ 0.05.
Unstandardized beta coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses.

When looking in detail at the relation that exists between political parties, public opinion, and the support of a given Member State for the Turkish enlargement, several cases seem relevant. On the one hand, while in most cases the position of the government tends to follow that of public opinion, there are two exceptions worthy of attention. In both the Netherlands and Denmark public opinion seems to be much more supportive than the government. This is puzzling as given the strategic importance of Turkey one would expect that a government would be supportive contrary to public opinion (as occurs in most cases), but not that the opposite would occur. There are two further cases which seem relevant in light of the results, namely, those in which a shift in positions occurred (France and Germany).

In almost every case governments tend to be on average more supportive of Turkish accession than their electorates; however, in both Denmark and in the Netherlands this relation is inverted. The puzzle presented by the Dutch and Dan-

ish cases can, nevertheless, be explained when one looks at party positions. In both cases, a strong polarization exists, and veto players play a crucial role. Also, in both countries, a strong radical right anti-immigrant party has successfully influenced the position of the government towards Turkish enlargement. In the Danish case, even though the Danish People's Party (DF) does not form part of the government, it has supported the coalition in power and in exchange obtained a hardening of the government's position towards immigrants and refugees. In the Dutch case, this change was brought about by the Pim Fortuyn revolution.

Denmark and the Netherlands: the influence of radical right parties on accession

The rise of radical right parties (RRP) in Western European countries has surprised many observers. Rydgren and Holsteyn (2005), for example, were puzzled by the rise of the Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) in the Netherlands, as the existing literature on RRP suggested such a phenomenon could not take place in a liberal and open society. If one follows the arguments of Betzt (1994) and Kitscheld (1995), there are eight main factors that seem to favour the emergence of radical right parties: a post-industrial society, a fragmentation of the political culture and multiculturalism, a sociocultural cleavage, widespread political discontent, xenophobia and racism, economic crises, a reaction against New Left or Green parties, and a proportional voting system.

At the time (2001) the Dutch economy had overcome the problems it faced in the first half of the nineties and was experiencing sustained growth. It was considered unlikely that any party advocating conservatism and nationalism could win a large share of the vote. The electoral success of the LPF, however, was based on a paradoxical combination of a liberal agenda combined with strong elements of populism and an anti-immigration (particularly anti-Muslim) rhetoric. Thus, Fortuyn characterized himself as the defender of Dutch liberal values against a backward Islamic culture. In particular, '[t]he anti-immigration rhetoric was largely framed in terms of protecting the rights of women and sexual minorities in Holland from the allegedly oppressive Islamic culture' (Rydgren/Holsteyn 2005: 49). Thus, while it is possible to include the LPF amongst the RRP, it is important to note that it does have some unique characteristics. Pennings and Keman (2003), on the basis of data from election manifestos, conclude that established parties failed to identify new demands from the electorate and that this failure was exploited by the populist rhetoric of Pim Fortuyn.

An interviewee who was taking part in accession negotiations explained that the rise of Pim Fortuyn and the strong showing of his Pim Fortuyn List after his assassination in 2002 (alongside the failed constitutional referendum) constituted a political earthquake in the Netherlands. It dramatically altered the position of the Dutch government towards enlargement and particularly in relation to enlargement towards Turkey. The anti-Islamic mood introduced by Pim For-

tuyn made it increasingly hard for Dutch governments to advocate enlargement towards Turkey. The interviewee observed:

> I think the constitution and the referendum we had in the Netherlands, that was absolutely the turning point. It was, and there was also a parallel process happening in the Netherlands: that was the unease about the immigration issue, about the established parties losing their appeal to the original constituencies; our Labour party had that problem where people felt they were not represented any longer. So the mood of the nation was pretty sombre and you probably heard about Pim Fortuyn, the man who discovered that if you exploit the immigration issue and the multicultural society issue you can get a lot of support and, because saying what you really wanted to say about this issue was discouraged for a long, long time, because then you were a racist or you were a fascist or you were … that was not politically correct, but in the meantime the social pressure mounted, mounted, mounted. In parallel we have the referendum on the Constitution.

Both the 2002 election and the failed Constitutional treaty translated into a shift in immigration and enlargement policies. According to Akkerman (2005), the effects of the LPF were considerable and still persist. The influence of the anti-Islamist and anti-immigration position of the LPF was consolidated as the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD), often referred to in the English-language press as the Liberals, one of the three major parties, incorporated these elements into its agenda. Two of its members, Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, achieved particular significance using these two platforms. As a result, since 2002 a strict immigration policy has been introduced and a strong campaign against Islamic schools was launched by the Liberal Party. Akkerman notes, however, that the coalition partners of the Liberal Party, the Christian-Democratic Appeal, have been able to prevent several anti-Islamic ideas being translated into policy. The referendum on the Constitutional treaty nevertheless seems to have strongly contributed to a shift in Dutch enlargement policy. As the aforementioned interviewee noted:

> Enlargement was not the main issue for the people saying no, but it was one of them; and it coincided with the general uneasiness about the political landscape in the Netherlands … so the after-effects of the Fortuyn revolution … since then domestic issues are very much important for debates on enlargement. If you have looked at the opinion polls on Turkey it's very negative, even you have people that say Turkey should not join even if they fulfil all the necessary criteria. So all politicians now know – and this is not only about Europe – that they have to listen to public opinion because before they weren't, they definitely weren't. So there was a huge change, but it's a fairly new phenomenon and it will remain an important constraint in the years to come.

The fact that a party winning less than a third of the votes managed to hijack the agenda on enlargement and immigration is explained by its anti-establishment nature and the radical break that its electoral success meant. It was a dramatic and short-lived phenomenon that nevertheless has had significant long-term effects on Dutch politics.

Even if in a less dramatic way, Denmark experienced a similar phenomenon. The Danish People's Party has combined an ethno-pluralist, xenophobic nationalism and welfare chauvinism with an anti-political establishment strategy (Rydgren 2004). Even at its creation in 1998 the party managed to gain over 7 per cent of the vote and by 2005 had managed to practically double that. Its share of the vote has stabilized over the last election in 2007; however, it has become highly influential since the government depends on its support to maintain a majority. The Danish People's Party has furthered a strong anti-immigrant and, as in the Dutch case, anti-Islamist campaign. With regards to Islam, the party equates 'immigrants from Muslim countries with Muslim fundamentalists' (Rydgen 2004: 485). Thus, it considers Muslim immigrants as part of a fifth column that aims at world domination and whose real intentions are yet to be seen. In this context, the prospect of having a Muslim country join the EU is strongly opposed. Since the 2001 election the party has become a de facto coalition party of the centre-right minority government even as it continues to claim it is not part of the establishment. The unofficial participation of the Danish People's Party in the government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen had an important effect, leading to a significant shift in immigration policies, such as cutting state benefits and raising the threshold required to obtain Danish citizenship (Ammitzbøll/Vidino 2007).

The publication of the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* of caricatures deemed offensive to Muslims led to a strong backlash both within the Danish Muslim community and abroad. This polemic has contributed to polarize even more the domestic debates about the Danish Muslim community. As in the Dutch case, public opinion is still relatively positive towards Turkish enlargement. However, as has also occurred in the Netherlands, the strong position of a veto player (and a minority but still significant proportion of the electorate) has translated into opposition to Turkish accession.

France and Germany: the role of elections in accession

The cases of France and Germany are particularly interesting as they show how electoral processes may affect the positions of Member States towards enlargement. The governments of both Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder faced enormous opposition from their electorates to their policies towards Turkish accession. While Gerhard Schröder could count on the support of his party and his coalition allies the Greens, Jacques Chirac was isolated in his support for Turkey even within his own party. In both cases, however, elections brought to power either parties or factions (in the French case) more in line with public preferences. The issue of enlargement towards Turkey played an important role in the election cam-

paigns of both Sarkozy's UMP and Merkel's CDU/CSU. The consequences of this shift in position by the two MS that have long been considered as the engines of integration have been significant. The open opposition of France and, more discreetly, of Germany has put enlargement negotiations with Turkey on ice.

Jacques Chirac had been a strong supporter of Turkish enlargement. A case in point was his addition (together with Gerhard Schröder) of the words 'without delay' to the European Council's Conclusions in Copenhagen dealing with Turkish enlargement (Ludlow 2005: 6). However, he had to face a majority of French voters (and an even higher proportion amongst supporters of his own party) who were against it. As Ludlow argues, '[w]ith Nicolas Sarkozy ready to pounce on any opportunity to embarrass Chirac and smooth his own path to the top, the Turkish question was by mid-2004 a major political problem for the president' (Ludlow 2005: 6). And so it was: Nicolas Sarkozy, recognizing an opportunity to distance himself from Chirac and at the same time to please the electorate, made his opposition to the Turkish enlargement one of the main themes of his political campaign. Once he had secured the Presidency in May 2007, he continued to make his opposition to Turkey one of the cornerstones of his European policy. Thus, his project for a Mediterranean Union, now largely devoid of content thanks to the opposition of Germany, was a hardly veiled attempt to derail the Turkish accession process.

Gerhard Schröder for his part faced a similar challenge from Angela Merkel and Edmund Stoiber. In a visit to Ankara in January 2004 Merkel presented her much publicized idea of a 'privileged partnership' instead of membership and in November of the same year she argued that the multicultural society had failed, referring in particular to the failure to integrate the Turkish minority living in Germany (Ludlow 2005). Though less outspoken than Nicolas Sarkozy, Merkel reiterated the view of a privileged partnership upon becoming Chancellor in November 2005. The latest elections that took place in September 2009 allowed Merkel to separate her CDU/CSU from the grand coalition with the SPD. However, a new alliance with the FDP brought a partner with whom significant differences on the Turkish enlargement existed. The new foreign minister and former head of the FDP, Guido Westerwelle, has nevertheless been unable to alter the Chancellor's policy. Thus, even though members of the FDP have joined the SPD in criticizing the lack of support for Turkish enlargement, the position of the government continues to be one of opposing accession.[23]

Preliminary conclusions

The results of this analysis support the view that domestic actors play an important role in explaining Member States' cooperation or lack of it in accession policies. This approach may be seen as complementing liberal intergovernmentalism, whose focus is on economic interdependence. Indeed, political parties and partisan veto players appear as the most important domestic factors affecting accession, even more so than economic ones. They help explain why even if political parties

and governments sometimes deviate from public preferences, they can do so only as long as no other political actor takes advantage of the gap that exists between elites and public. Once political actors (opposition parties or radical right parties) recognize and exploit this potential, governments adjust their positions to those of public preferences (or are voted out of office). One might say that governments follow strategic and economic interests that may deviate from public opinion only as long as no other actor exploits this. Once parties opposing accession gain power, or partisan veto players are present, governments tend to adjust their positions in line with public opinion and the views of national mass media. In cases where public opinion is favourable, opposition to accession is explained solely by the lack of support by political parties. The results of this study may also apply to cases beyond Turkey since other accession candidates (particularly those in the western Balkans) also face strong public opposition. This suggests the importance of political parties for any further round of enlargement.

Given that political parties are the most significant factor in explaining support for accession, it is worth reflecting on their role and on the link between political parties and public opinion. Whether public opinion shapes the positions of political parties or vice versa is a contested issue. Carrubba (2001) has suggested that political elites follow positions in the electorate, while the view that political parties are the ones giving cues or that the 'causality is elite driven' is supported by Hooge and Marks (2005) and Steenbergen and Jones (2002). Steenbergen et al. (2007) have suggested a third possibility more in line with the results of this analysis, that of a dual process in which elites both respond to and shape the views of the electorate. In the case of accession, the evidence from this chapter shows that often there is a mismatch between public opinion and political parties. This might result in parties that are against enlargement gaining power, or to a greater proportion of political parties opposing accession in national parliaments (which in turn would explain shifts in Member States' positions towards enlargement). In a second related process, the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties that use national identity considerations to mobilize opposition against the EU might further increase opposition to accession (De Vries/Edwards 2009). Thus, a dual process in which public opposition to accession fuels the rise of opposition or radical right parties, which in turn further politicizes the issue of enlargement, seems to be taking place.

5 • Conclusions

The previous chapters suggest that cooperation between MS in foreign policy is, as expected, affected by a combination of domestic political processes and economic interest. While the influence of economic and strategic interests proved easier to measure, accounting for the influence of domestic politics was more complex than anticipated. It is hard to capture the way that domestic forces shape EU foreign policy in a single overarching account, even if their influence was apparent in the two cases. That being said, the results of the study provide evidence to challenge the Almond-Lippmann thesis, in line with what has also been found by Hosti (1992; 2004) and others when studying US foreign policy. Furthermore, the empirical chapters also shed some light on the democratic credentials of EU foreign policy, since executives seem to be keenly aware of trends in public opinion and are strongly influenced by political parties and veto players. The results also help our understanding of EU foreign policy when compared to other policy areas in the EU, and in comparison with other political systems (such as the US, the country from which the Almond-Lippmann thesis originates).

In sum, while falling short of an overarching theory, the results of this study offer some insights into the influence of domestic factors in European foreign policy which might be useful in understanding its past, present, and future development. The influence of domestic factors seems crucial in areas in which cooperation between MS is necessary for them to function. This goes beyond foreign policy; the crisis surrounding the single currency is a recent and notable example of this. In foreign policy, institutional reforms such as the creation of the post of a High Representative and the setting up of a European External Action Service will achieve little if MS fail to collaborate more closely.

European foreign policy and the Almond-Lippmann consensus: do domestic politics matter?

The starting point for this book was to assess the relevance of the Almond-Lippmann consensus (which assumes that foreign policy is isolated from domestic political processes, and particularly from public opinion) to the European case. As was mentioned in the introductory chapter, the three main assumptions of this consensus are: the volatility of public opinion, a lack of structure in public attitudes, and the limited impact of the latter on foreign policy. As was also mentioned, this consensus has been challenged by a growing literature on US foreign policy (Holsti 1992; 2004; Page/Shapiro 1983; Jentleson 1992; Stimpson/MacKuen/Erikson 1995). These studies have shown that parliaments, pressure groups, the

mass media, opinion leaders, and public opinion all affect foreign policy decisions in the United States. One might ask, however, whether this also applies to the EU, since it is not a state but rather a complex system of external relations. Indeed, studies examining EU foreign policy have either ignored the influence of domestic politics or looked at it only in particular cases, usually the case of the big three (France, Germany, and the UK). To my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to look at the influence of domestic politics in the EU as a whole. On this basis, what lessons do we learn? Does the Almond-Lippmann consensus apply in the European case or, as in the United States, do domestic actors affect foreign policy decisions?

The first case examined was security and defence (ESDP/CSDP). In this area the influence of public preferences seems less direct than is the case in the US. However, public preferences do affect support and broad directions in the evolution of these policies. Perhaps this reflects the fact that EU operations are less visible than US military involvements in theatres such as Afghanistan and Iraq. While the EU has participated in missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, its involvement has focused on civilian or mixed efforts which, though controversial (particularly in MS such as Germany), are less likely to end in loss of personnel, which in turn tends to rapidly diminish support. Unlike the US, the EU has not yet defined a clear direction for its security and defence policies. There is a constant tension between its military and its civilian components. It is here where public opinion has been much more influential.

When looking at public preferences and at government policies there seems to be a close alignment between them when it comes to furthering either the civilian or the military component of ESDP/CSDP. For example, Scandinavian countries, in which both public opinion has wished, and the governments have sought, to strengthen civilian rather than purely military capacities, have participated in almost every single operation which involved civilian or mixed resources. This also occurs in MS that seek to strengthen ESDP/CSDP, such as France. As with the Scandinavian countries, there is a close alignment between public preferences and government policies, and France has been actively involved in military, civilian, and mixed operations. A third category where a close connection between public opinion and policies in the security and defence field can be observed occurs in those MS for whom maintaining a close alliance with the United States is a priority. In these cases, which cover a wide variety of states, including the new MS of Central and Eastern Europe as well as others such as Portugal and even to some extent the UK, support for operations has been conditional on their usefulness in maintaining good relations with the US. This is in line with the expectations presented at the outset and suggests that the Almond-Lippmann consensus fails to explain shifts in European security policies. Public preferences have been stable, been structured, followed logical patterns, and seem to have influenced, at least to some degree, Member States' support for ESDP/CSDP operations in the form of secondments of personnel.

A more surprising finding has to do with political crises and elections. This was somewhat unexpected, even though a link between popularity and foreign policy activism was anticipated. Elections seem to have a strong temporary effect on the participation of MS in security and defence operations; they tend to diminish personnel deployments. Political crises seem to have a similar effect. Other factors that proved relevant include those that could be expected by foreign policy analyses with a focus on the executive and not on domestic politics, such as bandwagoning or the effect of paybacks (Waltz 1979). A good example of this is the visa waiver programme, which was an important incentive for several of the new MS to increase their secondments of personnel in missions that were relevant to the United States.

The influence of public preferences was clearer in the second case studied. The positions of MS on accession seem to follow those of their electorates in cases where they are supportive (in combination with favourable media coverage and in the absence of veto players). When public preferences have been opposed to accession and governments favourable, voters have managed to shift the positions of MS by electing political parties that follow their preferences, as has occurred in France and Germany. In some cases where public preferences were favourable but where a significant polarization occurred, a minority has been able to exert a similar shift towards opposing accession if the government has depended on the support of parties opposing accession (veto players).

The cases of Denmark and the Netherlands provide important lessons as to the role that radical right parties (RRP) may play in exploiting the perceived indifference of elites towards public opinion. Both cases demonstrate that if a significant minority in the electorate is strongly opposed to particular policies (e.g. immigration), then this might be enough to shift policies. Economic interdependence also translates into support for accession, as expected by liberal intergovernmentalism. However, this is so only in combination with favourable political parties. As a result, the influence of domestic factors and of public preferences seems particularly pronounced in this case. All public preferences, mass media, and veto players, together with economic interdependence, play a role in shaping Member States' preferences towards accession, and political parties seem to play a central role. As in ESDP/CSDP, public preferences have been remarkably stable and structured and have noticeably affected cooperation between MS in this field of foreign policy. This provides further evidence that, as in the American case, the Almond-Lippmann consensus cannot adequately explain EU foreign policy.

Does EU foreign policy suffer from a democratic deficit?

A persistent debate surrounding EU policy-making has concerned whether or not, given its technical and supranational character, it suffers from a lack of democratic legitimacy or what some have called a democratic deficit (Kriesi 2007; Moravcsik 2002; Moravcsik/Vachudova 2003; Norris 1997; Scharpf 1997; Scharpf 2000). Foreign policy is a relevant area to consider in this debate given that some aspects

such as those covered by this study (defence and enlargement) are highly visible and encroach on national sovereignty. Since the focus of this book has been on the influence of domestic actors in the overall foreign policy-making of the EU, it could provide some evidence of the degree of leeway that policymakers enjoy from their electorates. If, as some argue, the institutions in Brussels have been able to carry out policies irrespective of the inclinations of national constituencies, one might conclude that such a deficit indeed exists. The results of the study, however, suggest otherwise.

Despite the efforts of policymakers to make EU foreign policy more coherent and more effective, it has been continuously weakened by the lack of cooperation between MS. This book has focused on the domestic sources that allow for or impede cooperation. The main conclusion that can be reached is that despite the importance of other factors such as power, interests, or rhetorical commitments, domestic politics cannot be taken out of the equation. As long as electoral preferences allow for or limit policymakers' room for manoeuvre, through opinion polls, political parties, mass media, or the influence of veto players, it is hard to argue that politics in Brussels is dissociated from domestic politics. This does not mean, however, that European foreign policies are doomed to fail, despite the different preferences in the electorates of the EU's twenty-seven MS. Domestic politics are dynamic and as such they provide windows of opportunity which might translate into higher degrees of cooperation at some times, with less cooperation at others. So, for example, while left-leaning governments are likely to advance accession negotiations, the opposite is likely to occur if centre or (radical-) right parties are in power, particularly for MS such as France or Germany. While this might make EU foreign policies less efficient, it is hard to argue that they lack democratic legitimacy.

Is European foreign policy unique?

The related question of whether European foreign policy can be compared to that of other states (given that the EU is not a state itself) also appears relevant. The cases studied suggest that a major difference does exist, since unlike most states the EU is not able to fully control the resources at its disposal. In security and defence policies, despite the commitments of the MS, their participation in missions has consistently fallen short of objectives. When compared with other actors such as the United States, there are clear differences. It is as if the US Army failed to provide the personnel required for a given mission. However, there are also similarities. Executives in both MS and in other countries such as the United States are affected in their decisions by political crises or elections. One might even argue that in the EU, since elections and political crises do not occur simultaneously in all MS (or in those participating in a mission), this might provide some resilience.

The case of enlargement makes the EU in a way unique, since there are few cases in which entities (or states) use membership as a foreign policy tool to stabilize peripheral regions. In this sense, the EU is peculiar, being more than a tradi-

tional regional organization and less than a state; even though historically there have been cases of states which have expanded through accession, such as Switzerland. On the other hand, one might argue that wide-ranging regional organizations and trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) face similar public opposition when they enlarge (or are created). In the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement at least, domestic politics played a major role in the United States and Canada (although less so in Mexico) and led to the inclusion of environmental and labour standards in the agreement. Despite some economic advantages, a main motivation for the US in signing NAFTA was to stabilize Mexico both politically and economically. In this sense, there are some parallels with EU accession policies. Much like in the EU, public opposition to accession (in this case to the agreement itself) was fuelled by a combination of economic and cultural fears, with immigration concerns at the forefront (Pastor 2011).

Paying some attention to the obvious differences in terms of policy-making, it seems possible to compare the influence that domestic actors have in the EU and in countries such as the US. When looking at similarities, it is not surprising that as in the US the Almond-Lippmann consensus fails to provide a convincing explanation of EU foreign policies, and that domestic dynamics offer part of the explanation. However, one might ask whether this is something unique to foreign policy or whether other policy areas are similarly affected.

In light of the politicization that has occurred as a result of the recent crisis in the single currency and particularly as a result of the tension between northern MS such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, and southern MS such as Greece, Spain, and Italy, it seems that domestic politics also play a major role in limiting policymakers' margin of manoeuvre in this area. While other policy areas might be shielded from these events, once an issue becomes salient and controversial it appears hard for policymakers to ignore public preferences and continue their support for common policies if these are opposed by the public. This suggests that European policies such as foreign policy will continue to be affected by political swings in MS. Hence, what can we expect future European foreign policies to be?

What is the future of European foreign policy?

As already mentioned, the fact that domestic politics play a relevant role in shaping European foreign policies does not automatically make them impossible to develop. What it means, and this is perhaps also a lesson for other similarly politicized policy areas such as monetary integration, is that it is a process where muddling through and complex solutions and compromises are to be expected. In the end, despite institutional changes such as the Lisbon Treaty which seek to make decision-making more effective, if an issue touches a raw nerve in a particular Member State due to its sensitivity to voters or political parties, one should expect opposition. This means blockages, foot-dragging, and generally a lack of coopera-

tion in furthering that particular policy. This is particularly true if a group of MS are affected. Once this occurs, either compromises and bargains have to be made which allow policymakers to justify their choices domestically, or, as has occurred with enlargement in particular, the whole process is delayed until a more favourable configuration exists.

This is not to say that institutional reforms are not relevant. Lack of coordination between the Commission and the Council was a major factor hindering the smooth implementation of security and defence policies. This type of problem is likely to be significantly reduced with the new structure put in place by the Lisbon Treaty. However, in this same policy area, the lack of coordination between Commission and Council was a relatively minor problem compared with the poor fulfilment of promises by MS in their secondments of personnel. As we have seen, this is partly explained by domestic dynamics and partly by other kinds of interests such as strategic ones, or simply by a lack of interest in the policy, or in the particular theatres where the EU is active.

In enlargement, since the Commission plays a central role in its implementation through constant monitoring and progress reports, the type of coordination problems present in security and defence policies do not exist. However, it is here (even more than in security and defence policies) that domestic politics has come to play a major role. The main reason for this might have to do with salience. While the overall development of security and defence policies is salient, and there are clear public preferences within the MS for either a stronger civilian role or a stronger military role for ESDP/CSDP, particular individual missions are less relevant. This might explain why personnel deployments are affected mainly on the basis of geography, the type of mission, and political crises, rather than public preferences (with some exceptions such as Afghanistan and Iraq). In accession negotiations the opposite is true, since individual cases are extremely significant. There are clear differences in public preferences in the different MS. While all MS are supportive of enlargement towards Iceland, Norway, or Switzerland, significant differences exist in support for the western Balkans and particularly for Turkey.

Political parties and veto players seem to play a prominent role as transmitters of public preferences, and in a few cases they have been able to exert pressure causing shifts of policy against enlargement despite overall public support. It would appear that in accession negotiations, domestic configurations in the MS play a major role, despite the fact that negotiations once agreed are supposedly apolitical. The case of France is a good example. The shift in government that brought Nicolas Sarkozy to power translated into continuous blockages which de facto froze negotiations with Turkey. Other MS, such as Germany and Austria, were only too happy to see France take the lead in blocking negotiations. This also reflected Austrian and German domestic preferences and those of the government of Angela Merkel. Despite the fact that Jacques Chirac had previously agreed to the negotiation framework, and that Sarkozy's opposition at times openly challenged agreed norms (e.g. by arguing that no new chapters which would only apply

to future members should be opened), the Commission was forced to accept this. As a result, Turkey's accession process has come to an almost complete halt. This might change again as a new centre-left government has been elected in France.

The new French President, François Hollande – unlike his predecessor, who was staunchly opposed to Turkish accession – has expressed his support for Turkey's joining the EU in an open letter.[1] For Turkish accession to 'de-freeze', that is, for the process of opening and closing accession chapters to restart, a broader shift in the composition of political parties in MS that are currently opposed is probably necessary, particularly in Germany. Since Chancellor Angela Merkel is likely to stay in power after the next German general election in 2013, this shift is unlikely to happen. However, were the election to result in a new grand coalition, and since the German Social Democrats and Greens support Turkish accession, a change in position is conceivable. If this were to occur, MS still opposing accession would be left isolated (making it hard for them to continue opposing the Commission and those MS in favour of accession), and if Turkey were to continue on the path of reform, the process might be restarted. There are many 'ifs' and they show how complex the process of accession has become.

This previous example suggests the kind of domestic dynamics that affect EU security and defence as well as enlargement policies. So far, studies of enlargement (and of EU foreign policy in general) have focused on negotiations between MS, on grand bargains, and on rhetorical commitments. This book has attempted to show that domestic politics play an important role in setting the limits for policymakers of what is possible and what is not when cooperating with other MS and the institutions in Brussels to develop and enact common foreign policies. These limits, like domestic politics themselves, are dynamic and hence akin to lines in the sand, supposedly not to be crossed but which in a given constellation might be advanced or reduced; after all, sand is malleable.

What does this mean for the future of European foreign policies? It means that unless major crises force policymakers to risk a backlash at home, the EU will probably continue to muddle through, advancing certain policies at times and at others leaving them dormant. Politics, after all, is the art of the possible; one might add that for twenty-seven MS to cooperate on common policies, the art of the possible becomes an even more difficult endeavour than Bismarck imagined.

Current changes in global politics, particularly the rise of China and other emerging countries, as well as the enormous challenges that arise from interdependence such as managing financial flows and climate change, make this process appear overtly cumbersome and static. However, albeit on a much smaller scale, there are examples of executives strongly constrained by federal arrangements (and referenda) which have been able to carry out successful foreign policies despite strong pressures towards inaction and isolation. In this sense, perhaps there is a place for the EU's somewhat unique system of foreign relations to play an active role in global politics. It might well be that shifts towards a more multipolar world reinforce the willingness of electorates, political parties, and in turn of MS

to cooperate more closely in furthering common foreign policies. An alternative scenario would be for groups of MS to advance integration amongst themselves, as is now permitted under the Lisbon Treaty. However, if past experience is any guide, this system of opt-outs ultimately leads to closer cooperation between the EU-27 rather than to a Balkanization of policies. As such, European policymakers are likely to continue their delicate balancing act between domestic constraints and external demands in furthering integration and common foreign policies for some time to come.

Appendices

Appendix 1 • Enlargement: fsQCA Positive Outcome

Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Outcome variable: o **Conditions tested:**		
	Consistency	**Coverage**
me	0.644231	0.779070
po	0.576923	0.863309
pp	0.634615	0.929577
ga	0.413462	0.641791
vp	0.221154	0.511111
ei	0.221154	0.766667

Intermediate solution, positive outcome

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey. Model: o = f(me,po,pp,ga,vp,ei)			
	raw coverage	**unique coverage**	**consistency**
~vp*pp	0.509615	0.182692	0.946429
ei*pp	0.134615	0.028846	0.933333
pp*me	0.394231	0.076923	0.976191
~vp*po*me	0.326923	0.086539	1.000000

solution coverage: 0.701923
solution consistency: 0.960526

Appendix 2 • Enlargement: fsQCA Absence of Outcome

II Negative outcome (absence of)

Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Outcome variable: ~o **Conditions tested:**		
	Consistency	**Coverage**
me	0.682927	0.325581
po	0.487805	0.287770
pp	0.268293	0.154930
ga	0.682927	0.417910
vp	0.536585	0.488889
ei	0.219512	0.300000

Intermediate solution, negative outcome

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey. Model: ~o = f(me,po,pp,ga,vp,ei)			
	raw coverage	**unique coverage**	**consistency**
vp*~ga*~pp*~po	0.060976	0.073171	0.384615

solution coverage: 0.073171
solution consistency: 0.428571

Appendix 3 • Coding of fsQCA Conditions

1 Outcome

Table 1 Calibration of fuzzy set member criteria on support for Turkish enlargement

Fuzzy Membership	Definition
1.0	Strong support
0.8	Support with reserves/circumstantial
0.6	Highly constrained support
0.2	Passive opposition
0	Opposition

The extended justification of the outcome variable is to be found in the main text.

Austria	Given the strong opposition of the Austrian government towards the Turkish enlargement, this condition is coded as zero.
Belgium	Belgium strongly supports the Turkish enlargement, but this support is dependent on internal conditions. As a result the condition is coded as 0.8.
Bulgaria	Given the strong support for the Turkish enlargement, this condition is coded as one.
Cyprus	Conditionally supports Turkey's enlargement bid and hence this condition is coded as 0.8.
Czech Republic	Support is strong but fragile, so this condition is coded as 0.6.
Denmark	Reluctant, coded as 0.2.
Estonia	Since support is mainly a result of security concerns the outcome is coded as 0.8.
Finland	Amongst the strongest supporters of Turkish membership of the EU. The outcome is coded as one.
France (Chirac)	The support of the Chirac government is considered to be fragile and hence the outcome in this case has been coded as 0.6.
France (Sarkozy)	The most outspoken opponent of the Turkish enlargement has been French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The outcome is thus coded as zero.
Germany (Schröder)	Schröder strongly supported the enlargement and was in a strong domestic position. As a result this condition is coded as one.
Germany (Merkel)	Merkel has made her opposition to enlargement clear. Given that Germany together with Austria and France have been the most open opponents of the Turkish enlargement, the outcome is coded as zero.
Greece	Support is strong but conditional; hence the outcome in this case has been coded as 0.8.

Hungary	As with other Central and Eastern European MS, security considerations lead to a strong but conditional support. As a result the outcome is coded as 0.8.
Ireland	Closely associated with the UK due to the common travel area, Ireland follows the UK's strong pro-enlargement policy. The outcome is coded as one.
Italy	Due in part to strong economic ties, Italy is a strong supporter of the Turkish enlargement. The outcome is coded as one.
Latvia	The reasons for the strong support of Latvia (and Lithuania) for the Turkish enlargement are almost identical to those of Estonia. Security considerations, particularly due to energy diversification, explain a strong conditional support. It is coded as 0.8.
Lithuania	As mentioned above, the strong support of Lithuania has to do with security concerns; it is coded as 0.8.
Luxembourg	Luxembourg has been categorized as a Member State which discretely opposes Turkish accession. The outcome in this case is coded as 0.2.
Malta	Given that one of the main parties is strongly Eurosceptic, Malta's support may change. As a result the outcome variable has been coded as 0.6.
Netherlands	The position of the Dutch government can be defined as 'being rather reluctant' (Kramer 2009). The outcome in this case is therefore coded as 0.2.
Poland	Amongst the strongest supporters of enlargement; the outcome is coded as one.
Portugal	As with Spain and Italy, Portugal is one of the strongest supporters of Turkish membership in the EU. The outcome is coded as one.
Romania	Also a strong supporter of the Turkish enlargement; the outcome is coded as one.
Slovakia	A strong supporter of EU membership for both economic and security reasons. The outcome is coded as one.
Slovenia	Support remains conditional on security imperatives. The outcome is coded as 0.8.
Spain	One of the strongest supporters of Turkish membership. The condition is coded as one.
Sweden	Also a staunch supporter of membership. The condition takes the value of one.
United Kingdom	A strong supporter of Turkey's membership bid. The condition is coded as one.

II Media coverage

Table 2 Calibration of fuzzy set member criteria on positive media coverage

Fuzzy Membership	Definition
1.0	Positive media coverage
0.6	Mainly positive media coverage
0.4	Mainly negative
0	Negative media coverage

Austria	Positive media coverage in Austria exceeds 30 per cent; as a result this condition takes the value of one.
Belgium	In this case positive media coverage barely exceeds 20 per cent so the condition has been coded as zero.
Bulgaria	Bulgaria has amongst the most favourable media coverage within the EU, almost 35 per cent. As a result the condition is coded as one.
Cyprus	Positive media coverage in Cyprus is slightly above 25 per cent, so this condition has been coded as 0.6.
Czech Republic	Positive coverage in the Czech Republic is slightly above the mean, so the condition has been coded as 0.6.
Denmark	Positive media coverage in Denmark is slightly below the average, so the condition is coded as 0.4.
Estonia	Positive media coverage is well above average, so the condition takes the value of one.
Finland	Finland's positive media coverage is above 30 per cent, so the condition is coded as one.
France	Positive media coverage in France is slightly above the mean and so it is coded as 0.6.
Germany	Positive media coverage in Germany is slightly above 25 per cent; the condition is coded as 0.6.
Greece	Has among the most pro-European media of the MS. As a result, the condition takes the value of one.
Hungary	Positive media coverage is slightly above 25 per cent and as a result the condition is coded as 0.6.
Ireland	Has one of the most Eurosceptic media amongst the MS. The condition is coded as zero.
Italy	Positive media coverage in Italy is at 20 per cent and so the condition is coded as zero.
Latvia	Positive media coverage in Latvia is almost 30 per cent so the condition is coded as one.
Lithuania	Has amongst the most pro-European media of the MS, well over 30 per cent. As a result, the condition is coded as one.

Luxembourg	Positive media coverage in this case is slightly below the average of 25 per cent, so the condition is coded as 0.4.
Malta	Media coverage in Malta is very positive, over 30 per cent, and so the condition is coded as one.
Netherlands	Positive media coverage in this case is slightly above 20 per cent and so the condition is coded as zero.
Poland	Positive media coverage in this case is well over 30 per cent and as a result the condition takes the value of one.
Portugal	Positive media coverage in Portugal is amongst the lowest in the EU, barely above 15 per cent. As a result, the condition is coded as zero.
Romania	This case is slightly above average and so the condition is coded as 0.6.
Slovakia	One of the most pro-European cases in terms of media coverage. The condition takes the value of one.
Slovenia	Positive media coverage in this case is well above average and so the condition is coded as one.
Spain	This case is also well above average and the condition is coded as one.
Sweden	With less than 20 per cent favourable media coverage, in this case the condition is coded as zero.
UK	The well-known Eurosceptic position of the British media is reflected by the lowest pro-European coverage amongst the MS. It is coded as zero.

III Public opinion

Table 3 Calibration of fuzzy set member criteria on public opinion

Fuzzy Membership	Definition
1.0	Strong support
0.6	Tend to support
0.4	Tend not to support
0.0	Strong opposition

Austria	As has already been mentioned, Austria is the Member State in which public opinion is most strongly against Turkish membership of the EU. With only 16 per cent in favour and 48 per cent against, it is coded as zero.
Belgium	45 per cent of respondents in Belgium are favourable and hence the condition takes the value of 0.4.
Bulgaria	As in Belgium, 45 per cent of respondents are favourable and the condition is coded as 0.4.

Cyprus	48 per cent of respondents in Cyprus are favourable towards Turkey's joining the EU. The condition is coded as 0.6.
Czech Republic	43 per cent of respondents in the Czech Republic are favourable. The condition is coded as 0.4.
Denmark	59 per cent of Danish respondents are favourable towards Turkey's EU membership. The condition is coded as one.
Estonia	In this case 48 per cent of respondents are favourable towards Turkey's EU membership. The condition takes the value of 0.6.
Finland	Finnish respondents are also mainly favourable with 47 per cent in favour (and 14 per cent against). The condition takes the value of 0.6.
France	Respondents in France are strongly against Turkey's joining the Union; only 35 per cent are favourable. The condition takes the value of zero.
Germany	As in France, German respondents are equally sceptical; only 35 per cent are favourable. The condition is coded as zero.
Greece	Greek respondents are mainly favourable with 47 per cent in favour. The condition is coded as 0.6.
Hungary	Hungarian respondents are also mainly in favour (53 per cent) and the condition is coded as 0.6.
Ireland	In the Irish case, only 39 per cent of respondents are favourable and hence the condition is coded as 0.4.
Italy	Almost the same as Irish respondents.
Latvia	Respondents in Latvia also tend to be unfavourable, with 41 per cent in favour. The condition is coded as 0.4.
Lithuania	Lithuanian respondents are a little more favourable than Latvians (45 per cent in favour) but are nevertheless still sceptical. As a result, the condition is coded as 0.4.
Luxembourg	Respondents in Luxembourg are amongst the most sceptical towards Turkish membership. With only 32 per cent in favour they are strongly against, and hence the condition is coded as zero.
Malta	Public opinion in Malta also tends to be negative. With 38 per cent in favour, the condition is coded as 0.4.
Netherlands	Dutch respondents are amongst the most favourable towards Turkey's joining the Union (67 per cent support). The condition is coded as one.
Poland	Polish public opinion is also mainly favourable. 57 per cent of respondents are favourable and hence the condition is coded as one.
Portugal	51 per cent of respondents in Portugal are favourable towards Turkish membership. As a result the condition takes the value of 0.6.
Romania	In the case of Romania, public opinion is strongly in favour, with 64 per cent of respondents supporting the enlargement to Turkey. The condition is coded as one.

Slovakia	The opposite trend can be observed in Slovakia where only 35 per cent of respondents are favourable. The condition is coded as zero.
Slovenia	Slovenian respondents are strongly favourable (57 per cent). As a result the condition is coded as one.
Spain	Spanish respondents are mostly favourable (55 per cent). The condition is coded as 0.6.
Sweden	Swedish respondents are the most favourable in the whole of the EU towards Turkey's joining, with 71 per cent in favour. The condition takes the value of one.
UK	UK respondents are less keen; at 42 per cent they tend to be against. The condition is accordingly coded as 0.4.

IV Political parties

Table 4 Calibration of fuzzy set member criteria: political parties' support

Fuzzy Membership	Definition
1.0	Strong support
0.6	Tend to support
0.4	Tend not to support
0	Oppose

Austria	The weighted index of Austrian political parties is 2.63. Since this is well below the average, it is coded as zero.
Belgium	The weighted index for Belgium takes the value of 4.08. As a result, the condition is coded as 0.4.
Bulgaria	The index for Bulgaria takes the value of 4.43. The condition is coded as 0.6.
Cyprus	This is one of the cases not included in the Chapel Hill Survey. However, considering that Cyprus has a strategic interest in Turkish EU membership and that Cypriot political parties tend to be very similar to Greek ones I have used Greek scores (5.5) as a proxy. The condition is, as a result, coded as one.
Czech Republic	The value of the index for the Czech case is 4.96. It is coded as one.
Denmark	The value of the index in this case is 3.64. It is coded as zero.
Estonia	The Chapel Hill Survey does not provide information on the Turkish question for Estonia. It does provide information, however, on the score for European foreign policies. The average difference between support for European foreign policies and for enlargement to Turkey in the results of the survey is 0.5. Taking the value of the weighted index of European foreign policy for Estonia (5.82) and subtracting the average difference between the two questions gives a value of 5.42. I have used this value as a proxy. The condition is coded as one.

Finland	The value of the index for Finland is 4.26. As a result the condition is coded as 0.6.
France	I have looked at the indices for both periods, under Chirac and under Sarkozy. In both cases the index is amongst the lowest, hovering around 2.5. The condition is coded as zero in both cases.
Germany	In the case of Germany there is a significant difference between the Schröder and Merkel governments. In the first case the strong support of both the Social Democrats (4.73) and particularly the Green Party (5.82) constituted a strong pro-enlargement component. However, the other political parties were very sceptical, and so the index takes the value of 3.87. In the second case (Merkel), the grand coalition was led by the CDU/CSU. Both parties are strongly sceptical towards the Turkish enlargement (the scores for the CDU and CSU are 2.36 and 1.64, respectively). The increase in the conservative parties' share of the vote is reflected by an overall lower score in the index, which now takes the value of 3.68. As a result, the condition has been coded as zero.
Greece	As has been mentioned, the index for Greece takes the value of 5.55. The condition is coded as one.
Hungary	The index in this case takes the value of 4.01. The condition is coded as 0.4.
Ireland	The index takes the value of 4.16. The condition is coded as 0.6.
Italy	The Italian index is slightly higher than the previous cases; nevertheless, it is still close to the average (4.66) and hence is coded as 0.6.
Latvia	The index in the Latvian case takes the value of 4.48 and as a result is also coded as 0.6.
Lithuania	In the case of Lithuania the index is much lower (3.48). It is coded as zero.
Luxembourg	This case has not been included in the Chapel Hill Survey. However, Luxembourg has long been one of the most vocal supporters of a federal EU. This is a position shared by all the main political parties, and this makes them strongly sceptical towards the Turkish enlargement, as it would make the prospect of a European federation impossible or at least highly unlikely. For this reason I have coded the case of Luxembourg as zero.
Malta	This case has also not been included in the Chapel Hill Survey. However, as Fenech (2003) argues, Maltese politics are bipolar. The EU is the main issue of contention between the two dominant political parties; the pro-European Nationalist Party (PN) and the Eurosceptic Malta Labour Party (MLP). Taking this into consideration, as well as the fact that the PN had a stronger share of the vote than the MLP in 2006 (see the section on veto players), I have coded the case of Malta as 0.6.
Netherlands	The index takes the value of 3.11 in the Netherlands. Amongst the lowest, it is coded as zero.

Poland	The index for Poland is quite low (3.26). This reflects in part the fact that the survey took place during the Kaczyński government. However, the score is still low when the Tusk government is taken into consideration (3.48). As a result, the condition is coded as zero.
Portugal	The index for Portugal takes the value of 4.88; as a result the condition is coded as one.
Romania	The index is much lower for Romania (3.7). It is coded as 0.4.
Slovakia	The index has a similar score in the Slovak case (3.88). It is coded as 0.4.
Slovenia	The index takes the value of 4.47 in the Slovenian case. It is coded as 0.6.
Spain	In the Spanish case the index takes the value of 4.78 and the condition is coded as one.
Sweden	As has been mentioned, the Swedish political parties are strongly favourable towards the Turkish enlargement. The index in this case takes the value of 5.5 and is accordingly coded as one.
UK	In the case of the UK the index takes the value of 4.75. It is coded as one.

v Government approval

Table 5 Calibration of fuzzy set member criteria: government approval

Fuzzy Membership	Definition
1.0	Strong support
0.6	Tend to support
0.4	Tend not to support
0	No support

Austria	With 57 per cent approval, the Austrian government is amongst those enjoying strong approval. It is coded as one.
Belgium	The Belgian government also enjoyed strong approval during the summer of 2007 (61 per cent) and the condition is coded as one.
Bulgaria	The Bulgarian government has one of the lowest approval rates among the twenty-seven MS. With 22 per cent approval, this condition is coded as zero.
Cyprus	The Cypriot government enjoys strong approval, with almost 67 per cent positive responses. The condition is coded as one.
Czech Republic	The Czech Republic is also among those MS with the lowest government approval rates, with below 27 per cent positive responses. It is as a result coded as zero.

Denmark	The Danish government on the other hand has one of the strongest approval rates with almost 68 per cent positive responses. It is accordingly coded as one.
Estonia	The Estonian government is equally strongly supported, with over 67 per cent positive responses. It is coded as one.
Finland	The Finnish government enjoys even higher support; at almost 74 per cent positive responses, it tops the chart. It is coded as one.
France	Since the French case is divided into the Chirac and Sarkozy cases (and as the French and German cases are the only ones where changes in government brought about a change in the outcome), different values are taken. For the Chirac government, data from Eurobarometer 66 (Spring 2007) is used (elections took place in June 2007). For the Sarkozy government, the data used is that of Eurobarometer 68 (Autumn 2007). The approval rate of the Chirac government was extremely low; at 24 per cent it is coded as zero. The Sarkozy government, on the other hand, enjoyed stronger approval (42 per cent) and so the condition in this case is coded as 0.4.
Germany	As in the case of France, two different values are taken to measure the approval of two different governments. Since elections took place in the autumn of 2005, the data for the Schröder government is taken from Eurobarometer 64 (Autumn 2005). The approval rate in this case was 25 per cent and hence it is coded as zero. For the Merkel government, as in other cases, data from Eurobarometer 67 is used. In this case the approval rate is higher, 42 per cent, and the condition is coded as 0.4.
Greece	The approval rate of the Greek government in the period examined was nearly 43 per cent; the condition takes the value of 0.4.
Hungary	In this case the approval rate was low, at 28 per cent. The condition is coded as zero.
Ireland	The approval rate in this case was slightly over 41 per cent and so the condition is coded as 0.4.
Italy	In the case of Italy, approval approached 38 per cent, and so the condition is coded as 0.4.
Latvia	The approval rate of the Latvian government is bottom of the list. With a little over 19 per cent, the condition is coded as zero.
Lithuania	In this case the approval rate is also low; at a little over 26 per cent, the condition takes the value of zero.
Luxembourg	In contrast with the previous case the government of Luxemburg enjoyed strong support, with almost 68 per cent favourable opinions. It is coded as one.
Malta	Government approval in this case reaches nearly 53 per cent and is coded as 0.6.
Netherlands	The Dutch government also tops the list; with an approval rate of almost 72 per cent it is coded as one.
Poland	This case on the other hand is amongst the lowest; with under 19 per cent it is coded as zero.

Portugal	The Portuguese government, with an approval rate of 45 per cent, sits in the middle of the list. It is accordingly coded as 0.6.
Romania	The Romanian government also has one of the lowest approval rates. At a little over 19 per cent, it is coded as zero.
Slovakia	Approval of the Slovakian government is also near the average of the EU-27. With a 45 per cent approval rate, it is coded as 0.6.
Slovenia	In the case of Slovenia, the approval rate is a little over 36 per cent. Given that this is still close to the average, it is coded as 0.4.
Spain	The Spanish government enjoys relatively strong support with a little over 52 per cent. It is accordingly coded as 0.6.
Sweden	In this case approval is high but still closer to the average than to those cases where support is the strongest. With an approval rate of 45 per cent, this condition is coded as 0.6.
UK	The government of the UK on the other hand is in the lower range of approval; with 33 per cent, it is coded as zero.

VI Veto players

Table 6 Calibration of fuzzy set member criteria: veto players

Fuzzy Membership	Definition
1.0	Veto players exist
0.0	No significant veto players

Given that this variable has been coded for both ESDP and Enlargement cases, a full description of the coding for this variable is provided as a separate appendix (Appendix 4).

Appendix 4 • Veto Players

This variable has been coded for both ESDP and enlargement cases. In the case of ESDP it is a 'dummy' variable measuring whether partisan veto players existed or not. The coding is the same as for enlargement except for the cases where partisan veto players appeared or disappeared as a result of elections. In the case of enlargement, the reference year is 2006; in the case of ESDP the period covered is 2005-2007. The coding for enlargement is provided below.

Austria
Two parties formed a coalition government in Austria from 2002 until the general election of October 2006: the ÖVP (Austrian People's Party) and the FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party). In 2005 the BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria) was created by members seceding from the Freedom Party (and led by the controversial Jörg Haider). This led to an ÖVP-BZÖ coalition. In the 2006 general election, the SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria) won a wafer-thin majority, ending the ÖVP-BZÖ coalition. After long negotiations a grand coalition between FPÖ and ÖVP came into being in early 2007. Significant ideological differences existed in the ÖVP-BZÖ (and FPÖ) coalition, and this made the FPÖ and later the BZÖ important veto players. Smaller but nevertheless important ideological differences existed within the FPÖ-ÖVP coalition, which ruled from 2007 until 2008, when it collapsed. Taking into account the fractious nature of Austrian politics and the significant ideological differences amongst the main political parties that have formed a government, this condition is coded as one.

Belgium
The Belgian general election of 2003 led to a multi-party coalition between the Socialist Party (PS, winning 13 per cent of the vote); the Socialist Party Different Spirit (SPA/14.9 per cent); the Reformist Movement (MR/11.4 per cent); and the Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD/15.4). The ideological differences between the coalition partners were not substantial overall; however, on the issue of Turkey important differences did exist between the MR (which was more sceptical) and the rest of the coalition partners. The general election that took place in June 2007 was followed by a long period of instability in which the Francophone and Flemish parties have found it increasingly difficult to form a government. Taking these factors into consideration, the condition is coded as one.

Bulgaria
The Bulgarian general election of 2005 was won by the Coalition for Bulgaria (KzB, with 34 per cent of the vote), which stayed in power until 2009. It formed a coalition government with the National Movement Simeon II (NDSV/21.8 per cent) and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS/14.1 per cent). The coalition was

stable and there were no significant ideological differences with the exception of the DPS, which is composed mainly of ethnic Turks. As could be expected, the DPS strongly supports the enlargement towards Turkey, whereas the other coalition parties, even if supportive, are less strong in their support. However, considering the stability of the government and the relatively minor ideological differences, this condition is coded as zero.

Cyprus

General elections took place in Cyprus in both 2001 and May 2006. The 2001 election was won with a narrow majority by the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, with 34.7 per cent of the vote). The Democratic Rally (DISY/34 per cent) came second, and the Democratic Party (DIKO/14.8 per cent) came third. In February 2003 Tassos Papadopoulos was elected president, backed by the Democratic Party, the Progressive Party of Working People, and two smaller parties, the Socialists (AKEL) and the Greens. The government was stable. There is no information on the case of Cyprus in the Chapel Hill Survey; however, no major ideological differences seem to have existed until the general election of May 2006. The coalition which was formed after the election (DIKO/AKEL/EDEK) broke down on July 2007 as disagreements emerged over the candidate the coalition would support in the presidential election of 2008. The row occurred as a result of a major ideological difference between AKEL and the other coalition partners on the policies towards resolving the division of the island.[1] The period 2001-2006 saw a stable coalition government, and no strong veto players were present. This changed after the 2006 election and as international pressure mounted towards a settlement of the division of Cyprus. Since the 2006 election Cypriot politics have become more unstable due to significant ideological differences. Given that this variable is coded taking 2006 as a reference point where no strong veto players existed, it is coded as zero.

Czech Republic

General elections took place in the Czech Republic in 2002 and 2006. The 2002 election was won by the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) with a little over 30 per cent of the vote. The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) came second with nearly 25 per cent of the vote. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) came third, capturing almost 19 per cent of the vote. The Social Democrats and other smaller parties formed a weak coalition government, while the Civic Democrats and the Communists went into opposition. Hence until 2006 Czech politics were characterized by a high number of veto players. The 2006 elections produced another hung parliament and it took 230 days for Mirek Topolánek, leader of the Civic Democrats (Liberals/35 per cent of the vote) to form a coalition with the Christian Democrats (7 per cent of the vote) and the Greens (6 per cent) in January 2007. This coalition also brought together parties with very opposed positions towards both European foreign policy (towards which the Christian Demo-

crats are highly favourable and the Liberals very unfavourable) and the Turkish enlargement (towards which the Liberals are very favourable and the Christian Democrats very unfavourable). The fractious nature of Czech politics reflects a significant number of veto players. Moreover, there are important ideological differences between coalition partners. As a result, this condition is coded as one.

Denmark

General elections took place in Denmark in February 2005 and November 2007. The 2005 election was characterized by a great deal of stability, with Fogh Rasmussen's Venstre–Liberal Party of Denmark taking the biggest share of votes (29 per cent) and his coalition ally the Conservative People's Party winning a little over 10 per cent. Both parties have almost identical ideological positions and had already been in coalition after the 2001 general election. Venstre also won most votes in the 2007 general election, allowing Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen to stay in power in a coalition with the Conservatives, and indirectly with the Danish People's Party. Even though there was significant stability, the indirect alliance with the Danish People's Party with whom very significant ideological differences exist means that veto players exist. As a result, this condition is coded as one.

Estonia

General elections in Estonia took place in March 2003 and March 2007. The 2003 election led to a coalition between the Estonian Centre Party (EK/25.4 per cent of the vote); the Estonian Reform Party (ER/17.69 per cent); and the Estonian People's Union (ERL/13.03 per cent). The coalition nominated Andus Ansip as Prime Minister. The ideological differences between these parties on European foreign policy are moderate (information on enlargement is not available). The coalition partners also won most votes in the 2007 election. However, Prime Minister Ansip from the Estonian Centre Party formed a new coalition with the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union Party and the Social Democratic Party. The ideological differences are not wider than those in the previous coalition. As a result, and considering that Prime Minister Ansip has continued in power, the condition is coded as zero.

Finland

General elections took place in March 2003 and 2007. The elections of 2003 had two main winners: the Centre Party (KESK/24.7 per cent of the vote) and the Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP/24.50). These two parties, together with the Swedish People's Party (RKP/4.6 per cent of the vote), which represents the Swedish minority in Finland, formed a coalition. There are no significant ideological differences between these three parties on European foreign policy or on the enlargement to Turkey. In the parliamentary elections of 2007 the SDP suffered significant losses and a new coalition was formed between the Centre Party, the National Coalition Party, the Greens, and the Swedish People's Party. The number of parties and the ideological differences increased somewhat in the 2007 election. However,

in 2006, the year of reference for this condition, Finland had a stable coalition and almost no ideological differences between its members. As a result, the condition is coded as zero.

France

French general elections took place in 2003 and 2007. In the 2003 elections the first round produced the surprising result of Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National (FN) coming second in the race, creating a political earthquake in the establishment. In the second round, however, Jacques Chirac's Rally for the Republic won over 80 per cent of the vote. The 2007 election was bitterly fought between the Socialists (PS) and the Union for Popular Movement (UMP, the successor to the Rally for the Republic). In the event the UMP won a little over 46 per cent of the popular vote and the Socialists a little over 42 per cent. This scenario would repeat itself in the presidential election. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, France is one of the cases where constitutional prerogatives have a strong effect. The president has wide-ranging powers and hence partisan veto players play no significant role. As a result, the condition is coded as zero for both the Chirac and Sarkozy governments.

Germany

General elections took place in 2005 and 2009. The 2005 election led to a tie between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Chancellor Schröder and Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats (CDU). The situation was complicated by the strong showing of the newly-created radical Left Party (Linkspartei), which made a left coalition impossible as the SDP pledged not to join a coalition with them. Eventually, a grand coalition between SPD and CDU/CSU came into being, with Angela Merkel becoming Chancellor. The previous coalition (SPD and Greens) had been stable and the two parties shared a common vision on issues such as the enlargement towards Turkey and European foreign policy. The grand coalition, nevertheless, had important differences, particularly with regard to the Turkish enlargement, where a major ideological difference exists between the two parties. As a result, the condition is coded as zero for the Schröder government and as one for the Merkel government.

Greece

General elections took place in 2004, 2007, and 2009. Greece also has a constitutional provision that reduces the number of veto players since the winner of the parliamentary election is given a forty-seat premium. Parliament also elects the president. Moreover, recent elections have been fought between two main parties. The 2004 and 2007 elections brought the New Democracy party into power, headed by Kostas Karamanlis, and the 2009 election George Papandreou of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Given these elements, the condition is coded as zero.

Hungary
General elections took place in 2002, 2006, and 2009. The 2002 election was won by the Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union and its allies the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The 2006 election brought to power the alliance of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP/43.21 per cent of the vote) and the Alliance of the Free Democratis (SzDSz/6.5 per cent). The 2009 election returned Fidesz to power. The Hungarian political landscape is composed of two main parties which tend to form alliances with smaller parties. Moreover, as has been noted in the previous chapter, the government has strong constitutional prerogatives, which greatly reduce the influence of possible veto players. As a result, the condition is coded as zero.

Ireland
General elections in Ireland took place in 2002 and 2007. The Irish political landscape is composed of two main parties, Fianna Fáil (FF, 'Soldiers of Destiny') and Fine Gael (FG, 'the Family of the Irish'). Fianna Fáil made a strong showing in the 2002 election, winning over 41 per cent (while Fine Gael won only a little over 22 per cent). It continued its previous coalition with the Progressive Democrats (PD/4 per cent). No significant differences existed between the two parties. Fianna Fáil also won the 2007 election, allowing Bertie Ahern to become Taoiseach (Prime Minister) again; in this case in an alliance with the Greens. As a result, the condition is coded as zero.

Italy
General elections took place in 2001, 2006, and 2008. Italian politics are well known for their factionalism and for alliances between disparate partners. The 2006 and 2008 elections saw a consolidation of parties and a movement towards some sort of two-party system, with Forza Italia (in a coalition under the banner of the House of Freedom) and L'Ulivo (in a coalition named the Union) disputing the 2006 elections. These were narrowly won by Romano Prodi's alliance, the Union. In the 2008 snap election the renamed formations, the Democratic Party and the People of Freedom, faced each other. These parties regroup a wide variety of factions, making cohesion within them very low. Moreover, both parties have had to rely on allies in order to secure a majority. Silvio Berlusconi's People of Freedom in alliance with the Northern League formed a government. Given the unstable nature of Italian politics, the wide number of actors, and the important ideological differences between them, this condition is coded as one.

Latvia
General elections took place in Latvia in 2002 and 2006. The 2002 elections brought in a right-wing coalition under the People's Party (TP) of Aigars Kalvitis together with Latvia's First Party (LPP), the Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS), and Latvian Way (LC). The 2006 election was won by the same coalition, which as a consequence stayed in power. Even though some ideological differences in terms

of party positions towards European foreign policy and particularly towards the Turkish enlargement exist, these are not substantial. Considering the stability of the coalition and the moderate ideological differences, the condition is coded as zero.

Lithuania
General elections took place in 2004 and 2008. The 2004 election brought into power a coalition between the Labour Party (DP/28.4 per cent of the vote), the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP/13.36 per cent), and the New Union (NS/7.34 per cent). There are some ideological differences between the parties in terms of their positions towards Turkey and EFP, but they are not significant. As a result this condition is coded as zero.

Luxembourg
Elections took place in 2004 and 2009. The 2004 election increased the share of the vote of the incumbent government's party, the Christian Social People's Party, led by Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker, who as a result continued to hold office. The coalition nevertheless shifted from an alliance with the Democratic Party (DP), which faced significant losses in the election, to one with the Luxembourg Socialist Democratic Party (LSAP). Unfortunately, Luxembourg has not been included in the Chapel Hill Survey and hence data on party positions is not available. Taking into consideration the limited number of coalition parties and the stability of the government, this condition has been coded as zero.

Malta
General elections were held in Malta in 2003 and 2008. The election of 2003 was dominated by the debate on EU membership. As Fenech (2003) argues, Maltese politics had been bipolar, with two dominant parties opposing each other and the issue of EU membership splitting along party membership lines. The pro-European Nationalist Party (PN) emerged victorious from the election, while the Malta Labour Party (MLP), which ran a fervently anti-EU campaign, lost. The result of the election not only paved the way for Malta's membership of the EU but also gave the PN a solid mandate. As a result this condition is coded as zero.

Netherlands
Dutch elections took place both in 2003 and in 2006. The 2003 election took place within a difficult context for the government coalition led by Jan Peter Balkenende. The previous general election of 2002 brought the newly-created radical right party of Pim Fortuyn (LPF) into a power-sharing agreement with Balkenende's Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). However, the radical positions of the LPF caused increased conflicts amongst the coalition partners and the fall of the government. The LPF fared badly in the 2003 election and this allowed the CDA (26.5 per cent of the vote) to form a new coalition with the People's Party for Freedom

and Democracy (VVD/14.6) and the Democrats 66 (D66/2 per cent). The ideological positions of the new coalition parties on both European foreign policy and enlargement towards Turkey are opposed. Considering the number of parties in the coalition and their ideological differences, significant veto players exist and as a result this variable has been coded as one.

Poland

General elections in Poland took place in 2005 and 2007. The 2005 elections resulted in two main winners. The first was the Law and Justice Party (PiS/27 per cent of the vote) led by the twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński. The second party, Civic Platform (PO/24 per cent of the vote) initially seemed to agree on a coalition government but withdrew as it became clear Lech Kaczyński would run for president. The twin brothers would come to dominate the Polish political landscape until 2007 as they were both Prime Minister and President. They formed a minority government with the radical Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (S/11 per cent of the vote) and the deeply conservative League of Polish Families (LPR/8 per cent). The ideological differences between the coalition partners were not substantial. They were all deeply conservative and sceptical of both European foreign policies and the enlargement towards Turkey. The Premiership and Presidency of the Kaczyński twins was characterized by a confrontational attitude towards the EU and particularly MS such as Germany. The 2007 election brought Donald Tusk's Civil Platform in alliance with the Polish People's Party (PSL) into power, ending the Premiership of Jarosław Kaczyński. Lech Kaczyński died in a tragic plane accident near Smolensk, Russia in April 2010. Both the 2005 and 2007 coalitions were strong and no substantial ideological differences existed between its members; as a result, the condition is coded as zero.

Portugal

General elections took place in Portugal in 2005 and in 2009. The 2005 elections were won by a wide margin by José Sócrates' Socialist Party (PS/45 per cent of the vote). The Democratic People's Party/Social Democratic Party (PPD/PPS) that had been in power managed to capture only a little over 28 per cent of the vote. As a result, the government of Sócrates enjoyed a strong mandate and no significant veto players. The condition is coded as zero.

Romania

Romania held general elections in both 2004 and 2008. The 2004 election led to a close result between the two main coalitions contending. The National Union, made up of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Humanist Party of Romania (PUR), won a little over 36 per cent of the vote. The Justice and Truth Alliance, made up of the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic Party (PD), won a little over 31 per cent. The political climate was poisoned by allegations of fraud from both sides until a coalition emerged between the PSD-PUR and the Hunga-

rian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR/6.2 per cent of the vote). No significant differences between the coalition parties exist towards European foreign policy and only moderate differences exist as to the Turkish enlargement. As a result, the condition is coded as zero.

Slovakia
General elections in Slovakia took place in 2006 and 2010. The 2006 election was won by Robert Fico's Direction–Social Democracy (Smer/29.14 per cent of the vote). It formed a coalition government with the Slovak National Party (SNS/11.73 per cent) and the People's Party–Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS/8.79 per cent). Significant ideological differences existed between the Slovak National Party and the other two coalition parties. The SNS position towards both European foreign policy and the Turkish enlargement scores very low. As a result, and considering its relevant share of the vote, the SNS can be considered to be a significant veto player. The condition is accordingly coded as one.

Slovenia
General elections took place in 2004 and 2008 in Slovenia. The 2004 elections were won by the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS/29.10 per cent of the vote). The party that came second was the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS/22.90 per cent). The SDS formed a coalition with the Slovenian People's Party (SLS/6.80 per cent); the New Slovenia–Christian People's Party (NSI/9 per cent); and the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS/4 per cent). Both in terms of European foreign policy and the Turkish enlargement, significant differences exist between coalition members. Taking into consideration the number of coalition members and the ideological differences amongst them, this variable is coded as one.

Spain
General elections took place in Spain in 2004 and 2008. The 2004 election was marked by the terrorist attacks in Madrid and their mishandling by the incumbent José María Aznar of the People's Party (PP/38.30 per cent). This gave the Socialists (PSOE/43.30 per cent of the vote) a last-minute boost which allowed them to win the election by five points. The PSOE formed a government under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero helped by the anti-war mood that prevailed after the unpopular Aznar administration's support for the American operation in Iraq and after the terrorist attacks in Madrid. Even though the complications of Spanish politics meant that the PSOE has had to consider the grievances of local parties (particularly the Catalans and the Basques), it has been able to govern without forming a coalition and so this condition is coded as zero.

Sweden
General elections to the Swedish Riksdag took place in September 2002 and 2006. The Social Democrats (SAP/39.85 per cent of the vote) comfortably won the biggest

share of the vote and formed a coalition. Two main coalitions traditionally form in the Riksdag: the Red-Green block composed of the Social Democrats, the Left Party (V/8.39 per cent), and the Green Party (MP/4.65 per cent); and the Alliance for Sweden coalition composed of the Moderate Party, the Centre Party (C/6.19 per cent), the Liberal People's Party (FP/8.67 per cent), and the Christian Democrats (KD/6.59 per cent). While significant differences exist in terms of European foreign policy between the SAP and the Left and Green parties, these are almost non-existent as far as the Turkish enlargement is concerned. Considering the stability of these coalitions and that no significant differences exist as to Turkish enlargement, the condition is coded as zero.

The Red-Green block lost almost 7 per cent of its share of the vote in the 2006 elections (the Social Democrats had their worst result ever), while the Alliance for Sweden augmented theirs by over 4 per cent and formed a new government under Fredrik Reinfeldt as Prime Minister. No significant ideological differences exist between the members of the Alliance for Sweden, either in European foreign policy or towards the Turkish enlargement.

UK

General elections in the UK took place in 2005 and 2010. In the 2005 election Tony Blair's Labour managed to secure a third term with a little over 35 per cent of the popular vote. The Tories (Conservative Party) won over 32 per cent and the Liberal Democrats came third with 22 per cent of the vote. Besides the fact that the UK has one of the most centralized governments – and that the Prime Minister enjoys enormous prerogatives – the stability of the Labour era means that hardly any partisan veto players exist. As a result this variable is coded as zero.

Appendix 5 • ESDP: Operationalization and Measurement

Outcome variable

MS have to shoulder a large part of the financial costs of the personnel and troops they deploy to ESDP missions, including their training. Because of this, and because of the fact that personnel is a crucial component in ESDP operations, the number of personnel sent is a good measure of burden-sharing between the different MS. There are three different types of ESDP missions: civilian, military, and mixed. Out of the twenty-three ESDP missions since its launch in 2003, only five have been purely military (ARTEMIS, EUFOR CONGO, EUFOR CHAD/RCA, EUFOR ALTHEA, and CONCORDIA).

The outcome variable for ESDP thus focuses on the deployment of personnel to civilian and mixed civilian-military missions. Personnel figures are not publicly available and have been obtained from the Council's Secretariat. The variable measures the personnel seconded by the MS to civilian and mixed civilian-military ESDP missions in the period September 2005 to December 2007. Unfortunately, bi-monthly figures previous to September 2005 are not available. Given that most civilian missions are still deployed, and that practically all of those missions that have been completed did so after September 2005, the study includes practically every civilian and mixed operation of the EU. Considering that there have only been five purely military operations, the great majority of ESDP operations to date are included in the analysis.

Independent variables

Political parties

Political parties are expected to have a direct effect on governmental positions towards EFP, but they also might exert an indirect effect through public opinion and the mass media, and they might also affect the popularity of the executive. The data for this variable was obtained through the Chapel Hill Survey carried out by the University of North Carolina. This is an expert survey undertaken by Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Moira Nelson, David Scott, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova, which asks country experts to evaluate the positions of national political parties on European integration on a seven-point scale (ranging from 1 to 7). The lowest score represents strong opposition to and the highest strong support for European integration. This score is also applied to different issue areas, one of which is foreign and security policy.

The dataset provides information on party positioning on European integration for 171 parties in twenty-three of the twenty-five then EU member states (not Luxembourg and Estonia) as well as in Bulgaria and Romania. The survey was administered between September 2002 and April 2003 to 636 academics specializing in political parties, European integration, or closely related topics in the

countries considered. A total of 238 surveys were completed, which amounts to a 37 per cent response rate. This means that out of the twenty-seven current MS we have responses for twenty-five. Given the lack of data, this variable was not applied to the cases of Luxembourg and Estonia.

Accordingly, the variable for political parties was created by aggregating scores of the different parties represented in parliament at any given moment (see also section 4.4). It is likely that if more Eurosceptic parties increase their electoral support it will be harder to enact pro-European policies.

Public opinion

Public opinion (PO) is hypothesized to play a constraining role in the positions and actions taken by a government. This variable is measured through Eurobarometer surveys on ESDP (QA31_3).[2]

Mass media

The media is also liable to affect the executive's positions and to have an indirect influence through opinion-shaping in public opinion, in political parties, and by affecting the popularity of the executive (approval ratings). Ideally a comparable measure for the position of the media on each one of the topics selected would have been used; or at least a comparable measure on the position of the mass media vis-à-vis the EU in the twenty-seven MS. However, to my knowledge such a measure does not exist and coding the positions of the media for each one of the twenty-seven MS was beyond the scope of the time available for this research. As a result, I measure this variable through a proxy, that is, the perception of the position of the media towards the EU in the twenty-seven MS. This variable has been obtained through question 20 of Eurobarometer 61 (February-March 2004). The question captures the percentage of respondents who consider that the EU is positively covered by their respective national media.[3] Unfortunately, this was a one-time question.

Approval ratings

Government support is measured through the Eurobarometer survey. Question 7_11 of the survey is considered. It asks respondents what degree of trust they have in their government.[4]

Veto players

In order to account for the influence of veto players, electoral results and the Chapel Hill Survey, mentioned previously, have been used as a reference. The variable of veto players takes the value of one (that is the existence of veto players), when either one of two conditions is met: i) the share of vote is divided amongst more than three political parties; and/or ii) coalition parties have widely divergent preferences towards European foreign policy (on the basis of the results of the Chapel Hill Survey).

Size

Size is measured in two different ways, firstly by population and secondly in terms of the economy. Population figures have been obtained from Eurostat. In order to capture the influence of size in economic terms, both imports and exports as a proportion of GDP have been added. Smaller countries with smaller domestic markets tend to have a much higher proportion of exports and imports than states with bigger domestic economies. This information has been obtained from the Commission's AMECO database.

Economic performance

GDP per capita is included in order to measure wealth and economic performance. More affluent countries are likely to find it easier to allocate resources in furthering EFP. Data has been obtained through the AMECO database.

Unemployment

Eurobarometer surveys consistently show that the most relevant concern of European citizens is unemployment. Thus, countries facing higher unemployment are likely to have lower support for costly policies. Data has been obtained from the AMECO database of the Commission.

Deficit

It is likely that governments with significant deficits, or which are in the process of budget consolidation, will find it harder to allocate resources to costly policies (for a justification on the costs of ESDP and enlargement, see the empirical chapters). Data has been obtained from Eurostat.

Appendix 6 • ESDP Missions

	Mission	Period
Europe		
Ongoing	EUPM	1 January 2003–
	EUFOR Althea	2 December 2004–
	EUBAM	1 December 2005–
	EULEX Kosovo	9 December 2008–
	EUMM Georgia	1 October 2008–
Completed	EUFOR Concordia (FYROM)	31 March 2003–15 December 2003
	EUPOL Proxima (FYROM)	15 December 2003–14 December 2005
	EUJUST Themis (Georgia)	16 July 2004–14 July 2005
	EUPAT (FYROM)	15 December 2005–14 June 2006
Africa		
Ongoing	EUSEC RD Congo	8 June 2005–
	EUPOL RD Congo	1 July 2007–
	Atalanta	November 2008–
	EUTM Somalia	May 2010-
Completed	Artemis (Congo)	12 June 2003–1 September 2003
	EUPOL Kinshasa	
	AMIS EU	18 July 2005–31 December 2007
	EUFOR RD Congo	12 June 2006–30 November 2006
	EUFOR Chad/RCA	17 March 2008–15 March 2009
	EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	12 February 2008–30 September 2010
Middle East/Asia		
Ongoing	EUJUST LEX (Iraq)	1 July 2005–
	EUBAM Rafah (Gaza)	25 November 2005–
	EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories)	1 January 2006–
	EUPOL Afghanistan	
Completed	AMM (Aceh Indonesia)	15 September 2005–15 December 2006

Appendix 7 • Political Parties: ESDP

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Belgium	Socialist Party (Walloon)	6.33	14.9	14.9	10.86	0.94317	0.94317	0.68744
Belgium	Socialist Party (Flemish)	6.55	13	13	10.26	0.8515	0.8515	0.67203
Belgium	Ecolo (ecologist)	5	3.1	3.1	5.1	0.155	0.155	0.255
Belgium	Agalev (ecologist)	5.1	2.5	2.5	3.98	0.1275	0.1275	0.20298
Belgium	Flemish Liberals and Democrats	6.82	15.4	15.4	11.83	1.05028	1.05028	0.80681
Belgium	Reformist Movement	6.89	11.4	11.4	12.52	0.78546	0.78546	0.86263
Belgium	Christian Social Party	6.44	5.5	5.5	6.06	0.3542	0.3542	0.39026
Belgium	Christian People's Party	6.63	13.3	13.3	18.51	0.88179	0.88179	1.22721
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance	5	3.1	3.1	w.FA	0.155	0.155	
Belgium	Flemish Block	2.75	11.6	11.6	11.99	0.319	0.319	0.32973
Score						**5.6229**	**5.6229**	**5.43408**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Denmark	Social Democracy Party in Denmark	5.5	25.9	25.9	25.5	1.4245	1.4245	1.4025
Denmark	Radical Left–Social Liberal Party	5	9.2	9.2	5.1	0.46	0.46	0.255
Denmark	Conservative People's Party	5.5	10.3	10.3	10.4	0.5665	0.5665	0.572
Denmark	Socialist People's Party	2.67	6	6	13	0.1602	0.1602	0.3471
Denmark	Left, Liberal Party of Denmark	6.25	29	29	26.2	1.8125	1.8125	1.6375
Denmark	Danish People's Party	2.08	13.2	13.2	13.9	0.27456	0.27456	0.28912
Score						**4.69826**	**4.69826**	**4.50322**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Germany	Christian-Democratic Union	6.43	32.6	32.6	32.6	2.09618	2.09618	2.09618
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany	6.29	38.4	38.4	38.4	2.41536	2.41536	2.41536
Germany	Free Democratic Party	6.14	4.7	4.7	.7	0.28858	0.28858	0.28858
Germany	Alliance 90/The Greens	6.36	5.4	5.4	5.4	0.34344	0.34344	0.34344
Germany	Party of Democratic Socialism/ Die Linke	2.82	8	8	8	0.2256	0.2256	0.2256
Germany	Christian Social Union in Bavaria	5.93	8.2	8.2	8.2	0.48626	0.48626	0.48626
Score						**5.85542**	**5.85542**	**5.85542**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Greece	Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement	6.73	40.5	40.5	38.1	2.72565	2.72565	2.56413
Greece	New Democracy	6.73	45.4	45.4	41.83	3.05542	3.05542	2.81516
Greece	Coalition of the Left and Progress	5.82	3.3	3.3	5.04	0.19206	0.19206	0.29333
Greece	Communist Party of Greece	1.86	5.9	5.9	8.15	0.10974	0.10974	0.15159
Score						**6.08287**	**6.08287**	**5.82421**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	6.33	43.3	43.3	43.3	2.74089	2.74089	2.74089
Spain	People's Party	4.5	38.3	38.3	38.3	1.7235	1.7235	1.7235
Spain	United Left	5.36	5.3	5.3	5.3	0.28408	0.28408	0.28408
Spain	Convergence and Union	5.6	3.3	3.3	3.3	0.1848	0.1848	0.1848
Spain	Basque Nationalist Party	5	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.065	0.065	0.065
Spain	Basque Solidarity	5.75	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.01725	0.01725	0.01725
Spain	Galician Nationalist Block	5.5	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.044	0.044	0.044
Spain	Andalusian Party	5.67	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.03969	0.03969	0.03969
Spain	Canarian Coalition	5.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.0522	0.0522	0.0522
Score						**5.15141**	**5.15141**	**5.15141**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
France	French Communist Party	2.58	4.8	4.8	4.29	0.12384	0.12384	0.11068
France	Socialist Party	5.75	24.1	24.1	24.73	1.38575	1.38575	1.42198
France	Left Radical Party	4	1.5	1.5	1.31	0.06	0.06	0.0524
France	The Greens	4.8	4.5	4.5	3.25	0.216	0.216	0.156
France	Rally for the Republic	5.58	33.5	33.5	39.54	1.8693	1.8693	2.20633
France	National Front	1.67	11.3	11.3	4.29	0.18871	0.18871	0.07164
France	Union for the French Democracy	6.1	4.8	4.8	7.61	0.2928	0.2928	0.46421
France	Liberal Democracy	5.33	0.4	0.4		0.02132	0.02132	
Score						**4.15772**	**4.15772**	**4.48324**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Ireland	Fianna Fáil	3.5	41.5	41.5	41.6	1.4525	1.4525	1.456
Ireland	Fine Gael	5.25	22.5	22.5	27.3	1.18125	1.18125	1.43325
Ireland	Labour Party	2.5	10.8	10.8	10.1	0.27	0.27	0.2525
Ireland	Green Party	1.38	3.8	3.8	4.7	0.05244	0.05244	0.06486
Ireland	Progressive Democrats	5.13	4	4	2.7	0.2052	0.2052	0.13851
Ireland	Sinn Féin	1.13	6.5	6.5	6.9	0.07345	0.07345	0.07797
Score						**3.23484**	**3.23484**	**3.42309**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Italy	Democrats of the Left	6.33	16.6	31.2	31.2	1.05078	1.97496	1.97496
Italy	Communist Refoundation	3.09	5	5.83	5.83	0.1545	0.180147	0.18015
Italy	National Alliance	3.75	12	12.31	12.31	0.45	0.461625	0.46163
Italy	League North/Northern League	2.17	3.9	4.58	4.58	0.08463	0.099386	0.09939
Italy	Christian Democratic Centre	5.45	1.6	6.75	6.75	0.0872	0.367875	0.36788
Italy	Forza Italia	4.25	29.4	23.66	23.66	1.2495	1.00555	1.00555
Italy	United Christian Democrats	5.36	1.6	Union of the Centre		0.08576		
Italy	Democrats	6.09	7.25	L'Ulivo	L'Ulivo	0.441525		
Italy	Italian People's Party	6.09	4.6	L'Ulivo	L'Ulivo	0.28014		
Italy	Italian Renewal (List Dini)	5.91	1.2	L'Ulivo	L'Ulivo	0.07092		
Italy	List Di Pietro Italy of Values	5.33	3.9	2.29	2.29	0.20787	0.122057	0.12206
Italy	Democrats Union for Europe	5.4	1.2	L'Ulivo	L'Ulivo	0.0648		
Score						**4.22762**	**4.2116**	**4.2116**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	5.29	28.6	26.5	26.5	1.51294	1.40185	1.40185
Netherlands	Labour Party	5.71	27.3	21.2	21.2	1.55883	1.21052	1.21052
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	4.43	17.9	14.6	14.6	0.79297	0.64678	0.64678
Netherlands	Democrats 66	6.14	4.1	2	2	0.25174	0.1228	0.1228
Netherlands	Green Left	4.86	5.1	4.6	4.6	0.24786	0.22356	0.22356
Netherlands	Political Reformed Party	4.33	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.06928	0.06928	0.06928
Netherlands	Socialist Party	3.33	6.3	16.6	16.6	0.20979	0.55278	0.55278
Netherlands	Pim Fortuyn List	3	5.7	5.9	5.9	0.171	0.177	0.177
Netherlands	Christian Union	5	2.1	4	4			
Score						**4.81441**	**4.40457**	**4.40457**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
UK	Conservative Party	1.72	32.3	32.3	32.3	0.55556	0.55556	0.55556
UK	Labour Party	5.19	35.3	35.3	35.3	1.83207	1.83207	1.83207
UK	Liberal Democrats	6.44	22.1	22.1	22.1	1.42324	1.42324	1.42324
UK	Scottish National Party	5.38	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.0807	0.0807	0.0807
UK	Plaid Cymru	5.33				0	0	0
Score						**3.89157**	**3.89157**	**3.89157**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Portugal	Unitarian Democratic Coalition	3.86	7.6	7.6	7.6	0.29336	0.29336	0.29336
Portugal	People's Party	3.33	7.3	7.3	7.3	0.24309	0.24309	0.24309
Portugal	Socialist Party	6.5	45	45	45	2.925	2.925	2.925
Portugal	Social Democratic Party	5.83	28.8	28.8	28.8	1.67904	1.67904	1.67904
Score						**5.14049**	**5.14049**	**5.14049**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria	5.13	36.5	35.34	35.34	1.87245	1.812942	1.81294
Austria	Austrian People's Party	6.5	42.3	34.33	34.33	2.7495	2.23145	2.23145
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	3.63	10	11.04	11.04	0.363	0.400752	0.40075
Austria	The Greens	5.13	9.5	11.05	11.05	0.48735	0.566865	0.56687
Austria	Liberal Forum	6	1			0.06	0	0
Score						**5.5323**	**5.01200**	**5.01201**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Finland	Social Democratic Party of Finland	4.89	22.9	22.9	21.4	1.11981	1.11981	1.04646
Finland	National Rally	5.33	21	21	22.3	1.1193	1.1193	1.18859
Finland	Finnish Centre	3	22.4	22.4	23.1	0.672	0.672	0.693
Finland	Left Wing League	3.67	9.9	9.9	8.8	0.36333	0.36333	0.32296
Finland	Swedish People's Party	5.11	5.1	5.1	4.6	0.26061	0.26061	0.23506
Finland	Green League	4.22	7.5	7.5	8.5	0.3165	0.3165	0.3587
Finland	Christian League of Finland	2.78	4.2	4.2	4.9	0.11676	0.11676	0.13622
Score						**3.96831**	**3.96831**	**3.98099**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Sweden	Left Party	1.33	8.3	5.85	5.85	0.11039	0.077805	0.07781
Sweden	Workers' Party–Social Democrats	4.92	39.9	35	35	1.96308	1.722	1.722
Sweden	Centre Party	3.5	6.2	7.88	7.88	0.217	0.2758	0.2758
Sweden	People's Party Liberals	6.58	13.3	7.54	7.54	0.87514	0.496132	0.49613
Sweden	Moderate Rally Party	5.92	15.1	26.23	26.23	0.89392	1.552816	1.55282
Sweden	Christian Democrats	4.08	9.1	6.59	6.59	0.37128	0.268872	0.26887
Sweden	Environmental Party The Greens	1.33	4.5	5.24	5.24	0.05985	0.069692	0.06969
Score						**4.49066**	**4.46311**	**4.46312**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Bulgaria	National Movement Simeon ii	5.4	21.8	21.8	21.8	1.1772	1.1772	1.1772
Bulgaria	United Democratic Forces	5.5	8.4	8.4	8.4	0.462	0.462	0.462
Bulgaria	Coalition for Bulgaria	5.1	34	34	34	1.734	1.734	1.734
Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	5.6	14.1	14.1	14.1	0.7896	0.7896	0.7896
Bulgaria	Gergiovden–VMRO	3.8				0	0	0
Bulgaria	Coalition Simeon ii	5.33				0	0	0
Bulgaria	National Union Attack	1.67	8.9	8.9		0.14863	0.14863	0.14863
Score						**4.31143**	**4.31143**	**4.31143**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Czech Rep	Czech Social Democratic Party	5.83	30.2	32.32	32.32	1.76066	1.884256	1.88426
Czech Rep	Civic Democratic Party	2.11	24.5	35.38	35.38	0.51695	0.746518	0.74652
Czech Rep	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	1.76	18.5	12.81	12.81	0.3256	0.225456	0.22546
Czech Rep	Christian Democratic Union–People's Party	5.61	10.29	7.23	7.23	0.577269	0.405603	0.4056
Czech Rep	Freedom Union–Democratic Union	5.67	4.15			0.235305	0	0
Score						**3.415784**	**3.261833**	**3.26183**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Estonia	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	6.67	31.93	31.93	17.9	2.129731	2.129731	1.19393
Estonia	Estonian Centre Party	5.33	25.4	25.4	26.1	1.35382	1.35382	1.39113
Estonia	Estonian Reform Party	6.67	17.69	17.69	27.8	1.179923	1.179923	1.85426
Estonia	Social Democratic Party	5	0.42	0.42	10.6	0.021	0.021	0.53
Estonia	Constitution Party	3.33	2.2	2.2	1	0.07326	0.07326	0.0333
Estonia	Estonian People's Union	5.67	13.02	13.02	7.1	0.73823	0.738234	
Score						**5.49596**	**5.49596**	**5.49596**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party	5.73	42.1	40.26	40.26	2.41233	2.306898	2.3069
Hungary	Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Party	3.09	35.11	41.96	41.96	1.084899	1.296564	1.29656
Hungary	Hungarian Democratic Forum	4.09	5.14	4.41	4.41	0.210226	0.180369	0.18037
Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats	5.91	5.5	6.31	6.31	0.32505	0.372921	0.37292
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	1	4.4	1.7	1.7	0.044	0.017	0.017
Hungary	Centre Party	3.33	3.9	0.26	0.26	0.12987	0.008658	0.00866
Score						**4.20637**	**4.18241**	**4.18241**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Latvia	New Era	4.25	23.9	16.38	16.38	1.01575	0.69615	0.69615
Latvia	For Human Rights in a United Latvia	4.25	18.9	6.03	6.03	0.80325	0.256275	0.25628
Latvia	People's Party	4.25	16.7	19.56	19.56	0.70975	0.8313	0.8313
Latvia	First Party of Latvia	4.67	9.6	8.58	8.58	0.44832	0.400686	0.40069
Latvia	Green and Farmers' Union	4.67	9.5	16.71	16.71	0.44365	0.780357	0.78036
Latvia	For Fatherland and Freedom–LNNK	4	5.4	6.94	6.94	0.216	0.2776	0.2776
Latvia	Latvia's Way	5	4.9			0.245	0	0
Latvia	Latvian Social-Democratic Workers' Party	4.33	4	3.5	3.5	0.1732	0.15155	0.15155
Latvia	Harmony Centre	4.25		14.42	14.42	0	0.61285	0.61285
Score						**4.05492**	**4.00676**	**4.00677**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Lithuania	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	5.2	20.7	20.7	20.7	1.0764	1.0764	1.0764
Lithuania	New Union (Social Liberals)	5.2	20.7	20.7	20.7	1.0764	1.0764	1.0764
Lithuania	Liberal and Centre Union	5.4	9.1	9.1	9.1	0.4914	0.4914	0.4914
Lithuania	Homeland Union	5.8	14.6	14.6	14.6	0.8468	0.8468	0.8468
Lithuania	Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union	4.8	6.6	6.6	6.6	0.3168	0.3168	0.3168
Lithuania	Election Action of Lithuania's Poles	4.6	3.8	3.8	3.8	0.1748	0.1748	0.1748
Lithuania	Order and Justice	4	11.4	11.4	11.4	0.456	0.456	0.456

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Lithuania	Labour Party	4.4	28.4	28.4	28.4	1.2496	1.2496	1.2496
Score						**5.6882**	**5.6882**	**5.6882**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Poland	Alliance of Democratic Left	4.14	11.3	11.3	13.15	0.46782	0.46782	0.54441
Poland	Union of Labour	4.57				0	0	0
Poland	Citizens' Platform	4.57	24.1	24.1	41.51	1.10137	1.10137	1.89701
Poland	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland	2	11.4	11.4	1.53	0.228	0.228	0.0306
Poland	Law and Justice	3.14	27	27	32.11	0.8478	0.8478	1.00825
Poland	Polish People's Party	3.29	7	7	8.91	0.2303	0.2303	0.29314
Poland	League of Polish Families	1.2	8	8	1.3	0.096	0.096	0.0156
Poland	Coalition Electoral Action Solidarity of the Right	3.2				0	0	0
Poland	Freedom Union/Democratic Party	4.57	2.5	2.5		0.11425	0.11425	0
Score						**3.08554**	**3.08554**	**3.78901**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Romania	Social Democratic Party	4.11	36.8	36.8	36.8	1.51248	1.51248	1.51248
Romania	Humanist Party of Romania	3.75				0	0	0
Romania	Party of Great Romania	1.86	13	13	13	0.2418	0.2418	0.2418
Romania	Democratic Party	5.5	31.5	31.5	31.5	1.7325	1.7325	1.7325
Romania	National Liberal Party	5				0	0	0
Romania	Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania	6	6.2	6.2	6.2	0.372	0.372	0.372
Romania	Democratic Convention of Romania 2000	6				0	0	0
Score						**3.85878**	**3.85878**	**3.85878**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Slovakia	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	4.2	19.5	8.79	8.79	0.819	0.36918	0.36918
Slovakia	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union	5.22	15.1	18.35	18.35	0.78822	0.95787	0.95787
Slovakia	Party Direction–Third Way	4.6	13.5	29.14	29.14	0.621	1.34044	1.34044
Slovakia	Party of the Hungarian Coalition	5.3	11.2	11.68	11.68	0.5936	0.61904	0.61904
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	3.9	8.3	8.31	8.31	0.3237	0.32409	0.32409
Slovakia	Alliance for a New Citizen	5	8	1.42	1.42	0.4	0.071	0.071
Slovakia	Communist Party of Slovakia	3	6.3	3.88	3.88	0.189	0.1164	0.1164
Slovakia	Right Slovak National Party	2.33	3.7			0.08621	0	0
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	2.86	3.3	11.73	11.73	0.09438	0.335478	0.33548
Slovakia	Movement for Democracy	4.25	3.3	0.63	0.63	0.14025	0.02677	0.02678
Score						**4.05536**	**4.16027**	**4.16027**

Country	Party	S. for EFP	% Vote 2005	% Vote 2006	% Vote 2007	EFPS 05	EFPS 06	EFPS 07
Slovenia	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	5.5	22.8	22.8	22.8	1.254	1.254	1.254
Slovenia	Social Democratic Party of Slovenia	5.5	29.08	29.08	29.08	1.5994	1.5994	1.5994
Slovenia	United List of Social-Democrats	4.5	10.17	10.17	10.17	0.45765	0.45765	0.45765
Slovenia	Slovenian People's Party and Slovenian Christian Democrats	4.25	6.82	6.82	6.82	0.28985	0.28985	0.28985
Slovenia	New Slovenian Christian People's Party	4.5	9.09	9.09	9.09	0.40905	0.40905	0.40905
Slovenia	Democratic Party of Retired People of Slovenia	2.75	4.04	4.04	4.04	0.1111	0.1111	0.1111
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	2.25	6.27	6.27	6.27	0.141075	0.141075	0.14108
Slovenia	Party of the Slovenia Youth	5	2.08	2.08	2.08	0.104	0.104	0.104
Score						**4.36612**	**4.36612**	**4.36613**

Appendix 8 • Political Parties: Enlargement

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Belgium	Socialist Party (Walloon)	6.00	13.00	0.94317
Belgium	Socialist Party (Flemish)	5.44	14.90	0.8515
Belgium	Ecolo (ecologist)	6.20	3.10	0.155
Belgium	Agalev (ecologist)	5.67	2.50	0.1275
Belgium	Flemish Liberals and Democrats	4.20	11.40	1.05028
Belgium	Reformist Movement	5.00	15.40	0.78546
Belgium	Christian Social Party	4.20	5.50	0.3542
Belgium	Christian People's Party	3.56	13.30	0.88179
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance	2.89	3.10	0.155
Belgium	Flemish Block	1.00	11.60	0.319
Score				**5.6229**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Denmark	Social Democrats	3.88	25.9	1.0049
Denmark	Radical Left–Social Liberal Party	5.50	9.2	0.506
Denmark	Conservative People's Party	3.75	10.3	0.38625
Denmark	Socialist People's Party	4.63	6	0.2778
Denmark	Venstre, Liberal Party of Denmark	3.75	29	1.0875
Denmark	Unity List–Red-Green Alliance	4.50	3.40	0.231
Denmark	Danish People's Party	1.75	13.20	1.4245
Denmark	June Movement	3.29	–	–
Score				**3.64647**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Germany	Christian Democratic Union	2.36	32.6	0.69148
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany	4.73	38.4	1.71226
Germany	Free Democratic Party	4.60	4.7	0.4554
Germany	Alliance 90–The Greens	5.82	5.4	0.48306
Germany	Left Party–Party of Democratic Socialism	4.67	8	0.41096
Germany	Christian Social Union in Bavaria	1.64	8.2	0.123
Score				**3.87616**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	6.11	40.50	2.47455
Greece	New Democracy	6.00	45.20	2.712
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left	5.75	3.30	0.18975
Greece	Communist Party of Greece	2.57	5.90	0.15163
Greece	Democratic Social Movement	n/a	1.80	n/a
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	1.29	2.20	0.02838
Score				**5.55631**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	5.73	43.30	2.48109
Spain	People's Party	4.27	38.30	1.63541
Spain	United Left	4.71	5.30	0.24963
Spain	Convergence and Unity	4.13	3.30	0.13629
Spain	Basque Nationalist Party	4.50	1.60	0.072
Spain	Basque Solidarity	4.50	.30	0.0135
Spain	Republican Left of Catalonia	4.00	2.50	0.1
Spain	Galician Nationalist Bloc	4.20	.80	0.0336
Spain	Canarian Coalition	4.40	.90	0.0396
Spain	Aragonese Council	5.00	.40	0.02
Score				**4.78112**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
France	French Communist Party	4.38	4.80	0.21024
France	Socialist Party	4.44	24.10	1.07004
France	Left Radical Party	4.71	1.50	0.07065
France	Green Party	4.88	4.50	0.2196
France	Union for Popular Movement	1.78	33.70	0.59986
France	National Front	1.00	11.30	0.113
France	Movement for France	1.50	.80	0.012
France	Union for French Democracy	4.00	4.80	0.192
Score				**2.48739**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Ireland	Fianna Fáil	4.57	41.50	1.89655
Ireland	Fine Gael	4.86	22.50	1.0935
Ireland	Labour Party	5.00	10.80	0.54
Ireland	Green Party	4.29	3.80	0.16302
Ireland	Progressive Democrats	5.00	4.00	0.2
Ireland	Sinn Féin	4.17	6.50	0.27105
Score				**4.16412**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Italy	Democrats of the Left (in coalition with DL and MRE)	5.75	18.70	1.07525
Italy	Communist Refoundation Party	4.33	5.80	0.25114
Italy	National Alliance	3.57	12.30	0.43911
Italy	Italian Democratic Socialists (in coalition with RAD)	5.00	1.46	0.073
Italy	Federation of Greens	5.60	2.10	0.1176
Italy	Northern League	1.25	4.60	0.0575
Italy	Italian Radicals	5.76	1.05	0.06048
Italy	Union of Christian and Centre Democrats	4.33	6.80	0.29444
Italy	Forza Italia	5.38	23.70	1.27506
Italy	Daisy–Democracy is Freedom	5.63	10.90	0.61367
Italy	South Tyrolean People's Party	2.75	.50	0.01375
Italy	Italy of Values	4.25	2.30	0.09775
Italy	Popular–UDEUR	4.00	1.40	0.056

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Italy	Pensioners' Party	3.20	.90	0.0288
Italy	European Republican Movement	5.60	1.56	0.08736
Italy	New Italian Socialist Party	4.60	.80	0.0368
Italy	Party of Italian Communists	3.80	2.30	0.0874
Score				**4.66511**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	3.38	26.50	0.8957
Netherlands	Labour Party	4.88	21.20	1.03456
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	2.38	14.60	0.34748
Netherlands	Democrats 66	5.75	2.00	0.115
Netherlands	Green Left	5.25	4.60	0.2415
Netherlands	Socialist Party	2.00	16.30	0.326
Netherlands	Christian Union	2.33	4.00	0.0932
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	1.00	5.90	0.059
Score				**3.11244**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
UK	Conservative Party	4.13	35.30	1.45789
UK	Labour Party	5.75	32.30	1.85725
UK	Liberal Democratic Party	5.75	22.10	1.27075
UK	Scottish National Party	4.57	1.50	0.06855
UK	Plaid Cymru	4.71	.60	0.02826
UK	Green Party	4.50	1.00	0.045
UK	UK Independence Party	1.14	2.20	0.02508
Score				**4.75278**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Portugal	Unitarian Democratic Coalition	4.71	7.60	0.35796
Portugal	Democratic and Social Centre/ People's Party	3.29	7.30	0.24017
Portugal	Socialist Party	5.75	45.00	2.5875
Portugal	Democratic People's Party/Social Democratic Party	4.71	28.80	1.35648
Portugal	Left Bloc	5.29	6.40	0.33856
Score				**4.88067**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria	2.33	34.84	0.811772
Austria	Austrian People's Party	3.00	34.33	1.0299
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	1.00	11.04	0.1104
Austria	The Greens	5.17	11.05	0.571285
Austria	Liberal Forum	5.00	.52	0.026
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	1.00	4.11	0.0411
Austria	Hans-Peter Martin's List	1.75	2.80	0.049
Score				**2.639457**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Finland	Social Democratic Party of Finland	4.73	24.50	1.15885
Finland	National Coalition Party	4.36	18.60	0.81096
Finland	Finnish Centre Party	4.45	24.70	1.09915
Finland	Left Alliance	4.27	9.90	0.42273
Finland	True Finns	1.82	1.60	0.02912
Finland	Swedish People's Party	4.55	4.60	0.2093
Finland	Green League	4.73	8.00	0.3784
Finland	Christian Democrats	2.91	5.30	0.15423
Score				**4.26274**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Sweden	Left Party	5.86	5.85	0.34281
Sweden	Worker's Party–Social Democrats	5.89	34.99	2.060911
Sweden	Centre Party	5.67	7.88	0.446796
Sweden	Liberal People's Party	6.11	7.54	0.460694
Sweden	Moderate Party	5.78	26.23	1.516094
Sweden	Christian-Democrats	5.56	6.59	0.366404
Sweden	Environmental Party The Greens	5.86	5.24	0.307064
Sweden	June List	5.60	n/a	n/a
Score				**5.500773**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Bulgaria	National Movement Simeon ii	5.00	21.80	1.09
Bulgaria	United Democratic Forces	4.55	8.40	0.3822
Bulgaria	Coalition for Bulgaria	4.91	34.00	1.6694
Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	6.91	14.10	0.97431
Bulgaria	National Union Attack	1.00	8.90	0.089
Bulgaria	Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria	3.27	7.10	0.23217
Bulgaria	Bulgarian People's Union	4.00	5.70	
Score				**4.43708**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Czech Rep	Czech Social Democratic Party	5.25	32.30	1.69575
Czech Rep	Civic Democratic Party	6.00	35.40	2.124
Czech Rep	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	4.00	12.80	0.512
Czech Rep	Christian Democratic Union–Czechoslovak People's Party	3.33	7.20	0.23976
Czech Rep	Union of Independents–European Democrats	4.25	2.10	0.08925
Czech Rep	Green Party	4.80	6.30	0.3024
Czech Rep	Independents	n/a	.00	n/a
Score				**4.96316**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Estonia	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	n/a	31.93	n/a
Estonia	Estonian Centre Party	n/a	25.40	n/a
Estonia	Estonian Reform Party	n/a	17.69	n/a
Estonia	Social Democratic Party	n/a	7.04	n/a
Estonia	Constitution Party	n/a	2.25	n/a
Estonia	Estonian People's Union	n/a	13.03	n/a
Score				**n/a**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party	4.80	43.21	2.07408
Hungary	Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union	3.60	36.13	1.30068
Hungary	Hungarian Democratic Forum	3.50	5.04	0.1764
Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats	5.20	6.50	0.338
Hungary	Christian Democratic People's Party	2.20	5.90	0.1298
Score				**4.01896**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Latvia	New Era Party	5.25	16.38	0.85995
Latvia	For Human Rights in United Latvia	3.75	6.03	0.226125
Latvia	People's Party	6.00	19.56	1.1736
Latvia	Latvia's First Party	5.25	8.58	0.45045
Latvia	Union of Greens and Farmers	4.50	16.71	0.75195
Latvia	For Fatherland and Freedom	3.50	6.94	0.2429
Latvia	Latvian Social Democratic Labour Party	3.75	3.50	0.13125
Latvia	Latvian Way	6.00	n/a	
Latvia	Harmony Centre	4.50	14.42	0.6489
Score				**4.485125**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Lithuania	Social Democratic Party of Lithuania	4.50	13.36	0.6012
Lithuania	New Union (Social Liberals)	3.80	7.34	0.27892
Lithuania	Liberal and Centre Union	3.60	9.10	0.3276
Lithuania	Homeland Union	3.17	14.60	0.46282
Lithuania	Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union	3.40	6.60	0.2244
Lithuania	Election Action of Lithuania's Poles	3.75	3.80	0.1425
Lithuania	Order and Justice	3.17	11.40	0.36138
Lithuania	Labour Party	3.83	28.40	1.08772
Score				**3.48654**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Poland	Alliance of Democratic Left	4.67	11.30	0.52771
Poland	Civic Platform	4.33	24.10	1.04353
Poland	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland	3.00	11.40	0.342
Poland	Law and Justice Party	2.33	27.00	0.6291
Poland	Polish People's Party	4.00	7.00	0.28
Poland	League of Polish Families	1.67	8.00	0.1336
Poland	Democratic Party	5.00	2.50	0.125
Poland	Social Democracy of Poland	4.67	3.90	0.18213
Score				**3.26307**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Romania	Social Democratic Party	4.50	31.50	1.4175
Romania	Conservative Party	4.00	5.30	0.212
Romania	Party of Great Romania	3.13	13.00	0.4069
Romania	Democratic Party	4.75	13.50	0.64125
Romania	National Liberal Party	4.38	18.00	0.7884
Romania	Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania	3.75	6.20	0.2325
Romania	Democratic Forum of Germans of Romania	4.33	n/a	n/a
Score				**3.69855**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Slovakia	People's Party–Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	4.15	8.79	0.364785
Slovakia	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union–Democratic Party	4.77	18.35	0.875295
Slovakia	Direction–Social Democracy	4.92	29.14	1.433688
Slovakia	Party of the Hungarian Coalition	4.62	11.63	0.537306
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	1.69	8.31	0.140439
Slovakia	Communist Party of Slovakia	3.60	3.88	0.13968
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	2.00	11.73	0.2346
Slovakia	Free Forum	4.50	3.47	0.15615
Score				**3.881943**

Country	Party	Turkish Enlargement	Vote	Weight
Slovenia	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	5.00	22.80	1.14
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	5.67	29.10	1.64997
Slovenia	United List of Social Democrats	5.33	10.20	0.54366
Slovenia	Slovenian People's Party	4.67	6.80	0.31756
Slovenia	New Slovenia–Christian People's Party	5.00	9.00	0.45
Slovenia	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia	3.67	4.00	0.1468
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	1.67	6.30	0.10521
Slovenia	Active Slovenia	4.00	3.00	0.12
Score				**4.4732**

Appendix 9 • GDP per Capita

Country	2003[5]	2004	2005	2006
EU-27	20.65866	21.58573	22.3858	23.50267
Belgium	26.48579	27.80951	28.8303	30.01724
Bulgaria	2.277427	2.560918	2.834954	3.268533
Czech Republic	7.93246	8.64727	9.80251	11.10593
Denmark	34.97222	36.30546	38.43281	40.4934
Germany	26.22152	26.8021	27.21915	28.19367
Estonia	6.4105	7.06625	8.31881	9.84133
Ireland	34.93139	36.58403	38.92773	41.07497
Greece	15.53563	16.74083	17.92058	19.22886
Spain	18.63913	19.70032	20.9329	22.25991
France	25.70548	26.58654	27.34751	28.35572
Italy	23.18133	23.90257	24.2812	25.06496
Cyprus	16.26248	17.16705	17.98446	18.85489
Latvia	4.29079	4.83214	5.65674	7.07086
Lithuania	4.76319	5.27527	6.05541	6.98921
Luxembourg	56.95284	59.89775	64.55735	71.615
Hungary	7.37265	8.14491	8.81464	8.92639
Malta	11.09583	11.17144	11.73337	12.38959
Netherlands	29.39931	30.17842	31.19225	32.69837
Austria	27.86179	28.88769	29.79726	31.13967
Poland	5.01751	5.349307	6.404971	7.121302
Portugal	13.27273	13.7239	14.10994	14.65023
Romania	2.420767	2.807268	3.678849	4.498018
Slovenia	12.68756	13.38783	14.12026	15.16652
Slovakia	5.4335	6.29146	7.0749	8.15174
Finland	27.99501	29.14411	29.96359	31.72284
Sweden	30.09024	31.25679	31.86116	33.69553
United Kingdom	27.13477	29.16487	29.96755	31.54843

Appendix 10 • Unemployment

Country	2005 q04[6]	2006 q01	2006 q02	2006 q03	2006 q04	2007 q01	2007 q02	2007 q03
Belgium	8.4	8.7	8.3	8.1	7.9	7.9	7.6	7.2
Bulgaria	9.9	9.7	9	8.8	8.4	8	6.8	6.6
Czech Republic	7.8	8	7.1	7	6.5	6	5.3	5.1
Denmark	4	4.5	3.9	3.7	3.5	4.4	3.6	4
Germany	10.7	11.2	10.1	9.7	9.7	9.4	8.5	8.4
Estonia	7	6.4	6.2	5.4	5.6	5.3	5	4.2
Ireland	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.8	4.1	4.2	4.6	4.8
Greece	9.7	9.7	8.8	8.3	8.8	9.1	8.1	7.9
Spain	8.7	9.1	8.5	8.1	8.3	8.5	8	8
France	9.3	9.4	8.5	8.7	8.6	8.7	7.7	7.8
Italy	8	7.6	6.5	6.1	6.9	6.4	5.7	5.6
Cyprus	5.2	5.9	4.1	4	4.2	4.8	3.4	4
Latvia	7.8	7.8	7.2	6.2	6.1	6.9	6	5.9
Lithuania	7.1	6.4	5.6	5.7	4.8	5	4.1	3.9
Luxembourg	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.6	3.9	4
Hungary	7.3	7.7	7.2	7.5	7.5	7.5	7	7.2
Malta	7.3	7.8	7.7	6.8	6.7	6.8	6.6	6.2
Netherlands	4.4	4.5	3.9	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.2	2.9
Austria	5.1	5.5	4.7	4.3	4.5	4.6	4.4	4.6
Poland	16.7	16.1	14.1	13	12.2	11.3	9.6	9
Portugal	8	7.7	7.3	7.4	8.2	8.4	7.9	7.9
Romania	6.8	7.8	7	7	7.2	7	6.5	6
Slovenia	7.2	6.9	5.9	5.5	5.6	5.6	4.5	4.4
Slovakia	15.4	15	13.5	12.9	12.1	11.7	11.2	11.3
Finland	7.6	8.4	8.9	6.8	6.8	7.6	7.7	6
Sweden	7.1	7.9	8	6.3	6	6.8	6.9	5.5
United Kingdom	5	5.1	5.3	5.6	5.3	5.4	5.2	5.4

Notes

Chapter 1

1 For the most recent figures on missions and operations of the European Union see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=en.
2 With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
3 There is a third factor, 'rhetorical commitments', that at least in enlargement has also been relevant (see: Schimmelfennig 2001).
4 In enlargement, for example, O'Brennan argues that '[t]he differentiated sharing responsibilities across the Council meant that enlargement decisions were discussed, deliberated, problematized and negotiated in a context where such territorial and social divisions weakened the coherence of Council positions. In addition to confusing the candidate states as to desired modes of action this fragmentation of power ensured that the Commission enjoyed a much greater role in policy and in the negotiations than the treaty provisions suggested' (2006: 180).

Chapter 2

1 It is composed of officials from permanent diplomatic representations.
2 It comprises the permanent representatives and its functions are the areas of General Affairs and External Relations (e.g. European security and defence policy and development cooperation); Economic and Financial Affairs (e.g. the budget); and Justice and Home Affairs (e.g. civil protection).
3 The General Affairs and External Relations Council, as part of the Council, deals with both general affairs such as enlargement and budget or administrative issues; and external relation issues like CFSP, ESDP, foreign trade, and development cooperation. Meetings bring together the foreign ministers of the MS plus the ministers in charge of European affairs, defence, trade, or development, depending on the issues being discussed.
4 Though Bulgaria and Romania only joined the EU in 2007, they have participated in ESDP missions throughout the period covered. Moreover, Eurobarometer surveys have included these two countries. This means that the information and data required for these new members are available for the time frame being considered.

Chapter 3

1 At the time of writing, the Lisbon Treaty had just entered into force. Consequently, none of the cases considered falls under the CSDP. Therefore, the acronym used throughout the book is ESDP and not CSDP.
2 Given that this principle is highly problematic, there are several options under discussion, such as establishing common funding for all missions based on a distribution principle. Most options aim, at least, at being able to share the financial burden of missions. So far, however, the problem remains unresolved.

3 Besides the bibliographical references cited, this section draws on interviews carried out with officials from the Commission and the Permanent Representations in Brussels during the month of October 2007; and with high-ranking officials and diplomats from MS and the Council Secretariat during a Wilton Park conference on European foreign policies that took place in June 2007. Due to the Chatham House rules that apply in Wilton Park, and the fact that interviews conducted in Brussels were anonymous, none of the interviewees' names or their affiliation is disclosed.

4 The Austrian parliament has delegated its right to approve to a standing committee. The government may, in cases of urgency, authorise deployment without parliamentary approval (Wagner 2006: 205).

5 In Sweden, the government may deploy troops without parliamentary approval 'if the deployment takes place within the framework of multilateral security institutions' (Wagner 2006: 205).

6 Germany is sometimes considered to be less of a heavyweight given its internal constraints.

7 For example, in Africa, for long one of the most important areas of French foreign policy, French influence has diminished over time. The EU is seen as the means of keeping this influence (Stark 2006: 18-19).

8 This table takes into consideration both the literature that has been discussed in this section, and other sources such as the Chapel Hill Survey (see section 3.3) in identifying party positions, and the Eurobarometer in identifying public attitudes as well as those of the mass media. On the basis of the literature, an evaluation is made of whether a Member State supports primarily the development of NATO or ESDP, and whether it supports the development of military or civilian capabilities in ESDP. Finally, examples of the main missions in which a given MS has been present are provided.

9 Interview with Gustav Lindstrom at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), 2 July 2008.

10 Available at http://www.cap.lmu.de/transatlantic/download/khol.doc.

11 The chapter looks at civilian and mixed civilian-military ESDP operations that took place or were deployed in the period September 2005 to December 2007. This time frame has been selected mainly on the basis of the availability of information. Personnel numbers are not publicly available and have been obtained from the Council's secretariat. Information previous to 2005 is not available, and the data required for the statistical model developed in section 4.5 becomes patchy after December 2007. Nevertheless, the period selected covers the majority of ESDP missions to date and hence reduces possible biases that this selection might entail.

12 EUPM has consisted of different missions. This study briefly covers EUPM 1 (January 2003 to December 2005) and focuses mainly on EUPM 2 (January 2006 to December 2007). While EUPM 1 focused on security sector reform, EUPM 2 (and EUPM 3) has focused on reforms to upgrade the capacity of local police forces (Merlingen 2009). In particular, these missions have aimed at improving the police-prosecutor interface, since prosecutors in Bosnia are the main elements in criminal investigations. The lack of good relations between police and the courts was one of the main problems in EUPM 1 that EUPM 2 aimed at overcoming.

13 Its main aim was the stabilization of the country through support of Macedonian authorities in improving law and order in the country. This meant supporting security sector reform, particularly the police, border police, criminal police, counter-intelligence, and internal control agencies. A crucial element of security sector reform was ensuring equitable representation of minorities in the police. Flessenkemper's study shows that this was an essential part of the effort to overcome mistrust following the inter-ethnic conflict that occurred in

the first half of 2001. The Macedonian police and other law enforcement agencies had reinforced a feeling of alienation amongst the Albanian population, which led to the outbreak of violence, almost leading to a civil war.

14 These were: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.

15 It was deployed from April 2005 to June 2007 and evolved into EUPOL DRC, which is an ongoing operation. The main aim of the mission was easing the political transition after the violence that ravaged the country between 1996 and 2002 through 'supporting the establishment of the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in charge of the protection of state institutions and reinforcing the internal security apparatus' (Vircoulon 222).

16 This mission followed EUFOR and EUPOL operations. Its objective was to help in the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and in their integration into the military (Martinelli 2008).

17 An interesting example of the link between domestic dynamics and ESDP missions is the case of Denmark in Aceh. The publication of the Muhammad cartoons in Danish papers in January and February 2006 seems to have affected Danish participation in the AMM mission. As the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia seemed a dangerous location for Danish personnel once the cartoons were published. Based on personnel figures obtained from the Council, it is clear that Denmark had been amongst the most active MS in Aceh. However, in March 2006, just one month after the cartoons were published, it cut its deployed personnel by half; by the end of the mission its presence had all but disappeared.

18 The cases have been selected to illustrate the diversity of preferences amongst the MS, from those strongly supporting ESDP, such as the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, to those that are more sceptical, such as the UK and Sweden.

19 The wording of the question is as follows: 'What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common defence and security policy among EU Member States.' The responses considered are those in favour.

20 The wording of the question is as follows: 'Do you think that the (National) media presents the European Union too positively, objectively, or too negatively?' The responses are: a) too positively, b) objectively, c) too negatively. The first two responses have been aggregated to generate this variable.

21 Cases displayed in this graph have been selected to show the diversity that exists amongst MS. Cases that were too similar to the ones already presented were omitted.

22 I have selected cases in which either support decreased substantially (Netherlands), increased substantially (France), showed almost no variation (Slovakia), or had significant variation (Poland).

23 The wording of the question is as follows: 'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? The national government.' The possible responses are: a) tend to trust, b) tend not to trust, and c) n/a. I have used the percentage of respondents that responded 'tend to trust'.

24 Information was obtained from Eurostat.

25 http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=121.GST.Q.I5.N.D1300.DEF.D0000.CU.G.

26 Comprising all twenty-seven Member States.

27 No quarterly data on deficits is available for Belgium. Hence, in this case, only twenty-six Member States have been considered.

28 The Chapel Hill Survey does not include Luxembourg, Malta, or Cyprus, and there is no available data on deficits for Belgium, hence only twenty-three MS have been considered.
29 As in the previous case, only twenty-three MS were considered, due to the lack of data for Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus.
30 Belgium not included.
31 Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus not included.
32 Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus not included.
33 Belgium not included.
34 Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus not included.
35 Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus not included.
36 Even though Sweden was participating in the EUPM operation in Bosnia, and around this time personnel requirements for the mission were halved, the reduction of deployed personnel affected by this event only explains a small part of the overall drop.
37 Czech Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra declared that on the one hand the issue of the missile defence shield should not be decided by a referendum, but on the other hand, as he said: 'I cannot imagine the US Congress not changing the visa regime in connection with the missile defence site in the Czech Republic' (Czech News Agency, 4 September 2006).

Chapter 4

1 A few examples to illustrate this point: France changed its constitution to require a referendum for any further enlargement, and French President Sarkozy made his opposition to Turkey a central element of his election campaign. Angela Merkel also campaigned widely under the premise of a 'privileged partnership' towards Turkey. The UK imposed labour restrictions on immigration from Romania and Bulgaria, in large part as a reaction to the huge influx of immigrants from the 2004 enlargement. Ireland followed suit as the two states have a common travel area. British Conservatives have profited from the immigration issue, since they made it a central (if at best partially successful) component in the run-up to the 2005 election. More recently, Gordon Brown included the immigration issue on Labour's agenda. The immigration issue also played an important role in the 2010 election. The Dutch have significantly altered their position towards enlargement and the EU as the economic consequences of enlargement, together with immigration fears, have spurred a vocal domestic debate. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by both Dutch and French voters has been attributed in part to the unease of voters about further enlargement. More recently, Italy has challenged the free movement of people within the Union because of security concerns, and has repatriated Romanian citizens on these grounds. Radical right parties have increased their presence in parliaments throughout Europe, leading to right-wing shifts in political parties on issues such as immigration.
2 Its public support decreased as the 2004 enlargement approached. This, nevertheless, seems explicable when the position taken by the Greek-Cypriot government towards the 'Annan Referendum', which was supported by the EU and aimed at the island's reunification, is taken into account. Turkish-Cypriots strongly supported this plan, but it was to a large extent rejected by Greek-Cypriots, given the vocal opposition of the Greek-Cypriot government to the plan. This suggests that public preferences react in a rational way, which goes against one of the main claims of the 'Almond-Lippmann consensus', which is that public opinion is volatile and irrational.
3 It is conceivable that the wider support for some countries was a result of their earlier engagement in the accession process. After all, Helmut Kohl had promised and set a date for Polish accession early on, and with it, Hungarian and Czech accession (O'Brennan 2006). However,

if this were the case, one would expect relative changes in public support over time. That support was stable overall, and that the differences in support between different candidate countries were remarkably constant, suggests otherwise.

4 Together with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the two main entities that form Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5 A dual process of economic modernization and of democratization began in 1983, when a civilian government returned to power. The economic reforms started with the coup in 1980 under the pressure and tutelage of the EC, the World Bank, and the IMF. The military appointed Turgut Özal as Prime Minister, a competent technocrat with strong links to Washington institutions. Özal used the aim of EC membership to introduce extensive economic reforms and to loosen the grip of the military, allowing for an opening of the political space (Ahmad 1993). This facilitated the rise of a new class of entrepreneurs who fundamentally transformed Turkish society and supported both the democratization process and the surge of Islamist and Kurdish parties. This process also consolidated Özal's grip on power; he comfortably won the 1987 elections and began to roll back the reforms introduced by the military in 1980. Özal was also able to block the presidential bid by Necdet Üruğ, one of the generals who staged the 1980 coup (Dodd 1992). This was hailed by the press as a civilian coup.

6 For example, see the recent discussion unleashed by Soner Cagaptay's article in *Foreign Affairs*: 'Is Turkey Leaving the West?', *Foreign Affairs* (26 October 2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65634/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west.

7 European Commission: Turkey 2011 progress report. Accessed November 2011. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf.

8 Euroactiv, 29 July 2010. 'Iceland Starts EU Talks while Turkey's Bid Remains on Ice' available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/iceland-starts-eu-talks-while-turkeys-bid-remains-ice-news-496730.

9 European Commission: Turkey 2011 progress report. Accessed November 2011. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf.

10 See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/positionep/pdf/ep_role_en.pdf.

11 For a detailed description of the process in the case of Croatia, see: http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/files/Progress-in-EU-Croatia-accession-negotiations-M.pdf.

12 A copy of the first two parts of the report, those consisting of the factual components, is sent to the candidate country as well.

13 A fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs**QCA**) is a methodological tool of macro-comparative research (Ragin 2000). It assesses causal relations on the basis of necessary and sufficient conditions. This approach is particularly well-suited to cases in which the outcome is theorized to result from combinations of conditions and not necessarily from single conditions (see Ragin 1987; Schneider/Wagemann 2007; Rihoux/Ragin 2008). In this respect, an important difference exists with regression analysis, since fs**QCA** does not assume independence amongst explanatory variables. fs**QCA** assumes that interactions amongst specific causal factors exist, that is, that conditions might be sufficient only in combination with other conditions ('conjunctural causation'); furthermore, it allows for different combinations of factors to lead to the same outcome or what is known as 'equifinal causation' (Schneider/Wagemann 2010). An fs**QCA** approach is particularly useful as an empirical theory test of ex ante 'most likely' causal configurations deduced on the basis of particular assumptions or hypotheses (see e.g. Blatter/Kreutzer/Rentl/Thiele 2010). Following this view, the main

assumptions and hypotheses that have been described in the third chapter are recapitulated below, paying particular attention to their applicability in a causal-configurative setting. A further aspect considered is the risk of having too many variables (conditions). Marx (2006) shows that if few cases are analysed with too many variables, only limited conclusions may be drawn. Fortunately, given the large number of cases included in the study (29), and following the criteria defined by Marx, the results obtained may not be randomly generated and thus can be considered to be valid.

14 See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0cc72202-bb7f-11df-a136-00144feab49a.html. Accessed 10 September 2010.

15 This measure was coded using trade figures from the CIA World Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_eur.html>. The condition took the value of 0 in cases where Turkey was not an important trade partner and 1 where it was a very important trade partner. Cutting points at 0.4 reflected where it was a minor trade partner, 0.6 a medium trade partner, and 0.8 a significant trade partner. Turkey is a very important trade partner (amongst the top five export markets for a given Member State) for Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. It is a medium trade partner (when a given Member State was among the top five markets of origin of Turkish imports, but for which Turkey is not one of its top five export markets) for France, Germany, and Italy. For the rest of the MS Turkey is not an important trade partner in any of the measures stated above.

16 The condition measuring mass media coverage is coded through Eurobarometer surveys. The wording of the question is as follows. 'Do you think that the (national) media present the European Union too positively, objectively, or too negatively?' Responses are: a) too positively, b) objectively, c) too negatively. The first two responses have been aggregated to generate this variable. The average for the Eurobarometer question on positive mass media coverage is 25 per cent. In order to calibrate this variable, if responses fall well under the 25 per cent average, they are coded as zero. In those cases where they are over 20 but below 25 per cent, they are coded as 0.4. If answers were between 25 and 30 per cent, they are coded as 0.6. Finally, those cases that exceed 30 per cent of positive coverage are coded as one.

17 This condition has been generated with data from Eurobarometer surveys. Eurobarometer 69: Fieldwork March-May 2008. Percentage of respondents in favour of Turkey joining the EU. Responses to the question of whether Turkey should join the Union or not range from 71 per cent in favour (Sweden) to only 16 per cent favourable opinions, that is, strong opposition (Austria). The average is 45 per cent in favour. Cases where public opinion is strongly favourable to Turkish enlargement (over 55 per cent in favour) have been coded as one. If public opinion tends to be favourable (between 46 and 55 per cent in favour), the condition takes the value of 0.6. Where public opinion tends to be against (between 36 and 45 per cent in favour), the condition takes the value of 0.4. Finally, if public opinion is strongly opposed (35 per cent or less in favour) the condition takes the value of zero.

18 This condition has been created using data from the 2006 Chapel Hill Survey. The survey was administered in the summer of 2007 and included 528 academics specializing in political parties and European integration (see Hooghe et al. 2010). A weighted index using each party and its electoral score was constructed for each Member State. Survey scores measure support of a given party for Turkish membership of the EU; they range from one (lowest) to seven (highest). The weighted index average is 4.14. Values over 4.7 have been coded as one. Values between the average and 4.7 have been coded as 0.6. Values between the average and 3.7 have been coded as 0.4. Values of less than 3.7 are coded as zero. Examples of the highest values observed are: Greece (5.55) and Sweden (5.50). The lowest are those of France under Sarkozy (2.48) and Austria (2.63).

19 This condition is based on question 7_11 of the Eurobarometer survey, which asks respondents the degree of trust they have in their government. In the aim of consistency, and since the Chapel Hill Survey was carried out in the summer of 2007, I have taken data from Eurobarometer 67 (fieldwork April-May 2007). The governments of the Netherlands and Finland enjoy the highest level of approval (over 70 per cent) while New Member States (e.g. Latvia, Poland, Romania) tend to have the lowest approval (around 20 per cent). The average of the EU-27 is 45 per cent. The variable is coded as one in cases where approval is high (over 55 per cent); as 0.6 where it is between 45 and 55 per cent; as 0.4 where it is less than 45 per cent but more than 35; and as zero where it is less than 35 per cent.

20 Using Tsebelis' (1995; 2002) notion of partisan veto players I have considered the number of parties that form a government and the ideological distances between them when forming an index. The rationale for this is that veto players are likely to exert the strongest influence when a government relies on their support to keep itself in power. In those cases where veto players exist, the condition has been coded as one. In cases where no significant veto players exist, it is coded as zero. I looked at the number of coalition partners that formed a government in 2006 as it is the reference year for the fs**QCA** analysis. I used data from the Chapel Hill Survey on party positions towards Turkish enlargement when measuring ideological distances between coalition parties.

21 The results presented are those of the positive outcome (that is, those conditions or combinations of them that explain support to accession). The absence of outcome (negative outcome) or the lack of support for accession has also been tested. It leads to consistency scores significantly below the .75 acceptance level and hence it is not possible to indicate that a clear set-theoretic relationship exists. These results are nevertheless provided in the appendices and are commonsensical (the tests for necessary conditions are also included).

22 In the fs**QCA** analysis, two alternative combinations of prime implicants were present: me ~po pp ~vp ~ei, and me pp ga ~vp ~ei. The second solution is closer to theoretical expectations, given that both domestic factors and economic interdependence are expected to have a positive effect on support (consistency scores are also stronger). The solution's consistency coefficient is within the limit defined (.9). Furthermore, the single solutions also show high consistency coefficients. Coverage, at 70 per cent, is significant; that of the individual solutions varies between 8 per cent and 18 per cent.

23 See, for example: 'Altkanzler Schröder und FDP kritisieren Merkels Türkei-Politik', *Die Zeit*, 31 March 2010. Available at: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2010-03/schroeder-merkel-tuerkei-kritik.

Chapter 5

1 'Since 2004 I have not changed my views. The Europe which accepted the start of accession negotiations continues to be faithful to its principles of "uniting different peoples, cultures, and beliefs". If Turkey wants to be part of Europe, that shows that in effect it wishes to modernise itself' (author's translation). 'Depuis 2004 mon point de vue n'a pas changé. L'Europe qui a accepté d'entamer les négociations d'adhésion à part entière de la Turquie, reste fidèle à ses principes "réunir les différents peuples, cultures et croyances". Si la Turquie veut faire partie de l'Europe, cela prouve en effet qu'elle veut se moderniser'. See: Une Lettre de François Hollande aux Turcs de France. Available at: http://www.armenews.com/article.php3?id_article=79302. Accessed July 2012.

Appendices

1 See: http://middleeast.about.com/od/cyprus/a/Cyprus-politics-government.htm.

2 The wording of the question is as follows. 'What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common defence and security policy among EU Member States.' The responses considered are those in favour.

3 The wording of the question is as follows. 'Do you think that the (National) media presents the European Union too positively, objectively or too negatively?' The responses are: a) too positively, b) objectively, c) too negatively. I tested for both the 'too positively' answer and aggregating 'too positively' and 'objectively' as a single variable to test for the impact of positive mass media. Both cases led to the same results.

4 The wording of the question is as follows. 'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?' Response choices are: a) tend to trust, b) tend not to trust, and c) not applicable.

5 *Source*: Eurostat. Note: quarterly data is used in the model. Annual figures provided as illustration.

6 *Source*: Eurostat. Date of extraction: Thursday, 19 June 2008.

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